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The research underlying this book was made possible by two differ-
ent grants. First, studies of the implementation of international
environmental agreements in Russia constituted part of the Fridtjof
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Military Threat to Norway: Mechanisms for Problem Solving at the
International, National and Sub-National Level’, financed by the
Norwegian Ministry of Defence for the years 2000–2001. The book
also partly builds on our previous research on Northwest Russian
politics, particularly in the spheres of fisheries management, nuclear
safety, federalism and civil–military relations.
We are indebted to a number of colleagues and partners for input
to and feedback on our research. Our work on Russian fisheries
management has been carried out together with Frode Nilssen at the
Norwegian Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture. Likewise, we
have worked closely together with our colleagues Arild Moe and
Steven Sawhill on the study of nuclear safety issues in Russia. Our
more generalised focus on Russian politics has in recent years bene-
fited from collaboration with the Centre for Russian Studies at the
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and, in particular, with
its director Helge Blakkisrud. Olav Schram Stokke, research direc-
tor of the FNI and project leader of the above-mentioned strategic
institute programme, helped formulate the book’s research topic
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phrase that the authors take full responsibility for the contents of the
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Lykke Ragner for cartography, Chris Saunders for language editing
and Maryanne Rygg for the final editing of the text.
In the transcription of Russian words into Latin characters, we
have tried to pay attention both to general practice and consistency.
Although we wanted to give consistency the upper hand, we have
occasionally allowed exceptions in order not to depart from what
might be considered general practice. While the Russian ë is gener-
ally transcribed as yo, we maintain customary English transcriptions
– such as Gorbachev, for instance. Russian e is written as ye at the
beginning of words and after vowels. Nevertheless, we skip the y in
proper names that already have a common spelling in English, e.g.
Karelia. The Russian hard and soft signs are not transcribed. 
The names of Russian organisations are generally rendered in
English translation rather than by their Russian acronyms, which
would probably bring little meaning to readers without any Russian.
Exceptions are made in the case of organisations whose full names
are seldom used in Russian. For instance, we write the State Com-
mittee for Fisheries (instead of the more colloquial Goskomryba),
but maintain acronyms such as Sevryba and Murmanrybvod. All
translations from the Russian and Norwegian are by the authors.
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How do Russian authorities go about implementing their international
environmental obligations? This question, indicating the present
book’s main topic of study, implies that implementation is here under-
stood as the political processes taking place at the national, and
possibly the sub-national, level after the conclusion of agreements or
establishment of regimes at the international level. In the literature on
international environmental agreements, processes at the domestic
level are receiving increased attention.1 After an initial main focus
on regime formation,2 the literature has in recent years come to be
dominated by studies of regime effectiveness and the implementation,
including processes at the domestic level, of provisions laid down by
international regimes.3 Moreover, the issue of regime linkages is also
gradually coming to the fore,4 i.e., how various regimes are linked to
each other normatively and structurally,5 and how national authorities
economise efforts by giving the same agency responsibility for imple-
menting the provisions of various international agreements. While the
questions of regime effectiveness and linkages at the regime level are
not explicitly discussed in this book, the study does aim at providing
an in-depth analysis of implementation processes at the national and
sub-national level in Russia, including the linkage of issues by agencies
at these levels.
Why focus on Russia? To answer with a cliché, Russia is a former
superpower, and still the world’s largest country, and hence deserves
attention in all matters involving Russian interests or possible impli-
cations for the outside world of policy choices made in Russia. In
the realm of environmental politics, this is particularly true: the
outside world cannot simply fence itself off from transboundary
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environmental problems originating in Russia. This leads us to a
second reason for the choice of focus: post-Soviet Russia is, in an
international context, particularly hard hit by environmental degra-
dation and resource depletion. The plan economy of the Soviet
Union did not pay sufficient attention to the sustainability of the
environment and natural resources and large parts of the country’s
natural environment were in a dire state when the Union was dis-
solved in 1991. Several of these problems, in particular air pollution
and the danger of nuclear radiation, are of a transboundary charac-
ter and of such gravity that they pose serious threats to the outside
world.6 Moreover, post-Soviet Russian politics have more than any-
thing been characterised by chaos and unpredictability; all the more
interesting is it then to see whether relatively stable policy patterns
can be found across various cases in Russian environmental politics. 
Finally, although there has been a certain amount of attention in
the literature on the implementation of international environmental
agreements in so-called transition economies,7 there has been little
systematic study of such implementation processes in Russia that
covers more than a few areas and analyses of more overarching
political development trends in the country.8 While students of inter-
national environmental politics have tended to concentrate on West-
ern states and countries in the third world, observers of Russian
politics have generally been preoccupied by following the day-to-
day political battle in Moscow and the Russian regions, and have
only to a very limited extent delved into specific areas of politics
such as environmental issues.9 Hence, the present study seeks to fill
a gap in the existing literature by providing both a systematic in-
depth analysis of various cases from the management of natural
resources and the environment and linking the discussion closely to
general trends in contemporary Russian politics.
The book includes case studies from the fields of fisheries manage-
ment,10 nuclear safety and air pollution control in Northwestern
Russia,11 here understood as Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts,
and, to some extent, also the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (see Figure
1.1).12 The Russian Federation inherited the federal structure of the
Soviet Union and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR) and today consists of 89 federal subjects. The relationship
between Moscow and the federal subjects has been a main issue of
contention in Russian politics since the establishment of the Federa-
tion in 1991.13 Hence, the division of responsibility between federal
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and regional authorities will necessarily be a major concern in a study
of the implementation of international environmental obligations in
the regions of Russia, as will co-ordination of work between various
agencies at both the federal and the regional level. Northwestern
Russia is a good case in point for an in-depth analysis since it in many
respects represents a microcosm of the Russian Federation. Most
important in this context, it epitomises an ‘exaggerated’ version of
Russia as a whole with its abundant natural resources and extremely
grave environmental conditions. 
What is the problem?
If asked to characterise the northwestern part of the Russian Federa-
tion in one or two phrases, it would be difficult to avoid a depiction
of the region as both blessed with extremely bountiful natural
resources and, at the same time, bedevilled by grave environmental
problems. The region, a northern periphery partly located north of
the Arctic Circle, owes the existence of its human settlements largely
to the presence of natural resources. In the southern parts of the
region, mainly in today’s Arkhangelsk Oblast, forestry has for cen-
turies constituted the foundation for life.14 In the more barren
Murmansk Oblast, which geographically corresponds to the Kola
Peninsula, fisheries and mining provided the industrial foundation for
the creation of large human settlements after World War I, rendering
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Figure 1.1 Northwestern Russia
the region the most densely populated area of the Circumpolar Arctic
during the last half of the twentieth century.15 The fishing grounds of
the adjacent Barents Sea are among the most productive in the world,
and the mineral deposits of the Kola Peninsula, mainly iron ore, nickel
and apatite, are remarkable for their richness.16 From the 1920s
onwards, massive fishing fleets were built up in the region and, at the
time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, Murmansk had the largest
fish-processing plant in the entire Union.17 Town names such as Nikel
and Apatity, for their part, indicate the importance of the mining and
metallurgical complex in the region. 
The extraction of natural resources and the accompanying mili-
tary build-up have, however, taken place at the expense of environ-
mental considerations. Since the 1990s, Northwestern Russia has
been more renowned for its environmental degradation than for its
abundant resources.18 Since Western journalists were gradually given
easier access to this heavily militarised region from the mid-1980s,
the black tree stumps of the dying forests around Nikel and
Monchegorsk have come to symbolise the sullen environmental
state of Russia to many in the West. The nickel smelters of these two
towns had virtually killed the forests surrounding them and served
as sources of pollution also for the neighbouring Nordic countries
and other parts of Russia. ‘Stop the death clouds!’ became the slogan
of environmental organisations in the Nordic countries in the early
1990s. The Nordic countries had plans for gigantic assistance pro-
grammes to reduce the pollution spewing out of the production
plants of the mining and metallurgical complex of Northwestern
Russia, but nothing has come of these plans so far.19 Financial hard-
ship has forced the plants to cut back on activities in recent years,
though without affecting the alarming rate of air pollution in the
European Arctic to any significant extent.
Throughout the 1990s, another environmental threat in the region
upstaged air pollution as a focus of public concern, namely the danger
of radiation from nuclear installations, discarded nuclear vessels,
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The fire on board and sub-
sequent sinking of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets of the Russian
Northern Fleet southwest of Bear Island in the Barents Sea in April
1989 was a further wake-up call for the European public to the
danger of nuclear radiation from nuclear-powered vessels stationed in
Northwestern Russia.20 Towards the end of 1990, rumours emerged
that the Soviet Union had been dumping radioactive material in the
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Barents and Kara Seas.21 The rumours were officially confirmed in a
Russian parliamentary report a few years later (Yablokov et al. 1993).
A major problem in the latter half of the 1990s was the build-up of
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in Northwestern Russia.
Existing storage facilities were full, and there were no safe vehicles to
transport the radioactive material out of the region for reprocessing
or permanent storage. Moreover, financial constraints have forced the
Northern Fleet to decommission large quantities of nuclear-powered
vessels in recent years.22 Rumours are also circulating about the unsafe
functioning of vessels still in service (Hønneland and Jørgensen
1999a). The Kursk accident of August 2000, albeit mainly a human
tragedy, functioned as a reminder of the potential dangers residing in
the Northern Fleet’s nuclear-powered vessels, not least to the envi-
ronment. Although radiation levels in the region are at present low,
there are considerable risks connected with the unsatisfactory storage
of radioactive waste, decommissioned nuclear submarines awaiting
dismantling and the continued operation of unsafe nuclear power
installations, notably the Kola Nuclear Power Plant at Polyarnye Zori.
Finally, signs of resource depletion have recently been emerging
in the region, most notably in the Barents Sea fisheries.23 These
fisheries, managed bilaterally by Russia and Norway since the mid-
1970s, had for many years been seen as a management success. At
the turn of the millennium, however, the Norwegian–Arctic cod
stock, by far the most commercially important species in the area,
appeared to be in severe crisis. Some would have it that the situation
is similar for the management system itself due to the dire state of its
main object of regulation. There are indeed reasons for such an alle-
gation: scientists are uncertain as to the size of the stock; managers
do not follow the advice of the scientists in the establishment of
quotas; and the enforcement system, at least on the Russian side,
seems poorly fit to keep track of actual catch levels and avoid fish-
ing of juvenile specimens. As will follow from Chapter 4, many of
these problems can be directly related to more general developments
in Russian society and politics.
What is to be implemented?
The environmental problems of Northwestern Russia are directly or
indirectly addressed by a number of international treaties, agreements,
regimes and other co-operative arrangements. Some of these are
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global instruments that happen to have implications for the particular
problems of the region; others are specifically aimed at solving them.
In some cases, specific arrangements are linked to more general instru-
ments at the global level. Moreover, some are ‘hard’, legally binding
arrangements and others ‘softer’ approaches of a more programmatic
character. Both legally binding and non-binding instruments are
included in the present study.24
An overview is given below of the international agreements and
regimes whose implementation is studied in the cases used in this
book. It differentiates between arrangements at the global, regional
and bilateral levels.25 The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather
to include those instruments considered of most importance to the
problems at hand. The main selection criterion is that the arrange-
ments must have provisions that require attempts at influencing the
behaviour of target groups located in Northwestern Russia.
Fisheries management
The major global instrument underlying systems for marine fisheries
management throughout the world is the 1982 Law of the Sea Con-
vention (LOSC) (United Nations 1982), which entered into force on
16 November 1994. The Convention, with its 320 articles and 9
appendices, deals with a range of issues related to the use and man-
agement of the world’s ocean areas.26 Most important for fisheries
management is the introduction of the principle of 200-mile exclusive
economic zones (EEZ). This implies that coastal states are given ‘sov-
ereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources’ in these zones (United Nations
1982, Article 56[1]). With the rights follows the obligation to secure
reasonable exploration, exploitation, conservation and management
of the resources. For instance, fish stocks are to be maintained at a
level that can produce maximum sustainable yield (MSY), i.e. the
level at which the greatest quantity of fish can be caught annually
without the total size of the stock being reduced. Moreover, coastal
states are required to promote the objective of optimum utilisation of
the living resources of its EEZ, and to establish total allowable catches
(TACs) for each fish stock within its EEZ. Finally, coastal states are
obliged to co-operate in the management of shared stocks.
More recent global fisheries agreements tend to focus mainly on
the management of fisheries taking place in high seas areas, i.e.
beyond 200 miles from shore. They include the 1995 Fish Stocks
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Agreement (United Nations 1995), which, inter alia, foresees the
establishment of regional or sub-regional organisations or arrange-
ments for the management of marine resources on the high seas27 –
and two FAO documents: the FAO Compliance Agreement of 1993
(Food and Agriculture Organization 1993) and the FAO Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of 1995 (Food and Agriculture
Organization 1996). The Compliance Agreement sets out the
responsibility of the flag state and includes provisions on the
maximisation of information about high-seas fishing activities. The
Code of Conduct is a non-binding instrument which promotes a
responsible approach to all aspects of fishing.
In the Barents Sea, both Norway and Russia established their
EEZs in 1977. This led to a transition from multilateral negotiations
for the Barents Sea fisheries under the auspices of the Northeast
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) to bilateral negotiations
between coastal states with sovereign rights to fish stocks. To for-
malise these mutual fishing rights and, more importantly, to estab-
lish a common management regime suitable to secure the fish stocks
of the area, Norway and the Soviet Union entered into several bilat-
eral fishery co-operation agreements in the mid-1970s. The most
important agreements on the establishment of the management
regime are the mutual agreements of 11 April 1975 (Stortinget
1975) on co-operation in the fisheries sector and of 15 October
1976 (Stortinget 1976) on mutual fisheries relations, the so-called
framework agreements.
The Norwegian–Russian management regime for the Barents
Sea fish stocks defines objectives and practices for co-operative man-
agement between the two states within the fields of research and
regulations, and, since 1993, also enforcement. The co-operation
between Russian/Soviet and Norwegian scientists in the mapping
of the Barents Sea fish resources dates back to the 1950s.28 It is now
institutionalised within the framework of the International Council
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The Joint Norwegian–
Russian Fisheries Commission, consisting of bureaucrats, scientists
and representatives of the fishing industries of the two countries,
convenes at least once a year to establish TACs for the joint
fish stocks of the Barents Sea: cod, haddock and capelin. Cod and
haddock are shared on a 50–50 basis, while the capelin quota is
shared 60–40 in Norway’s favour. In addition, quotas of the parties’
exclusive stocks are exchanged. After the sessions in the Joint
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Commission, the two parties conduct further quota exchanges in
bilateral negotiations with third countries. An enforcement co-oper-
ation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea fisheries has
been in operation since 1993.29 A Permanent Russian–Norwegian
Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within
the Fisheries Sector was established under the Joint Commission
that year. In addition to administering enforcement co-operation, it
has undertaken several more comprehensive tasks, such as elaborat-
ing a uniform system of conversion factors, joint routines for the
closing and opening of fishing grounds, and a co-ordinated intro-
duction of obligatory use of selection grids in the cod fishery. More-
over, the Permanent Committee functions as a forum for discussion
and clarifications between the parties in the periods between ses-
sions in the Joint Commission.
Several regional fisheries regimes and agreements are also of rele-
vance for Northwestern Russia. Although NEAFC lost much of its
significance after the introduction of the EEZs and coastal state
management authority to within 200 miles, it still exerts a certain
regulation responsibility in high seas areas in the Northeast
Atlantic.30 Moreover, Northwest Russian fishers occasionally partic-
ipate in fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic, or the NAFO area
(Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 1978). In these ‘conven-
tion areas’, Russian authorities are obliged to ensure that convention
obligations are complied with by Russian fishers. Finally, Russian
participation in ICES obliges Russian scientists to contribute to the
estimates of size and state of the fish stocks of the Northeast Atlantic,
in particular in the Barents Sea.
Nuclear safety
As follows from the above description of environmental problems of
Northwestern Russia, the threats of nuclear radiation emerge from
several different sources in the region: dumped radioactive materi-
als, decommissioned nuclear submarines, nuclear waste and spent
nuclear fuel, as well as the unsafe functioning of nuclear installa-
tions. Hence, the handling of these various problem complexes is
regulated by different instruments at different levels. The most
important arrangements at the global level are found in attempts to
secure the safe functioning of nuclear installations, mainly under the
auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).31 The
statute of IAEA entered into force in 1957 and authorises the
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Agency ‘to establish or adopt [. . .] standards for protection of health
and minimisation of danger to life and property (including such
standards for labour conditions), and to provide for the application
of these standards’ (International Atomic Energy Agency 1957, Arti-
cle III.A.6). The development of practical international co-operation
in nuclear safety began in the early 1960s and reached its present
wide-ranging scale in the 1980s and 1990s after the accidents at
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island (Timerbaev and Iorysh 1999). The
present IAEA regime on safe development of nuclear energy is based
on a range of international legal instruments. Major elements of the
regime are, inter alia: the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Nuclear Damage (International Atomic Energy Agency
1963);32 the 1974 Nuclear Safety Standards (International Atomic
Energy Agency 1974);33 the 1986 Notification Convention (Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency 1986a);34 the 1986 Assistance Con-
vention (International Atomic Energy Agency 1986b);35 the 1994
Convention on Nuclear Safety (International Atomic Energy Agency
1994)36 and the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management (International Atomic Energy Agency 1997).37
The 1972 London Convention (International Maritime Organiza-
tion 1972)38 is the main instrument of the global dumping regime,
banning the disposal at sea of hazardous waste, defined in terms of
toxicity, persistence and tendency to bioaccumulate in marine
organisms. Radioactive waste has been the most politicised of the
issues involved (Stokke 1998, 2000b). Some items may not be
dumped at all whereas others require special permits. Members of
the regime are obliged to monitor and record their dumping activi-
ties and report them to the secretariat of the Convention, located
with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The regime
also includes provisions for enforcement and dispute settlement. 
Four regional instruments stand out as relevant for nuclear safety
issues in Northwestern Russia: the AMEC and CTR programmes in
connection with discarded nuclear submarines and storage of spent
nuclear fuel and other nuclear wastes; the MNEPR as a planned ini-
tiative to secure satisfactory framework conditions for foreign states
engaged in nuclear safety projects in Russia; and BEAR as a more gen-
eral co-operative framework aimed partly at environmental issues.
The Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation
(AMEC) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996) was signed in 1996 by
Norway, the Russian Federation and the USA.39 The parties stated
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their mutual interest in reducing the deleterious effects of military
operations to the Arctic environment, including the ecological risks
associated with nuclear waste in the Arctic. Norway and the USA
pledged their support in providing the Russians with technological
and other assistance to help them de-fuel nuclear submarines
removed from service, and to develop safe storage facilities for spent
nuclear fuel and other nuclear wastes. The AMEC Declaration estab-
lishes an institutional framework for contact and co-operation
between military authorities in the three states. By 1998, however,
the agreement had little to show for itself in terms of practical results. 
In the spring of 1998, US authorities decided to link AMEC with
the Nunn–Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme (US
Department of State 1992, 1993; Sawhill 2000). The CTR Pro-
gramme was created by the US Congress in 1991 as a mechanism to
assist the Soviet Union in complying with its obligations of arms
reductions with the START I Agreement, and hopefully also new
commitments under START II. It has provided more than USD
2,000 million to former Soviet states since 1991. One of the goals of
the CTR Programme is to scrap 30 Russian ballistic missile sub-
marines by 2001. The Russians currently have the capacity to scrap
only a handful of submarines per year, the major obstacle being the
de-fuelling process and dealing with the resulting waste and spent
nuclear fuel. By linking AMEC and CTR, US authorities were able
to provide a ready source of cash (USD 5 million for 1998) and
indemnification from liability. 
Finally, it can be discussed whether the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region (BEAR) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993) should be per-
ceived as a regional regime of relevance to nuclear safety in North-
western Russia. This co-operative arrangement between Norway,
Sweden, Finland and Russia was established in 1993 and has both a
national and regional component.40 It includes co-operation in a
range of functional areas, but environmental issues are supposed to
permeate the regime as a whole. A separate working group on the
environment is also part of the regime. Stokke (2000a) argues that
the BEAR co-operation is closely linked to other regimes at global,
regional and bilateral level of relevance to the environment of the
European Arctic.
Various bilateral activities of a programmatic character exist in the
field of nuclear safety between Russia and other countries. The most
comprehensive bilateral co-operation programme is the one with
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Norway. In 1995, the Norwegian Government introduced a Plan of
Action on nuclear safety in neighbouring countries (Ministry of For-
eign Affairs 1995), aimed primarily at combating threats from
Northwestern Russia.41 In the period 1995–99, NOK 343 million
was allocated to activities supported under the Plan of Action. The
activities have been categorised into four priority areas: (1) safety
measures at nuclear facilities; (2) management, storage and disposal
of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel; (3) radioactive pollution
in northern areas; and (4) arms-related environmental hazards. In
May 1998, a Framework Agreement was signed between Norway
and Russia, stating that Norway shall render free technical assistance
in the stated areas, and that Russia shall exempt the delivery of such
assistance from taxes, customs duties and other fees and provide
nuclear liability protections to Norway in ten projects identified
as covered by the Agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998).
The Framework Agreement foresees the establishment of a Joint
Russian–Norwegian Commission to co-ordinate and control its
implementation. The Commission has so far convened once every
year since 1998 and devoted most of its work to the implementation
of the ten projects identified in the Framework Agreement. Finally,
it should be mentioned that an expert group on investigations of
radioactive pollution in the northern areas was established under
the Joint Russian–Norwegian Environmental Commission (see next
section) as early as in 1992. 
Norway has taken a leading role in endeavours to create a Multi-
lateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federa-
tion (MNEPR). The aim of this initiative is to secure satisfactory
conditions for all participating countries in nuclear safety projects in
Russia, e.g. related to indemnity against nuclear liability, access and
oversight and exemption from taxes, customs and other fees. The
current draft agreement is stricter than the Russian–Norwegian
Framework Agreement as it includes provisions on personnel immu-
nity, access and oversight. A Declaration of Principles was signed in
March 1999 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999), but a binding legal
framework is still not in sight.
Air pollution control
International efforts to regulate emissions of environmentally haz-
ardous substances into the air include instruments aimed at solving
the problems of acid rain, depletion of the ozone layer and climate
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change, of which only the former will be discussed here. Related to
the air pollution of Northwestern Russia, by far the most important
international instrument42 is the 1979 UN Economic Commission
for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP) (UN Economic Commission for Europe 1979).43 It
addresses problems in Europe and North America concerning air-
borne pollutants, notably acid rain, and establishes a framework for
co-ordinating pollution control measures and common emission
standards.44 The contracting parties are to take into account the pre-
cautionary approach as set forth in the 1992 Rio Declaration. They
must reduce annual emissions from a reference year, and emission
limits are established for some selected sources. A monitoring
system has been set up, and five substantive protocols have been
negotiated under the regime: on NOX (1988) (UN Economic Com-
mission for Europe 1988a);45 volatile organic compounds (1991)
(UN Economic Commission for Europe 1991);46 sulphur (1994)
(UN Economic Commission for Europe 1994);47 heavy metals
(1998) (UN Economic Commission for Europe 1998a);48 and per-
sistent organic pollutants (1998) (UN Economic Commission for
Europe 1998b).49 The Soviet Union/Russian Federation has been an
active partner in the LTRAP regime. Traditionally rather reserved
towards co-operation with the West during the Cold War, in the late
1970s the Soviet Union was enthusiastic in its support of the LRTAP
process, regarding it more in terms of ‘high politics’ than from
an environmental point of view (Kotov and Nikitina 1998a). At
present, Russia has ratified the Convention itself and the NOX
Protocol and signed, but not ratified, the Sulphur Protocol.
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a program-
matic, legally non-binding document and process initiated by Finland
in 1991, commits the eight Arctic states (Russia, Canada, the United
States and the five Nordic countries) to undertake research and
develop strategies for six priority environmental problems. A number
of co-operative programmes have been established: (1) Arctic Moni-
toring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); (2) Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); (3) Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna (CAFF); and (4) Emergency Preparedness, Preven-
tion and Response (EPPR) programme. These programmes reported
to the Ministers of the Environment of the Arctic countries, who, in
turn, identified priority areas for further action. Four ministerial
conferences were held under the AEPS framework between 1991 and
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1997. The AEPS programmes have now been subsumed under the
Arctic Council, a forum established by the Arctic states in 1996
(Arctic Council Declaration 1996). At the first meeting of the Arctic
Council, a Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment (RPA), developed by the PAME working
group, was adopted. VanderZwaag (2000, p. 192) describes the
adoption of the RPA as ‘small, soft steps in addressing land-based pol-
lution in the Arctic’, observing at the same time that detailed actions
are only recommended for persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and
heavy metals, and that financial and technical commitments are left
uncertain, although the need to assist the Russian Federation in
taking pollution prevention actions is stressed.
Environmental co-operation between Russia and the Nordic states
in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) (see previous section) and
bilaterally is also of relevance for air pollution control in Northwest-
ern Russia. Of particular importance is the Joint Russian–Norwegian
Environmental Commission, which was established in 1988. Under
the Joint Commission, comprising leading environmental agencies in
the two states, several working groups have been established, includ-
ing the Working Group on Airborne Pollution. The latter has devel-
oped an environmental monitoring and modelling programme for the
border areas. The focus of capacity-enhancement efforts has been on
the question of the modernisation of the Pechenganickel smelter,
which was brought up at governmental level when the Environmental
Commission was established. 
The ‘clusters’ of agreements to be implemented
The various agreements to be implemented are listed in Table 1.1. In
the management of the Northwest Russian fisheries, Russia has a
rather clear set of international commitments. From the global
instruments come obligations to manage the fish stocks with a view
to maintaining Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), to establish
TACs for the fish stocks in the Russian EEZ, to co-operate with
Norway in the management of shared stocks, and to take responsi-
bility for the activities of vessels under Russian flag in high seas
areas. Regional arrangements demand participation by Russian
scientists in ICES and enforcement of international standards in
‘convention areas’ such as NAFO and NEAFC. The obligations from
the global, and partly regional level, are confirmed and specified
in the bilateral regime with Norway. The framework agreements
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provide basic guidelines for the co-operation. Decisions by the Joint
Commission, partly interpreted, specified and adjusted in the Per-
manent Committee, give concrete obligations that are binding for
the parties. This includes the obligation that joint decisions are
enforced in due manner by Russian authorities and complied with by
target groups.
Table 1.1 International obligations of the Russian Federation requiring
implementation in its northwestern regiona
Level/case Fisheries management Nuclear safety Air pollution control
Global LOSC (IAEA)
Fish Stocks Agreement London Convention
Compliance Agreement
Code of Conduct
Regional ICES AMEC LRTAP
(NEAFC) CTR (BEAR)
(NAFO) (MNEPR) (AEPS/Arctic 
(BEAR) Council)
Bilateral Joint Russian– Joint Russian– Joint Russian–
Norwegian Fisheries Norwegian Norwegian
Commissionb Commission on Environmental 
Bilateral quota-sharing Nuclear Safetyb Commissionb
agreements with other Various program- Various program-
states matic activities matic activities 
with other states with other states
a The agreements/regimes in parenthesis are not explicitly discussed in this book.
Others are mentioned only sporadically in the case studies since their commitments
are specified in agreements at lower levels. For instance, this is the case with the
global fisheries agreements.
b The Commissions are here used to denote the entire bilateral regimes, including
obligations issuing from levels higher (framework agreements) and lower
(committees subordinate to them) than the Commissions themselves. 
There is a rather uniform set of international commitments also
in the case of air pollution control. Binding standards for emis-
sion reduction are provided by the LRTAP regime, and more
programmatic instruments at the regional and bilateral level, such
as BEAR, AEPS/Arctic Council and the Joint Russian–Norwegian
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Environmental Commission, seek to assist Russia in fulfilling these
obligations. A difference between the regimes for fisheries manage-
ment and air pollution control is the relative weight of the different
levels and the way in which commitments at various levels are
linked. While the ‘lower’ levels of the air pollution control regime
serve mainly to assist in the implementation of obligations from
‘higher’ levels, new and more concrete obligations follow from the
‘lower’ levels of the fisheries management regime. The global regime
provides general principles which are given concrete contents at the
regional, and primarily bilateral level. Hence, the bilateral level
emerges with heavier weight in the fisheries management regime, or,
alternatively, the global/regional level is more specific in the case of
air pollution control than in fisheries management.
What are here grouped together as the ‘nuclear safety regime’ for
Northwestern Russia, provide a far more loosely coupled set of oblig-
ations than is the case with fisheries management and air pollution
control. This follows partly from the fact that nuclear hazards come
from highly different sources, such as dumping of radioactive mate-
rials, stored nuclear waste and spent fuel and the unsafe functioning
of nuclear installations. Various global and regional instruments are
aimed at different problem areas: the IAEA at safety at nuclear instal-
lations, the London Convention at dumping activities and AMEC
and CTR mainly at decommissioned nuclear vessels. Again, pro-
grammatic activities under BEAR and the Joint Russian–Norwegian
Commission on Nuclear Safety supplement the global and other
regional initiatives, mainly in terms of financial assistance. Concrete
commitments come primarily from the ‘higher’ levels, but with the
conclusion of the 1998 Framework Agreement between Russia and
Norway, more specific international obligations emerge also from the
bilateral level.
What is the wavelength?
Chapter 2 gives a more detailed account of the questions we seek to
answer. One could at this point, however, ask why we have selected
that particular set of questions. Is this primarily a book about the
implementation of international environmental agreements or of
particular sectors of Russian politics? What readership do we want
to address and what body of scholarly literature do we want to make
our findings relevant to? What’s the ‘wavelength’ of the book?
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Despite its explicit theoretical focus on implementation of inter-
national obligations, we would claim that this is primarily a book
about the peculiarities of Russian politics. It is our aim to extend the
description and discussion of political processes beyond the point at
which most accounts of Russian politics tend to stop. For instance, a
common theme in studies of Russian politics in recent years has been
the relationship between authorities at the federal and regional level.
Such studies normally concentrate on legal, political and economic
aspects of these relations. How much autonomy does the Constitu-
tion give to the Russian federal subjects? How ‘authoritative’ do the
governors emerge before federal authorities? How much financial
resources do the different regions manage to extract from the federal
budget? Seldom are such discussions followed up by analyses of con-
sequences for different sectors of politics: do the recent changes in
the formal status of governors have any influence on fisheries man-
agement in the region? Does the bilateral agreement between a fed-
eral subject and Moscow have any impact on environmental politics
in the region? In addition to these questions, it is our aim to provide
detail and nuances to the debate about the relationship between var-
ious agencies at the same political level. How ‘federal’ are actually
federal agencies located in the regions? Do the old Soviet industrial
complexes in the region come through as allies of regional or federal
authorities? Do some federal agencies appear to stand closer to
regional authorities than to other agencies at the same level? The
comparison of three different cases from one and the same region
will hopefully reveal patterns that can serve as useful supplements to
the more general literature on Russian politics.
On the other hand, we are still convinced that our discussion will
prove relevant also to the theoretical implementation debate. While
the described events must be ‘seen through the glasses’ of Russian
politics – having a logic not necessarily applicable to political
processes in other countries – the results are intended to add up to
the accumulating knowledge on implementation of environmental
agreements. Among the questions asked that are of relevance to
the overarching theoretical debate are the following: how does the
nature of the problem influence implementation? To what extent
can implementation performance be explained by the nature of
the international agreement? Is it decisive which national agencies
are given responsibility for implementation? Does the inclusion
of target groups or NGOs make implementation more effective?
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How does financial support from other countries affect the imple-
mentation process?
At a somewhat less ambitious level theoretically – focusing on
implementation in Russian regions rather than on implementation in
general – one can compare the three cases of the book in a quest to
reveal what kind of international agreements stand the best chance of
being successfully implemented in the regions of the Russian Federa-
tion. Can differences between the cases be ascribed to the nature of
the problems at hand or to the character of the international agree-
ments? To the extent that the latter appears to be the case: is imple-
mentation improved by the existence of a ‘heavy’ global or regional
commitment (securing, for instance, support from federal authorities
that might view the implementation of such agreements as a national
prestige)? Or would it prove easier to influence the behaviour of
target groups in the region by use of more flexible programmatic ini-
tiatives at the bilateral level (hinging, as in the case of Northwestern
Russia, on geographical proximity to foreign countries)? On the
other hand: do non-binding arrangements at the global level have any
effect at all? What about binding agreements at the bilateral level?
And finally: can any lessons of a more general nature be drawn
from the three cases about the linkage of binding and programmatic
instruments and initiatives at the various political levels?
Hence, one can ‘tune in’ on our investigation from various
points of departure: from a theoretical interest in implementation
of international agreements or power constellations in Russian pol-
itics, or from a more practical interest in Russian politics or Arctic
environmental affairs.
A note on methodology
The empirical data used in the case studies of the book are based on
frequent field trips over several years to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk
Oblasts and Moscow. A range of interviews have been conducted
with representatives of federal and regional authorities, industries,
NGOs and others.50 Regional media have also been very useful. We
have elsewhere elaborated the difficulties of conducting social science
research in Northwestern Russia (Hønneland and Jørgensen 1999a,
pp. 6–7): as one of the most heavily militarised areas in the world and
rather ‘conservative’ politically,51 the region is, in general, charac-
terised by suspicion towards curious foreigners. Since Russia has no
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long-standing tradition of ‘free’ social science research, foreign
researchers are often mistaken for journalists or even spies. Further-
more, foreign involvement in environmental affairs has, since the
arrest of Aleksandr Nikitin in February 1996,52 come to be closely
linked to espionage in the minds of many inhabitants of Northwest-
ern Russia.53 In addition to a careful and gradual build-up of trust
between us and potential sources of information, the well-known
Russian method of using acquaintances has been indispensable also
for this study.54 When no other source of information is mentioned,
the data are built on personal interviews. Such interviews have been
more important in the case studies on fisheries management and
nuclear safety; the study of air pollution control is to a larger extent
based on secondary literature. In order to protect our interviewees
from potential problems at home, we have chosen not to reveal
their identity. 
An issue with methodological implications is how the temporal
aspect of implementation is perceived. As will follow from Chapter
2, an important question is how the emergence of international
obligations influences policy issues at the national and regional level
in Russia. Are the observed patterns of behaviour the result of these
particular obligations, or would they have occurred anyway? The
international agreements under investigation here were concluded
at different times, nearly half of them with the Soviet Union as con-
tracting partner. Do we want to study political processes initiated
immediately after the establishment of an international regime, or
how the Russian Federation in recent years has gone about fulfilling
these obligations? The primary focus of the investigation is on polit-
ical processes during the 1990s. For one thing, it has proven difficult
to obtain information about earlier events.55 Moreover, more than
half of the agreements studied were concluded during this period.
Our main argument for focusing on that decade is, however, the fact
that major changes have taken place in Russian politics since 1990.
First, a new state formation emerged in 1991, taking over most
international obligations of the Soviet Union. Second, such a far-
reaching restructuring of the political system of the state has taken
place after its establishment that it becomes an interesting question
in itself to investigate how these obligations have been handled
along with the reorganisations. 
18 International environmental agreements in Russia
Outline of the book
This chapter has given a preliminary introduction to the research
questions addressed in the book and a brief overview of the interna-
tional arrangements that are of most relevance to fisheries manage-
ment, nuclear safety and air pollution control in Northwestern
Russia. Chapter 2 provides more detail on the theoretical debate
about the implementation of international environmental agree-
ments, leading up to a more individualised approach to the issues
under investigation here. Chapter 3 deals with recent developments
in Russian politics at the federal and regional level, providing a back-
drop to our subsequent discussion of the division of responsibilities
in the implementation of international environmental commitments.
The first part of this chapter focuses in particular on relations
between Moscow and the regions. What does the 1993 Constitution
say about these relations, and how have things developed in practice?
Which legal, political and economic instruments do federal authori-
ties have to influence development in the regions? The second part
of Chapter 3 turns to political and economic developments in North-
western Russia in recent years. In addition to providing background
information about the history, economy and industry of the region,
a major aim is to sketch the overarching power structures of North-
west Russian politics. What is the authority and power of the popu-
larly elected governors (the regional executives), the oblast dumas
(the regional legislative) and representatives of federal authorities in
the region? Chapters 4, 5 and 6 constitute the main discussion of the
book, addressing the Russian implementation of international agree-
ments within fisheries management, nuclear safety and air pollution
control, respectively. A similar set-up is followed in each of the three
chapters, starting with a more detailed description of the problem at
hand and the major target groups than has been provided in this
introductory chapter. A discussion follows on the extent to which the
particular international obligations are reflected in the existing legal
basis of the Russian Federation. Next, attention is turned to the role
of various actors in the implementation process: to what extent are
federal authorities, regional authorities, the industrial complex,
NGOs and others engaged in implementation activities? How is the
power balance between various governmental bodies – representing,
for instance, differing interests such as utilisation and conservation
of resources and the environment – at the same level? The issues of
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implementation performance and target compliance are addressed in
the concluding sections of each case study. 
Chapter 7 sums up the major findings of the study. Experiences
from the implementation process of the three cases are compared
and lessons extracted for the theoretical implementation debate in
general, and for the implementation of international environmental
agreements in Russia in particular. 
Notes
1 See, e.g., Hanf and Underdal (1998) and Underdal and Hanf (2000).
2 See, e.g., Young (1989, 1991), Haas (1990), Benedick (1991) and
Young and Osherenko (1993). 
3 See, e.g., Haas et al. (1993), Victor et al. (1998a), Wettestad (1999) and
Young (1999). Another important volume is Weiss and Jacobson
(1998), which focuses particularly on treaty compliance, but under-
stands this concept as part of those processes we define as implementa-
tion (see Chapter 2).
4 See, e.g., Young (1996) and Stokke (2000a, 2001).
5 Normative linkages imply that norms developed within one regime
affect the normative contents of another. By structural linkages we
mean the transfer or imitation of components of one regime to or by
another (Stokke 2000a).
6 For instance, Russia emits roughly as much carbon dioxide (CO2) as all
of Western Europe combined (Victor et al. 1998b, p. 3).
7 The concept of ‘transition economy’ – see, for instance, how Victor et
al. (1998b, p. 3) speak of these countries’ ‘transition from central plan-
ning to a liberal, market-based society’ – indicates a development opti-
mism on behalf of these states’ economy and politics that we find hard
to apply to contemporary Russia. Instead, we speak of ‘post-Soviet
Russian economy and politics’ to denote the period after the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union; whether recent developments will lead to a
‘liberal, market-based society’ remains to be seen. 
8 A few cases of Russian implementation are compared in Victor et al.
(1998a), but they are only to a limited extent considered in relation to
major development trends in Russian politics. The works of Vladimir
Kotov and Elena Nikitina deserve particular mention (Kotov 1994;
Kotov and Nikitina 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Munton et al. 1999, Nikitina
1991, 1995; Zimmermann et al. 1998). See also Stokke (2000a,
2000b) for contributions dealing with implementation of international
environmental agreements in Russia. International institutions for envi-
ronmental aid to the former Soviet Union are discussed in Connolly
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and List (1996) and Connolly et al. (1996). Darst (1997, 2001) pro-
vides detailed information on environmental management at the
national level in Russia and on the country’s co-operation in this field
with other states, but does not focus explicitly on the implementation
of Russia’s international commitments.
9 It might, of course, be argued that this is an over-simplification; there
is, for instance, a considerable literature on Russian nuclear safety pol-
itics. However, this literature is seldom linked in a systematic way to
studies of overarching political processes in the country. Our point is
that specialists on Russian politics tend to focus on political develop-
ment trends of a more general nature than those found within different
policy sectors. 
10 Whether fisheries management can be classified as environmental poli-
tics, can of course be disputed. The management of natural resources
and the environment are, however, often grouped together in policy
studies. For the sake of language variation and simplicity, we occasion-
ally speak of environmental politics in this book when we in fact have in
mind the management of both the environment and natural resources.
11 The selection of cases for the study was based on a mixture of substan-
tial and practical concerns. First, fisheries management, nuclear safety
and air pollution control are among the most important environmental
and resource issues for the region, as will be argued below. Second, the
authors have prior in-depth knowledge on fisheries management (Høn-
neland 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Hønneland and Nilssen 2000,
2001; Jørgensen 1999) and nuclear safety (Hønneland and Jørgensen
1999a; Hønneland and Moe 2000; Sawhill and Jørgensen 2001), and
to some extent also air pollution control (Hønneland et al. 1999),
through earlier research projects on Northwest Russian politics.
12 See Chapter 3 for further elaboration on the geographical delimitation
of the study. 
13 For a discussion of centre–region relations in the Russian Federation,
see, e.g., Shlapentokh et al. (1997), M. McAuley (1997), Blakkisrud
(1997), Stavrakis et al. (1997), Alexseev (1999) and Hønneland and
Blakkisrud (2001).
14 See, e.g., Hønneland and Blakkisrud (2001).
15 For brief overviews of the history of the Kola Peninsula, see, e.g., Høn-
neland and Jørgensen (1999a, 1999b) or Hønneland and Blakkisrud
(2001).
16 Ibid.
17 For an overview of Northwest Russian fisheries, see Hønneland (1998,
2000a).
18 See AMAP (1997, 1998) for authoritative reviews of the environmen-
tal state of the Russian Arctic.
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19 Previous schemes were finally buried in 1997, but a new agreement on
the modernisation of the Pechenganickel smelter was concluded
between Norway and Russia in June 2001. The new project is sched-
uled to be completed in 2006–7; see Chapter 6.
20 The Chernobyl accident in April 1986 was, of course, the first wake-up
call for the European public to the dangers of nuclear radiation. The
Komsomolets accident, for its part, served to remind the public that
radiation could emanate from other sources than power plants, still by
far the most serious threat to the general public.
21 See, e.g., Stokke (1998, 2000b).
22 See Nilsen et al. (1996) for an authoritative assessment of the risk of
radioactive contamination from the Russian Northern Fleet.
23 As mentioned above, the extraction of stationary resources on the Kola
Peninsula has decreased in recent years due to economic problems at
company level.
24 There are good arguments for not focusing exclusively on legally bind-
ing arrangements. First, it can be assumed that non-binding agreements
are also sought to be implemented by states. Second, states vary in their
propensity to conclude binding agreements, and many tend to enter
into such agreements only when they feel certain that they will be able
to comply with their obligations, this being particularly true for the
Soviet Union/Russian Federation (Victor et al. 1998a). Hence, it can be
expected that ‘implementation activities’ – efforts to change the behav-
iour of target groups – are no less prevalent in Russia for non-binding
than for binding agreements. 
25 Clearly, the categorisation could have been done in other ways. The
sub-regional level, comprising co-operative arrangements between
parts of various countries, has been omitted here. Bilateral arrange-
ments, often regarded as ‘regional’ instruments, are here separated out
as a category of their own.
26 See Churchill and Lowe (1999) for an overview and evaluation of the
LOSC.
27 See, e.g., Balton (1996) or Hayashi (1995, 1996) for discussions of the
Fish Stocks Agreement.
28 See Stokke et al. (1999) for a discussion of the Russian–Norwegian fish-
eries research co-operation.
29 For a review of the enforcement co-operation between Russia and
Norway, see Hønneland (2000b).
30 This authority is nested in a revised Convention of 1982 (Northeast
Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1982). The signatory states can also
choose to delegate management responsibility for certain species in
their EEZs to NEAFC. See Churchill (2001) for a discussion of the
NEAFC regime.
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31 See Fisher (1997) for a history and overview of activities of IAEA.
32 The Convention entered into force on 12 November 1977. It is signed,
but not ratified by the Russian Federation.
33 This is a series of codes and safety guidelines intended to ensure the safe
design, siting and operation of nuclear power reactors.
34 The Convention entered into force on 27 October 1986. It is signed
and ratified by the Russian Federation.
35 The Convention entered into force on 26 February 1987. It is signed
and ratified by the Russian Federation.
36 The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. It is signed
and ratified by the Russian Federation.
37 The Convention has not yet entered into force.
38 The Convention entered into force on 30 August 1975. It has been
signed and ratified by the Russian Federation.
39 See Sawhill (2000) and Sawhill and Jørgensen (2001) for a description
and assessment of the AMEC co-operation.
40 The Regional Council is composed of representatives of the three
northernmost counties of Norway, the two northernmost counties of
Sweden and Finland, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, and the
Republic of Karelia and Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Russia, as well
as a representative of the indigenous people of the region, the Saami.
At the national level, the Barents Council consists of government rep-
resentatives from Russia, the five Nordic countries and the European
Commission. For discussions of the establishment and performance of
BEAR, see Dellenbrant and Olsson (1994), Stokke and Tunander
(1994), Dahlström et al. (1995), Dellenbrant and Wiberg (1997) and
Flikke (1998).
41 See Hønneland and Moe (2000) for an evaluation of the Plan of Action.
42 No global convention exists on land-based pollution control; the main
initiatives to date have shunned a strict precautionary approach to pol-
lution control (VanderZwaag 2000).
43 The Convention entered into force on 16 March 1983. It is signed and
ratified by the Russian Federation.
44 See, e.g., Hanf (2000) for an overview of how the acid rain regime
evolved.
45 The Protocol entered into force on 14 February 1991. It is signed and
ratified by the Russian Federation.
46 The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1997. It has not been
signed by the Russian Federation.
47 The Protocol entered into force on 5 August 1998. It is signed, but not
ratified by the Russian Federation. The Protocol follows the former Sul-
phur Protocol adopted in Helsinki 8 July 1985, which entered into
force 2 September 1987. 
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48 The Protocol has not yet entered into force. It has not been signed by
the Russian Federation.
49 The Protocol has not yet entered into force. It has not been signed by
the Russian Federation.
50 Since both of us speak Russian, all interviews have been conducted
without interpreter. This is assumed to enhance the validity of the
interview data.
51 Murmansk is one of the few Russian cities where a Lenin statue still
dominates a main thoroughfare – in this case the Lenin Prospekt.
52 Former Northern Fleet officer Aleksandr Nikitin was accused of espi-
onage while collecting data on the nuclear risk on the Kola Peninsula
for the Norwegian environmental NGO Bellona. Charges were finally
dropped in 2000.
53 Cf. a recent news bulletin from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty under
the heading ‘Murmansk a Hotbed of Foreign Spies’: ‘Foreign intelli-
gence services have targeted Murmansk Oblast as a “priority” area for
their activities, Nikolai Zharkov, head of the Federal Security Service
(FSB) directorate in Murmansk Oblast, told Interfax North-West on 28
December [. . .] Zharkov also revealed that foreign governments fre-
quently “pursue their own interests” under the cover of environmental
organizations’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 December 2000).
54 Even ‘official figures’ have agreed to talk to us only after being intro-
duced to us by common acquaintances.
55 In practice, it has not been very difficult to relate to this temporal
aspect of implementation notwithstanding missing historical data.
When, for instance, it can be established that a ‘department for con-
vention areas’ exists under the fisheries enforcement agency Murman-
rybvod, the interesting point is not so much when it was established –
it was obviously set up to take care of Soviet/Russian obligations under
the NEAFC and NAFO Conventions – but that it exists, under whose
political authority it is nested, and how it functions.
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The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a remarkable
increase in the breadth and depth of international environmental co-
operation.1 Several explanations have been offered to account for
this trend, among them the growing transborder implications of
national environmental problems and the combination of a general
rise in international transactions and governmental involvement in
environmental affairs at the national level (Hanf and Underdal
1998, pp. 149–51). Co-operative arrangements show great variation
in their degree of formalism and ambition as well as in their geo-
graphic and functional scope. Typically, co-operation in a given issue
area will initially be accompanied by rather vague joint declarations
on the need to address the problem in question. Subsequently, as the
co-operative process gets under way and the understanding of the
problem – as well as the consensus on its nature – grow deeper, the
parties may agree on stricter and more specific obligations.2 More-
over, environmental accords vary in scope, ranging from global via
regional and sub-regional to bilateral arrangements. Global agree-
ments tend to be of a framework character whereas more specific
requirements are often found in accords at a lower level, typically
nested in the more overarching global arrangements.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical backdrop to and
elaborate a research design for the investigation. The chapter con-
sists of four main parts. The first section seeks to place the imple-
mentation literature in a wider theoretical context, asking how the
two major theoretical approaches to international relations, realism
and liberalism, see the role of institutions in the implementation
of international agreements. The ‘whats’, ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of the
2
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implementation debate are addressed in the second section, focusing
in particular on the interface between the concepts of ‘implementa-
tion’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘compliance’. Some major lessons from
implementation of environmental agreements in post-Communist
societies are summarised in the third section of the chapter. The the-
oretical background and the experience of implementation in post-
Communist states are subsumed in the fourth section, which
elaborates a specific research design for the study. The chapter
should be read in conjunction with Chapter 1, which presents the
overall focus of the investigation, and Chapter 3, which focuses
more specifically on the legal, political and economic conditions for
implementation in the Russian Federation.
Do institutions matter?
The question of whether international co-operative arrangements in
themselves have any influence on national policies is a matter of dis-
pute among students of international relations. This dispute origi-
nates from divergent views on the nature of the international system
of states. Thus, to the hardcore realist, the anarchic nature of the
world community is its most salient feature, and the states of which
it is composed appear as rational unitary actors with maximisation of
a fairly clear-cut set of national interests as the sole motivation for
any action undertaken. In a purist-realist perspective, the fact that
there is no such thing as international government necessarily implies
that international agreements and other co-operative arrangements
either simply reflect the national interests of participating states, or
they reflect the specific preferences of the most powerful states. Con-
sequently, such agreements have no independent influence on states’
actions. In the realist perspective, state implementation of or compli-
ance with international obligations is not considered a particularly
interesting issue. For one thing, states are assumed to generally
comply with such obligations. The argument is that: (1) states accept
treaties only when their governments have concluded that they are in
their interest; (2) they generally comply with treaties; and (3) when
they do not, sanctions are employed both to punish offenders and to
deter others from violating them (Weiss and Jacobson 1998). As
asserted by the famous realist Morgenthau (1978), the great majority
of the rules of international law are observed by most nations most
of the time. For the realist, behaviour frequently conforms to treaty
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rules because both the behaviour and the rules reflect the interests of
the powerful states. In essence, observed compliance merely reflects
one of the following three situations: (1) a hegemonic state has forced
or induced a less powerful state to comply; (2) the treaty rules only
codify the parties’ existing behaviour; or (3) the treaty resolves a co-
ordination game in which no party has any incentive to violate the
rules once a stable equilibrium has been established (Mitchell 1994a).
In the relative simplicity of the realist approach lie both its major
strength and its greatest shortcomings. While allowing for coherent
theorising and construction of elegant models, realist perspectives
are criticised for ignoring the complexity of international relations.
The main opposing camp – less coherent than the realist one, and
alternately labelled pluralist and liberal3 – tends to emphasise com-
plex interdependence between states as opposed to international
anarchy. It also emphasises the complexity of domestic decision-
making as opposed to the rational unitary actor perspective of the
realists. States’ actions are seen as outcomes of complex policy
processes at both the domestic and the international level, and inter-
national co-operative arrangements are viewed as one of many
variables that may contribute to shaping these outcomes. This by no
means implies that interests and power are considered insignificant
in international relations. However, within the complex interdepen-
dence model, the role of non-state actors is drawn into the calculus,
the concept of national interest is questioned, and the relevance of
power is seen as highly dependent on the actual issue area. Specifi-
cally, many researchers have argued that the realist perspective may
be most relevant where analyses of high politics – in particular secu-
rity issues – are concerned, while more complex approaches may be
called for when dealing with ‘low politics’, including environmental
issues. In the realm of environmental policy, it will not always be
clear what the ‘national interest’ of a state is. Various sub-groups of
society may have highly diverging interests, while sharing common
interests with sub-groups in other countries. Moreover, the ‘value’
of a clean environment compared to that of the continuation of a
polluting activity is not easily determined. It may be tied to a given
society’s ‘culture’, and it may change over time, e.g. as a result of
new knowledge (Hanf and Underdal 1998; Weiss and Jacobson
1998). Considering this, it may be argued that there is some room
for institutions like international co-operative arrangements to actu-
ally influence states’ policies. Such institutions may empower ‘green’
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sub-groups in participating states, and they may contribute to the
production and diffusion of new knowledge. Rather than forcing
states to act against their own interests they may help ‘to shift coun-
tries’ perceptions of their self-interest and the possibilities for reach-
ing it through joint actions’ (Hanf 2000, p. 38, referring to Levy’s
argument (1995)).
A common trait of most literature on implementation and treaty
compliance, reflecting its origin in the broader liberal camp, is the
claim that institutions matter. Where realists view treaty compliance
as ‘coincidental’ in the sense that they claim the observed behaviour
would have occurred even in the absence of treaty rules, liberalists
argue that compliance might be the result of the chosen form of
organisation of the regime. Liberalists maintain that it might be right
that most states comply with most treaty rules most of the time, but
that this is not because enforcement is applied against non-compli-
ers. Chayes and Chayes (1995, p. 32) claim that ‘Sanctioning
authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and
likely to be ineffective when used’. The lack of formal sanctions does
not mean, however, that there are no penalties for non-compliance
or rewards for compliance. In line with the theory of complex inter-
dependence, liberalists argue that states have continuing relation-
ships with each other over a range of issues, and that questions of
compliance arise in an environment of diffuse reciprocity. 
One important liberalist argument in the debate about implemen-
tation of and compliance with international agreements is that nego-
tiations do not end with the conclusion of a treaty, but are a
continuous aspect of living under the agreement (Chayes and Chayes
1991). Securing compliance with a treaty becomes a matter of ‘bar-
gaining in the shadow of the law’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979).
This implies that disputes are sought to be resolved and compliance
induced through negotiations after the treaty has been concluded.
The procedures employed may range from simple bilateral negotia-
tions to formal arbitration, either specifically provided by the treaty
or evolving in response to need. Attempts have even been made to
bridge the compliance literature and bargaining theory, introducing
the concept of ‘post-agreement bargaining’ (Jönsson and Tallberg
1998). Moreover, liberalists claim that bureaucratic processes often
favour compliance over non-compliance. In national bureaucracies,
economy counts in decisions to comply with a treaty as a matter of
standard operating procedure, rather than in weighing the costs and
28 International environmental agreements in Russia
benefits each time an issue of compliance arises. Gathering informa-
tion and securing inter-agency agreement are high-cost activities and
can be performed only in relatively important questions (Chayes and
Chayes 1991). The liberalist perspective includes two main types of
prescriptions to increase compliance for participants in international
regimes: first, to arrange the institutional setting of the regime to
facilitate compliance; and second, to engage in argumentative efforts
in order to persuade potential non-compliers to comply. In particu-
lar, it recommends transparency in the working of regimes or
treaties, mechanisms for dispute settlement and technical and finan-
cial assistance to states that have practical problems with complying
(Chayes and Chayes 1991, 1993; Mitchell 1994a, 1994b). 
Implementation: the whats, whys and hows
So far, we have spoken rather loosely about the implementation
of and compliance with international agreements, without defining
the concepts. This section looks more thoroughly into how various
authors have understood these concepts, and a definition of imple-
mentation is provided for further use in this study. Moreover, we ask
which circumstances may require a particular focus on the imple-
mentation process, rather than on compliance performance, as far as
international environmental agreements are concerned. Finally,
some of the main hypotheses set forth by other authors in the field
are reviewed.
What is implementation?
Whether vague and declaratory or explicit and binding, interna-
tional commitments generally imply some sort of behavioural
changes at the national level, which will ideally lead to the fulfilment
of those commitments. Domestic implementation refers to the steps
undertaken nationally in order to induce these changes. This process
includes the translation of international commitments into national
legislation, as well as administrative and other measures adopted by
relevant authorities in order to induce target groups to comply. It
may also include activities undertaken by NGOs or the target groups
themselves. List and Rittberger (1998) thus identify several levels of
implementation activity. Transformation of international agree-
ments into national law takes place at the national normative level.
De facto implementation by state activity and by private actors, as
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well as state supervision and stimulation of private actors, takes
place at the national factual level. Sometimes, domestic implemen-
tation is conceived of as a much narrower concept. For instance,
Weiss and Jacobson (1998) take implementation to refer only to
national legislative activities (i.e. the national normative level), while
subsequent activities are understood in terms of compliance or non-
compliance. This understanding of implementation renders the con-
cept a stylised and rather dull thing to study. Moreover, while
accords between states are necessarily concluded at the international
level, implementation primarily takes place within the individual
states, i.e. at the national and sub-national levels. Hence, we under-
stand by implementation the measures undertaken at the national
and sub-national levels to bring the behaviour of target groups into
accordance with the particular state’s international commitments.
We assume that national and sub-national authorities as well as
NGOs and target groups can be involved in implementation activi-
ties. Moreover, we assume that implementation is sometimes carried
out jointly by national groups and members of other states; this is
referred to as joint implementation.4
The concept of implementation is intimately tied to that of effec-
tiveness: if international commitments are not followed through at
the national level, the agreement in question will have little effect,
since the activities to be regulated are normally of a domestic char-
acter. The effectiveness of an international regime is often connected
to either the achievements of the stated objectives of the regime or
the solution of the problems that led to the establishment of the
regime (see e.g. Weiss and Jacobson 1998). Effectiveness is some-
times seen as primarily related to compliance. However, as sug-
gested by, e.g., Victor et al. (1998b), the degree of implementation
may be a more trustworthy measure of effectiveness than the degree
of compliance. In cases where commitments are less ambitious,
states may achieve perfect compliance with the formal provisions of
a given agreement with very little behavioural adaptation.5 Compli-
ance may also be accidental, while implementation is by definition
instrumental. In accordance with this view, we are in this study inter-
ested in the active steps taken by authorities and other actors within
the state in focus to bring the behaviour of target groups into line
with the state’s international commitments. We are less concerned
with the degree of compliance by target groups, although compli-
ance is considered relevant to the extent that it is believed to be the
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result of implementation efforts (see last section of this chapter).
Nor are we primarily occupied with the solution of the problems in
question or other aspects of regime effectiveness.
Why study implementation?
Implementation of international environmental regimes is surpris-
ingly often a very difficult task. If our subject of study were, say,
international co-operation in the field of disarmament, it might be
argued that the process of attaining agreements would warrant more
interest than their subsequent implementation, since the former
could be expected to be the most difficult part of the process. Once
an agreement on reducing, e.g., the number of nuclear warheads is
in place, the state in question will usually have little difficulty in car-
rying out that commitment – providing, of course, that it intends to
honour the agreement. In contrast to this, and in contrast to realist
assumptions, recent studies indicate that failure on the part of states
to implement environmental commitments is often unintentional, in
the sense that it is a result of real and often unexpected difficulties
encountered during the implementation process, rather than a con-
scious choice to refrain from implementation (Chayes and Chayes
1993, 1995; Mitchell 1994a, 1994b; Weiss and Jacobson 1998;
Victor et al. 1998a). 
Successful implementation of international commitments is con-
tingent upon both the will and the ability of states to influence activ-
ities at the domestic level. Environmental problems are a side effect
of legitimate activities, and environmental policies tend to penetrate
deeply into other policy areas (Hanf 2000). Regulating the behav-
iour leading to, e.g., pollution often involves constraining the
actions of many actors or groups of actors – from certain sectors of
the economy down to the individual citizen. Moreover, precisely
because of the ‘intrusive’ character of environmental politics, its
implementation is seldom left to the environmental authorities
alone. Just like the ‘problem’ activities, the regulative efforts typi-
cally involve many actors: environmental authorities as well as
industrial ministries; agencies at the central, regional and local
levels. Moreover, ‘the costs of environmental protection tend to be
certain, immediate, and concentrated to specific sectors of the econ-
omy, while the benefits will appear, by comparison, to be diffuse,
uncertain, collective, and something that can be harvested only in a
more or less distant future’ (Hanf and Underdal 1998, p. 157).
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Thus, successful implementation may be highly dependent on a
given state’s capacity to govern, and on its ability to design policies
to overcome, for instance, the danger of vertical disintegration,
whereby a vast number of micro-decisions lead to unexpected and
contrary aggregate outcomes (1998).
Analysing implementation processes 
Implementation is not necessarily a process in which the state in its
various incarnations tries to modify the behaviour of certain target
groups. Often, target groups (typically the industry in question) pos-
sess information and knowledge that may make implementation
more effective, providing these actors are allowed to participate
actively in the process. Non-state actors like NGOs may also play a
role, although some studies have concluded that NGOs typically
play a greater role during the regime formation phase than during
the subsequent implementation stage (Victor et al. 1998a). External
support may also be important, not least for states that have few
bureaucratic or economic resources. This support may consist in
anything from direct financial contributions to joint implementation
of relevant projects. 
Weiss and Jacobson (1998) have specified a number of variables
that are believed to affect the chances of successful implementation
of international environmental agreements. The characteristics of
the activity to be governed imply that some activities are of greater
economic value to the state than others, some are more easy to mon-
itor than others, while the process of implementation has more side
effects related to some activities than to others. Another important
issue is the nature of the agreement. What is the scope of the agree-
ment – in other words, how much behavioural adaptation does it
require by states? Are its provisions precise or general? Are they
binding or non-binding? Moreover, a state’s implementation efforts
are presumably affected by the encompassing international envi-
ronment. Have other states taken action to implement the agree-
ment in question? Is it possible to be a free rider under the accord?
Finally, the social, cultural, political and economic characteristics of
the implementing country are assumed to influence implementation
and compliance.
32 International environmental agreements in Russia
Implementing international environmental commitments 
in post-Communist societies
From the initiation of large-scale industrialisation in the Soviet
Union in the 1930s and until the fall of Communism, the environ-
mental policy performance of that country – and of the whole
Eastern Bloc – was notoriously poor. As international environ-
mental co-operation developed and broadened during the 1970s
and 1980s, the industrial countries at least to some extent
recognised their responsibility as the largest contributors to global
environmental degradation by accepting stricter commitments than
they expected developing countries to take on. However, where the
Eastern Bloc countries are concerned, there was a marked tendency
for them to take on only commitments that would require little or
no behavioural adjustments.
Today, all these countries are going through some sort of transition
towards democracy and a market economy, although they differ with
respect to aspirations as well as performance.6 In principle, this ought
to create some hope for improvement, since liberal states generally
have a better environmental record than non-liberal states. However,
the one study that has included a specific focus on post-Communist
societies and implementation (Victor et al. 1998a), does not give
much reason for optimism, particularly with respect to Russia.
Admittedly, polluting activities in the former Eastern Bloc coun-
tries have declined during transition, but closer scrutiny reveals that
compliance with, e.g., the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP) provisions is largely attributable to economic decline. Pol-
lution per unit GDP has generally risen in post-Communist states,
indicating that their industry is actually ‘dirtier’ than ever, and that
a mechanism is at work which has been described as ‘compliance
without implementation’ (Raustiala and Victor 1998, p. 670).
The post-Communist period has been marked by a growing
inclusion of the East European countries, and, to a lesser extent,
the former Soviet republics, into international co-operative arrange-
ments of various kinds, including environmental ones. At the domes-
tic level, the post-Communist states have tended to use Western
models for environmental policy regulation, notably by adopting
provisions relying on market mechanisms. However, as demon-
strated by Victor et al. (1998a), such measures frequently have
other (mostly unexpected and undesirable) consequences in post-
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Communist states than in the more developed liberal market
economies of the West. Moreover, the post-Communist states are
characterised by certain developmental traits, some of which are
conducive to implementation of environmental policies, but many
of which have the opposite effect. These traits can be summed up as
democratisation and decentralisation of political power, transition
from a planned to a market economy and extensive changes in the
legal sphere. A crucial factor that has exacerbated or impaired the
impact of these processes, is the fact that in most cases they have
been accompanied by considerable economic decline.
The political sphere 
Several studies indicate that a state’s political system may pro-
foundly affect its performance in the area of environmental policy,
both in the area of domestic politics and international co-operation.
It would be a gross over-simplification to treat the relationship
between the two variables (‘political system’ and ‘environmental
performance’) as precisely defined. Nevertheless, there seems to be
a tendency for democratic states to show greater will to give prior-
ity to environmental considerations, while totalitarian states, though
less inclined to prioritise environmental issues, show greater ability
to implement environmental commitments, once they are taken on. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, in the heyday of glasnost and per-
estroika, democratic mobilisation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
republics frequently centred around environmental issues. As the veil
of secrecy was partially lifted, serious ecological problems were
revealed to a public formerly ignorant of their scale – in some cases
even of their existence – and these issues swiftly moved to the top of
the political agenda. However, while a democratic system may be
associated with higher concern for the environment, economic
decline tends to have the opposite effect, and this certainly seems to
be confirmed by subsequent developments in the post-Communist
countries. Most people soon became more concerned with their own
economic well-being – indeed, with day-to-day survival – than with
ecological problems, and, likewise, politicians increasingly focused
on how to reverse the negative trend and achieve economic growth.
At the same time, to the extent that governments were willing to
implement environmental policy goals (international commitments
as well as nationally defined objectives), they found themselves
increasingly unable to do so. While the Soviet Union, for instance,
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with its extremely centralised political system, actually may have
come quite close to the realist conception of states as unitary actors,
this image hardly applies to any of the post-Communist countries.
Although the democratisation process cannot be viewed as fully com-
pleted in these countries, decentralisation and diffusion of power has
lengthened the chain of implementation and thus decreased the
governments’ abilities to implement policy in general, not least in an
area as complex as environmental politics. In the Russian case, this
tendency is strengthened by the federal structure of the state. More-
over, the economic crisis combined with the particular trajectory of
economic reform in Russia have greatly undermined the fiscal
strength of the government, rendering its implementation capabilities
even weaker. Thus, in the post-Communist countries in general, and
in Russia in particular, economic decline has served as a counter-force
to the tendency of democracy to enhance public environmental
concern, while it has amplified its tendency to complicate the task
of implementation. 
The economic sphere 
A functioning market economy is normally characterised by high
economic efficiency, and thus the transition from plan to market
in Russia and Eastern Europe ought ideally to have put a stop to
the inefficient and environmentally unsound over-consumption of
resources so typical of these countries’ industries. It might also have
been expected that the market forces’ push towards efficiency would
have caused industrial enterprises to invest in new technologies,
which in turn would create considerable environmental dividends.
On the other hand, the market transition could be expected to have
some negative effects as well, since privatisation would result in
weaker state control over target groups (e.g. industrial enterprises).
Again, the negative predictions have been proven right, while the
predicted positive outcomes (i.e. investments in cleaner technology)
have largely failed to materialise. Adjustments of production modes
and a shift to new technologies both require immediate investments,
while the increased returns take some time to occur. The lack of a
functioning system for credit blocked this option for many enter-
prises. Moreover, privatisation was largely carried out in a legal
vacuum and in circumstances characterised by little transparency,
poor oversight by the authorities and a general lack of certainty
about the future. Thus, incentives were created for those controlling
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(not necessarily owning) the privatising enterprises to harvest
great short-term profits in ways which were hardly conducive to the
long-time profitability of the enterprises. Far from making invest-
ments in their enterprises, some directors and/or owners blatantly
plundered them of their assets and pocketed the profits. At the same
time, many highly inefficient enterprises were kept alive and not
allowed to go bankrupt, as authorities feared the social conse-
quences of their demise. 
The legal sphere 
The earliest phase of transition was characterised both by a strong
focus on environmental matters and on intensive revision of old leg-
islation, and in many of the post-Communist countries this resulted
in relatively progressive laws in the area of environmental protec-
tion. However, gradually the initial momentum was lost, and in
many cases this meant that strong framework legislation, e.g. as
expressed in the constitution of a particular state, was not reflected
in specific laws and regulations. Moreover, the belief in the effi-
ciency of market mechanisms as a way of regulating target behaviour
has not been quite justified by realities. The post-Communist states
do not yet have functioning markets, and thus ‘distortions’ occur
more often here than in mature market economies. Sanctions such
as fines have been rendered inefficient due to inflation, which
demonstrates how the legislative process has failed to keep pace with
the general development of society. The court system has often
proven unable to enforce regulations effectively, and it often takes a
very long time before a case is brought to court. The independence
of courts cannot be taken for granted, and the same goes for con-
trolling agencies, which often have strong ties with regional or local
executive authorities. The authorities, in turn, are often more con-
cerned with an enterprise’s role as an employer, taxpayer and/or
provider of social services than with any adverse effect its activities
may have on the environment.
The transition period has been less protracted and less difficult
in the East European and Baltic States than in the former Soviet
republics. Many of the former countries show signs of approaching
the end of transition, while the future of the latter, the Russian
Federation included, still seems highly uncertain. 
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An agenda for research
The study will focus on Russian implementation activities related to
the international commitments outlined in Chapter 1. By implemen-
tation activities we understand the active steps initiated by Russian
authorities, and presumably carried out in co-operative efforts
between federal and regional authorities, target groups and other
non-state actors (and sometimes also in co-operation with other
states), in order to bring the behaviour of target groups in line with
international commitments. Compliance with international agree-
ments is here not seen as particularly interesting in itself, cf. the ten-
dency referred to above of post-Communist states to show
‘compliance without implementation’. However, compliance is
viewed as relevant to the extent that the observed behaviour of target
groups can be causally linked to implementation activities. Therefore,
each case study will contain an overview of target group compliance
related to the overall discussion of implementation performance.
A point of departure for the study is the lesson drawn in previous
studies that implementation failure is often unintentional, the result
of difficulties encountered during the implementation process rather
than a conscious choice by the state in question to refrain from
implementation. As pointed out in the previous section of this chap-
ter, it can be assumed that this is particularly true for post-Commu-
nist states. During the so-called transition period, these states have
experienced devolution of power – lengthening the previous chain
of implementation – weakened fiscal strength and control over
target group activities, a slow legislative process, a tendency for
sanctions to be ineffective and have only a brief history of indepen-
dent enforcement agencies. Hence, the study has a particular focus
on Russia’s ‘capacity to govern’, here: capacity to initiate and co-
ordinate the necessary organisational and policy-related measures
required to bring the actions of target groups into line with the
country’s international commitments.
By approaching each problem area in the same fashion and sys-
tematically asking the same questions, we will facilitate comparison
between the three cases. First, factors will be identified that fur-
ther/hamper implementation in each specific case. Second, cases will
be compared in order to distinguish between factors that are case-
specific and those that are common to all three cases. Third, these
findings will be compared with findings from other relevant studies. 
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The first step to be carried out within each problem area is to
examine the nature of the problem. This will have strong implica-
tions for our subsequent evaluation and comparison of implementa-
tion records in each of the cases. If the problem is related to activities
of private actors, the implementation process is believed to be more
difficult than if it relates to the working of state enterprises. Like-
wise, implementation is assumed to be more difficult the greater the
significance of the regulated activity in economic terms, and the
harder it is to monitor the activity and detect non-compliant behav-
iour by target groups.
Key questions related to the nature of the problem are:
● Is the activity controlled by private or public actors?
● How important is the activity in economic and other terms?
● How are costs and benefits associated with the activity, and with
regulation, distributed?
● Is it easy or difficult to monitor the activity and detect non-com-
pliance with regulations? 
The next step of the investigation is to study the international com-
mitments selected for examination in each issue area. The more
demanding the commitments – binding rather than non-binding,
containing specific provisions rather than vague ones, and requiring
significant adjustments in the behaviour of target groups – the more
difficult the implementation process can be expected to be. 
Key questions related to the nature of the commitments include:
● How much adjustment in behaviour do the commitments
require?
● Are the provisions of the commitments vague or precise?
● Are the commitments expressed through binding agreements or
are they declaratory in nature? 
The nature of the problem and the nature of the international com-
mitments will be studied to the extent that they may offer alterna-
tive explanations for variation in compliance, i.e. variation that
cannot be ascribed to characteristics of the domestic implementation
process. By contrast, the domestic process is defined as our main
object of scrutiny; thus, it will be studied in greater detail.
Usually, the first step in the domestic implementation process is to
adjust national legislation to the requirements laid down by the
international agreements in question, i.e. in those cases where such
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requirements exist. Consequently, we shall address the legislative
issues first, asking whether the necessary laws and regulations have
been passed at the national and sub-national level, what sanctions
are prescribed and whether these are actually employed. 
Key questions related to the incorporation of international com-
mitments in national legislation are:
● Are international commitments reflected in domestic laws and
regulations?
● Has new legislation been adopted to reflect these commitments?
● What kind of sanctions (if any) does the law provide for in case
of non-compliance?
The further domestic process, whereby the intentions expressed in the
international commitments and in domestic legislation are translated
into action, can progress in different ways. Unless the target groups
are already in compliance with the provisions of the commitments –
which, indeed, would render implementation as we define it unneces-
sary – the authorities must try to influence target group behaviour.
This may involve the use of various methods, from coercion (law
enforcement by [threat of] sanctions), to positive incentives (e.g. mate-
rial support) and communicative efforts (e.g. information campaigns),
and it may involve a large number of actors. Due to the complexity of
this process, we shall approach it in a stepwise fashion, studying the
roles of various groups of actors separately: authorities at various
levels, target groups and other actors like NGOs and research com-
munities. The role of external actors, like international governmental
organisations (IGOs) and foreign NGOs, in the domestic implemen-
tation process will also be addressed. 
The main responsibility for policy implementation normally rests
with the executive branch of government. The delimitation of
responsibilities between various sectoral branches within the execu-
tive as well as between the federal and regional level will be studied.
Of particular interest is the division of responsibility between gov-
ernmental structures representing polluters and users of natural
resources on the one hand and monitoring and enforcement bodies
on the other. As far as target groups and other non-state actors are
concerned, we are primarily interested in whether they are ‘admit-
ted’ into the implementation process, their material capabilities to
influence implementation and the degree of independence they
enjoy vis-à-vis public authorities.
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Key questions related to implementation activities of public
authorities include:
● What are the roles of governmental structures representing pol-
luters and users of natural resources (e.g. industry ministries)
versus those responsible for environmental protection?
● Which are the ‘strongest’ in terms of formal status, budget, per-
sonnel resources etc.?
● To what extent is the responsibility for implementation delegated
to regional and local authorities?
● To what extent are sanctions prescribed by legislation used in
practice?
Key questions related to implementation activities of target groups
are:
● Is the activity in question carried out by private or state actors?
● What kinds of capabilities do the target groups have at their dis-
posal in terms of financial resources, relations with authorities
and contacts to major ‘financial–industrial groups’?
● To what extent is the responsibility for implementation delegated
to the target groups?
Key questions related to implementation activities by other non-
state actors include:
● Are these groups given any official role in the implementation
process?
● What kind of capabilities do they have in terms of financing,
knowledge, contacts etc.?
The latter two questions are relevant also with respect to external
actors. It is necessary to keep in mind that the role of external actors
is analytically somewhat ambiguous. They may be involved more or
less directly in the domestic implementation process, but neverthe-
less it might be more correct to define their activities as an ‘interna-
tional’, rather than ‘domestic’, variable.
Notes
1 For instance, Weiss and Jacobson (1998, p. 1) note that at the time of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stock-
holm in 1972 there were only a few dozen multilateral treaties dealing
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with environmental issues. By the time of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992 more than 900
international legal instruments wee either directed towards environ-
mental protection or had more than one important component
addressing the issue.
2 Thus, Hanf and Underdal (1998) point out how such policy processes
typically run through a number of stages, where the identification of a
problem is frequently followed by the adoption of a framework con-
vention, which, at a later stage, is supplemented by protocols spelling
out more specific measures.
3 Modern international relations theory claims that both realism and
liberalism are rationalist perspectives as opposed to reflectivist
approaches; see, e.g., Wæver (1996).
4 We are aware that the concept ‘joint implementation’ has a more lim-
ited meaning when speaking about, for instance, the global climate
regime. Nevertheless, we have chosen to use it here referring to all
kinds of joint initiatives between Russia and other states to facilitate
implementation of Russia’s international obligations.
5 This is, of course, very much a question of how effectiveness is defined.
Underdal (1992) points out that effectiveness may be understood either
in terms of relative improvement, or in terms of the distance to a
defined optimal state of affairs. The scope of implementing activities
carried out may give a better indication of relative improvement, while
compliance rates may say rather more about the distance to the optimal
state.
6 See note 7, Chapter 1, for our reservations against labelling the post-
Comunist states ‘transition economies’.
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This chapter gives a presentation of Russia’s federative system and
of the political and economic situation in the northwestern regions
of the country. The objective of the first part of the chapter is to
describe the overarching political structures of the Russian Federa-
tion, particularly those pertaining to the centre–region dimension,
thus providing a backdrop to the discussion of various agencies’
involvement in the implementation of international environmental
agreements. The second part of the chapter addresses the particular
political and economic conditions under which implementation is
supposed to take place in the case studies of the book.
The development of a Russian federation
The Russian Federation, in the form it has taken since the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union, is the direct successor of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Some central traits of this
structure, particularly those concerning the formal arrangements of
centre–periphery relations, have been retained in the new federation.
However, the substance of these relations has undergone considerable
changes since the Soviet era. After a brief outline of the Soviet legacy,
the main features of the new Russian federalism, focusing on legal,
political and economic aspects, will be presented in this section.
Federalism and regional self-government: the Soviet legacy1
Unlike its predecessor, the Russian empire, the Soviet Union was
organised in a federal structure.2 Originally, the rationale for
establishing a federal state structure was partly tactical, partly a
3
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consequence of Bolshevik nationalist theory. From a tactical point
of view, the organisation of the RSFSR as a federal unit in January
1918,3 as well as the establishment of the Soviet Union four years
later, can be regarded as a historical compromise between the
Russian-dominated Bolshevik party and their non-Russian allies
(Smith 1995). The Bolsheviks were facing pressures from civil war
and dissolution tendencies within the previous empire, and the most
important ethno-national groups were granted a certain degree of
autonomy as a reward for signing up to the new federal state for-
mation. Furthermore, the establishment of a federal structure partly
follows from the prescriptions of Marxist ideology. Marx himself
had characterised the Russian empire as the ‘prison of nations’, and
his statement that ‘no nation is free as long as it suppresses another
nation’ was frequently cited by Lenin (Kaiser 1994).
The Soviet federal structure that evolved under Stalin was a com-
promise between these ideological guidelines and the demands of
practical politics. The result was a form of ‘pro forma ethno-feder-
alism organised according to the matryoshka principle’ (Blakkisrud
1997, p. 13). Ethnic groups of more than one million people, living
within a geographical region that could easily be demarcated, whose
territory bordered on a third state, were allowed to create union
republics. Groups failing to meet one or more of these requirements
were granted a more limited autonomy within the borders of the
union republics. Depending on various conditions, such as the size
of the population and its level of development, these groups could
establish autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts (regions) or
autonomous okrugs (districts). The administrative division of the
union was subject to frequent revisions under Stalin, and to a certain
degree also under Khrushchev, but from the early 1960s to 1991, it
consisted of 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8
autonomous oblasts and 10 autonomous okrugs.
Parallel to the ethno-federal structure, there existed a strictly admin-
istrative-territorial division in krays (territories) and oblasts within the
greater union republics. These territorially defined units were directly
subordinate to the union republics and were thus not part of the fed-
eral structure. On the other hand, krays and oblasts could themselves
contain federal units, as an autonomous oblast could be included in a
kray, and an autonomous okrug in either a kray or an oblast.
Despite the formal arrangement of both the Soviet Union and
the RSFSR as federations, their power structure was extremely
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hierarchical and centralised.4 In effect, a total subjection to central
party organs was required. The Soviet system of government con-
sisted of three parallel hierarchies: the representative or legislative
organs (soviets); the executive organs (which were nominally subor-
dinate to the soviets at each level); and the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU). At each administrative level (union, republic,
oblast, okrug etc.), there was a soviet, an executive committee and
a party organisation.5 The party provided the vertical line of com-
mand that held the system together. The soviets were large, ‘deco-
rative’ assemblies that met rarely, and did little more than
rubber-stamp the decisions of the executive committees, which had
usually been agreed with the party organisation at the relevant level.
The soviets, on their part, worked according to the paradoxical prin-
ciple of democratic centralism: deputies at each level were account-
able both to their electorate and to the soviet at the next level up. In
practice, however, centralism generally had the upper hand, and, as
already described, party organs exercised a complete control over
decisions in soviets and executive committees.
From RSFSR to the Russian Federation
Among the most dramatic results of Gorbachev’s reforms was the
nationalistic awakening that eventually led to the dismantling of the
Soviet Union itself. After the 1991 August coup attempt failed, the
very processes that the coup makers tried to prevent started to accel-
erate. Gorbachev’s authority became even weaker than before the
failed coup, and institutions at the union level lost most of their
legitimacy, influence and, eventually, also financing. By December
1991, the actual decision-making authority in the Soviet Union had
been transferred to the republic level. One republic after another
declared itself sovereign, and when the leaders of the RSFSR,
Ukraine and Belarus met in early December to create the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), the demise of the Soviet Union
was formalised.
There seems to have been no disagreement among Russian lead-
ers that a federal structure should be retained also in the new Russ-
ian state formation. There were, however, different opinions as to
which form of federalism should be chosen.6 The outcome of the
debate was quite pragmatic: in the unstable political situation of the
day, extensive administrative reforms were perceived as too haz-
ardous, and it was agreed to preserve a slightly modified version of
the old structure. The system of both ethnically and territorially
defined federal subjects was retained. The latter were kept
unchanged, while there was an upgrading in administrative status of
the autonomous republics and four of the five autonomous oblasts,
which were hereafter defined as republics.7 The new Russian Feder-
ation consists of 89 federal subjects, of which 32 are ethnically
defined (21 republics, 1 autonomous oblast and 10 autonomous
okrugs) and 57 are territorially defined (6 krays, 49 oblasts and 2
cities with status as federal subjects). The federal subjects vary
widely with respect to both population and territory. Whereas the
autonomous areas comprise more than 50 per cent of the federa-
tion’s territory, they contain only 18 per cent of its population.
The most controversial issue of Russian politics during the years
1992–93 was the elaboration of a new federal constitution. The pri-
mary controversy ran along the basic fault lines in Russian politics:
the division of power between the President and the Parliament, and
between federal authorities and the regions. The process of elabo-
rating a new constitution was embarked upon already in 1990, but
it was only with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the estab-
lishment of the Russian Federation that the need for a new basic
legal framework became urgent. Various drafts were presented
during 1992 and the first half of 1993. Two of these became the
object of serious discussion, one produced by President Yeltsin and
one by the Constitutional Committee. As was to be expected, the
President’s proposal prescribed a strong presidential rule, while that
of the Constitutional Committee implied a parliamentarian model.
The federal subjects diverged in their view of the proposals. The ver-
tical division of power, i.e. the federal structure, was more impor-
tant to them than the horizontal organisation of the state. As the
controversy sharpened, both the President and the Parliament made
new concessions to the regions in an attempt to win their support.
Several aspects of President Yeltsin’s proposal are clearly designed to
suit the interests of the ethnically defined federal subjects.
In June 1993, Yeltsin summoned a constitutional conference,
which one month later launched a compromise between the two
proposals. A working group was appointed in September to imple-
ment further co-ordination, but before it could present its result,
political realities in Russia changed dramatically. On 21 September,
Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament and ordered new elections. Fierce
protests from the opposition immediately followed. The dispute
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culminated on 3 and 4 October when the protests of the parliamen-
tarians and their supporters, who had barricaded themselves within
the White House, were overcome by force. After these incidents,
President Yeltsin had control of the parliamentary opposition, and
his revised constitution draft represents a clear concentration of
power with the presidential apparatus, as well as a centralist struc-
ture of decision-making.
As the Parliament was now eradicated as a political competitor,
the President no longer depended on the same level of support from
the federal subjects as before. Several of the privileges they had won
in the course of the previous power struggle were now modified or
even omitted from the constitution draft. The republics were, for
instance, no longer described as sovereign entities. When the draft
was voted on in a referendum on 12 December, more than half of
the republics as well as 11 territorially defined federal subjects
rejected it, either through low participation or by votes against it
from more than 50 per cent of the electorate. Nevertheless, the new
Constitution was adopted since it received support from 58.4 per
cent of the electorate at the federal level, and since election turnout
was above 50 per cent (54.8 per cent).
Evolving centre–region relations
The 1993 Constitution replaced the centralised administrative
regime of the Soviet period with a system that grants the federal
subjects a considerable degree of legal autonomy. Executive power
of the regions is nested with the regional administration and its
head of administration, or governor (in the republics: president).
The large regional soviets (with 200–250 members) are replaced
by smaller legislative bodies – most often named dumas8 – at the
regional level.
This section provides a brief overview of main aspects of the legal
relationship between Moscow and the subjects of the Russian
Federation. It also raises the question whether the formal rights of
the federal subjects have been followed up in practice. First, have
political realities in post-Soviet Russia allowed the devolution of
power to ensue according to the legal stipulations of the Constitu-
tion? Second, has decentralisation been accompanied by sufficient
sources of economic revenue at the regional level or been reduced to
a judicial and/or political exercise of good intentions?
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Legal aspects9 The Constitution lays down a threefold framework
for the distribution of jurisdiction between federal and regional
authorities (see Figure 3.1). Article 71 lists all areas where federal
authorities have exclusive competence, including foreign and secu-
rity politics. Article 72 defines a comprehensive list of areas over
which federal and regional authorities have joint jurisdiction. Arti-
cle 73 states that except for the areas of jurisdiction mentioned in
Articles 71 and 72 the federal subjects ‘exercise the entire spectrum
of state power’. The picture is completed by Article 76, Paragraph
4, which states that on matters of joint jurisdiction ‘laws and other
regulatory legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation may
not contravene federal laws’.
In a discussion of centre–region relations, Article 72 is clearly of
most interest since it involves both the federal and regional level. The
Article lists 14 different areas in which the two levels share jurisdic-
tion, among them ‘issues of possession, use and management of the
land, mineral resources, water and other natural resources’ (Article
72, Paragraph 1(c)) and ‘management of natural resources, protec-
tion of the environment and ecological safety’ (Article 72, Paragraph
1(e)). In accordance with Article 76, Paragraph 5, the Constitution
grants federal legislation priority over regional legislation in areas
of joint jurisdiction. On the other hand, the scope of regional legis-
lation is not limited by the areas covered by federal legislation. In
practice, the federal legislature has so far failed to pass legislation on
a variety of important issues under Article 72, leaving considerable
room for regional legislators to freely draft regulations.10
In addition to working through the above-mentioned regional
legal initiative, some federal subjects have tried to reduce the impact
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CONSTITUTION
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Const. Art. 71
Federal const. laws
Federal laws
JOINT JURISDICTION
Const. Art. 72
Federal laws
Regional laws
REGIONAL JURISDICTION
Const. Art. 73
Regional constitutions
Regional laws
Figure 3.1 The legal hierarchy for distribution of competence between the
federal and regional levels
Source: Risnes (2001).
of the legislative vacuum by concluding bilateral agreements with
the federal centre. These agreements normally contain declaratory
provisions on co-operation between federal and regional authori-
ties, but are followed by a number of sub-agreements regulating
more practical questions of particular importance to the federal sub-
ject in question. Although initially conceived as a way to bring a
reluctant Republic of Tatarstan back into the Federation, the bilat-
eral treaties soon developed into a dynamic tool for regulating
centre–region relations. By now, more than half of the federal sub-
jects have adopted such agreements. On the one hand, the adoption
of bilateral agreements strengthens the legal basis of centre–region
relations; on the other, they increase the diversity and inconsistency
of the legal system as a whole.
Finally, it should be noted that the centralised administrative
structure of the Soviet period has not disappeared altogether. Com-
pared to the significant changes in Russian law and politics since the
early 1990s, the bureaucracy has changed surprisingly little. Most
important spheres of politics are still the exclusive responsibility of
federal authorities – ministries (23),11 state committees (6), federal
commissions (2), federal services (13), federal agencies (8) and
supervisory agencies (2) – and these have a fine-meshed net of
representations in the regions. The new legal status of regional
authorities resulted in a need for co-operation between regional
administrations and regional branches of federal authorities. The co-
operation was often co-ordinated by the presidential representative
in the region, a position introduced by President Yeltsin to oversee
the implementation in the regions of decisions made at the federal
level.12 In general, the presence of federal authorities in the regions
appears to have constituted a buffer against effective transferral of
power to the federal subjects. On the other hand, it has been claimed
that regional authorities in reality have enjoyed considerable influ-
ence over federal administration in the regions. As a result, President
Putin in May 2000 introduced seven new federal administrative dis-
tricts aimed at managing the work of federal agencies in the regions
(see next section). At the same time, he took an initiative to bring all
regional legislation into accordance with federal legislation and
review the future of the bilateral agreements by the end of 2001.
Political aspects13 The years prior to the adoption of the 1993 Con-
stitution had been characterised by demands for increased sovereignty
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for political entities at all levels in the Soviet Union/Russian
Federation, often referred to as the ‘Parade of Sovereignties’.14 As
noted above, however, President Yeltsin no longer depended on the
strong support of the regions after defeating the Supreme Soviet in
the autumn of 1993. Already before that, he had secured for himself
the right to personally appoint the heads of regional administrations
(governors) although the Parliament – against the veto of the Presi-
dent – in the spring of 1991 had adopted a law which opened for
direct election of heads of administration.15 Combined with the intro-
duction of presidential representatives in the regions (see previous
section), the period 1993–96 is clearly characterised by Yeltsin tight-
ening his grip on regional executives.16 Moreover, the division of
power emerging during this period developed along what has been
called the ‘executive vertical’, replacing the Communist Party as
the ‘transmission belt’ in relations between the regions and political
centre of the state. At both the federal and regional level, the legisla-
tures were considered subordinate political positions.
After 1996, the Russian regions have consolidated their position
and to some extent also increased their autonomy. A major event in
centre–region relations was the long awaited gubernatorial elections
organised during the winter of 1996–97 (the ‘Parade of Governors’).
The heads of the regional administrations can now refer to a popu-
lar mandate rather than presidential decree as their source of legiti-
macy, clearly reducing their dependence on federal authorities. The
centre can no longer rely on direct control over the executive verti-
cal and has now to resort mainly to the budgetary process in its
efforts to influence development in the regions (see next section).
Recent years have again been characterised by federal authorities
attempting to stop the devolution of power from the centre. As men-
tioned above, giving the presidential representatives responsibility
for overseeing the activities of federal agencies in the regions was no
guarantee of these representatives’ loyalty to federal authorities. In
practice, the majority of presidential representatives appear to have
‘gone native’, ending up as allies of the governors or republican pres-
idents. In the May 2000 reorganisation mentioned above, President
Putin introduced a new administrative layer between the centre and
the federal subjects, the federal okrugs. Seven federal okrugs were
established, led by presidential representatives. The old system of
presidential representatives in the federal subjects was abolished. It
can be argued that the reorganisation represents a re-centralisation
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in itself. Simultaneously, the regional leaders lost the control they
had acquired over federal agencies located on their territory. Shortly
after, Putin also curbed the legal power of the regional heads of
administration by depriving them of their representation in the
Federation Council, the upper house of the Federal Parliament.
Economic aspects17 In the period that followed the establishment
of the Russian Federation, the economy of the country underwent
radical economic reforms. The main elements were privatisation,
price and tax liberalisation and the adoption of a number of laws to
facilitate the introduction of a market economy. The economic
aspect of Russian federalism rests on three main pillars: the division
of responsibility between federal, regional and local authorities; the
re-distributive effects of the tax system; and transfers between the
federal and regional level. The division of responsibility between the
different levels of government implies that the federal level is
responsible for macro-economic stabilisation, inter-regional distrib-
ution and the provision of public goods of national interest, such as
defence. Sub-regional authorities cover expenditures such as health,
primary education and housing subsidies.18 The Russian tax system
consists of local, regional and federal taxes. The most important
taxes are the VAT, the corporate profit tax and the personal income
tax.19 Eighty-five per cent, 81 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively,
of these taxes is transferred to the federal budget. The tax system is
generally considered to be complicated, and compliance is low.
Transfers from federal authorities to the regions is the third instru-
ment of fiscal federalism in Russia, constituting approximately
10–12 per cent of the total federal budget in recent years.20 A.
McAuley (1997)21 finds that more support is transferred to regions
that are poorer than the national average compared to other regions.
Moreover, ethnically defined federal subjects are, almost without
exception, net receivers of federal support.
Until the eve of the rouble crisis in August 1998, the Russian econ-
omy seemed to have stabilised and even embarked on a slightly pos-
itive trend. During the crisis – by Russians referred to only as August
– Russia changed its exchange rate regime from a fixed exchange rate
to a floating one. The devaluation was regarded as a major defeat for
the Russian stabilisation policy,22 but in hindsight it appears to have
implied one step back in order later to take two steps forward. The
rouble has stabilised, inflation did not accelerate, the trade balance
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has improved, and, most importantly, Russia had economic growth
in 1999 and 2000.
Under the Soviet central planning system, political priorities, and
not market mechanisms, determined which resources should be
developed and where production should take place. The extremely
centralised decision-making process, low perceived transportation
costs and remote sources of raw materials contributed to a decen-
tralised economic geography. A by-product of Soviet resource
exploitation and industrial policy was the construction of a large
number of mono-industrial towns in the resource-rich, formerly
largely unpopulated northern peripheries of the Soviet Union.
During the Soviet period, the centripetal forces that have depopu-
lated Western peripheral regions were not in operation in Russia.
Paradoxically, the introduction of decentralised economic decision-
making may reactivate these centripetal forces. Exposed to new
demands for profitability and competitiveness, the transport-intensive
Soviet-style economy faces severe structural problems. Depopulation
may spark a negative spiral at the regional level: fewer people means
a decreasing home market for local industries. This has two implica-
tions for a region’s industrial potential. First, it reduces the market for
local supply industries. Second, it reduces the incentives for the loca-
tion of other industries to the region. Ironically, then, economic
decentralisation in a post-Soviet Russian context thus might lead to
depopulation and centralisation.
The economy and politics of Northwestern Russia
This section presents the northwestern periphery of the Russian Fed-
eration, providing an overview of the economic situation in the
region and its most important political power structures. First, the
geographical concept ‘Northwestern Russia’ is discussed and defined
for further use in the book. Next, a brief historical background is pro-
vided along with some main characteristics of the region in terms of
population, resources and industry. Finally, an overview is provided
of the political system at the regional level in Northwestern Russia.
Northwestern Russia: a concept definition
In Russia, there are several ‘official’ definitions of the country’s
northwestern part. The Russian Northwestern Economic Region,
for instance, is defined as the oblasts of Novgorod, Leningrad and
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Pskov as well as the city of St Petersburg; whereas Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk and Vologda Oblasts, the Republics of Karelia and
Komi and Nenets Autonomous Okrug are defined as the Northern
Economic Region.23 The Northwestern Association, on its part, was
established early in 1993 to facilitate co-ordination of the northern
regions’ relations with the federal centre and to draw Moscow’s
attention to its particular problems.24 It includes the Republics of
Karelia and Komi, as well as Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad,
Kirov, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod and Pskov Oblasts, Nenets
Autonomous Okrug and the city of St Petersburg.
The Russian conceptions of ‘Northwestern Russia’ are all either
significantly broader than – or totally different from – those found
in the West, in particular in the Nordic countries. In the West, the
term ‘Northwestern Russia’ is normally used when referring to
the Russian part of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, i.e. Murmansk
and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the Republic of Karelia and Nenets
Autonomous Okrug. However, there is a tendency at least in Norway
to understand the term even more narrowly; people occasionally
speak of Northwestern Russia even if they primarily have in mind the
Kola Peninsula or Murmansk Oblast. In this book, the subject matter
of the discussion forces a compromise between the two latter defini-
tions. In terms of implementation of international environmental
agreements in the Barents Sea region, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk
Oblasts, and, partly, also the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, are by far
the most relevant federal subjects. Among these, focus is in particular
on the former. For instance, although the ‘northern fishery basin’
of the Russian Federation is defined as including the fisheries of
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the Republic of Karelia and
Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the majority of fishing enterprises are
located in Murmansk Oblast.25 Likewise, air pollution control is more
urgently required on the Kola Peninsula than in the rest of the region,
as are nuclear safety measures.
A brief historical background
Northwestern Russia represents a true microcosm of Soviet and
Russian administrative-territorial engineering. The four federal sub-
jects that are normally understood of as comprising ‘Northwestern
Russia’ include the three main categories of Russian federal entities:
Karelia is a republic, Nenets an autonomous okrug, and Arkhangelsk
and Murmansk are oblasts.26 A brief historical background to the
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two latter regions, covering the main geographical scope of the cur-
rent study, is given in the following.
The history of Murmansk (see Figure 3.2) – both the administra-
tive entity and the city itself – is a relatively short one. In the autumn
of 1997, the inhabitants of Murmansk City celebrated the 80th
anniversary of its founding. At the same time, those so inclined
could celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,
underscoring the relatively brief political and economic history of
the region.
Until World War I, the vast territory of the Kola Peninsula was
inhabited by only a few thousand people and was of practically no
significance, military or otherwise, to the Russian empire.27
Although the strategic potential of the ice-free Murman Coast had
been recognised at least a half-century earlier, the Russian authori-
ties did not move to develop this potential until they were forced to
act by the vicissitudes of World War I. The lack of ice-free ports in
European Russia, except for those in the Black and Baltic Seas where
the Russian fleets could easily be cut off in narrow straits, prompted
the construction of the Murman Railway, which reached the Kola
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Figure 3.2 Murmansk Oblast
Fjord in 1916. The same year, the supply port Romanov-na-
Murmane was founded at the end-stop of the railway line. In 1917,
its name was changed to Murmansk.
During the Civil War of 1918–20, Murmansk was a base for
British, French and American expeditionary forces against the
Bolsheviks, and Soviet power was established only in 1920. The fol-
lowing year, Murmansk became the administrative centre of the
newly formed Murmansk Guberniya. From 1927 through 1937, the
region was administered as an okrug within Leningrad Oblast. As a
result of the region’s growing population and economic and politi-
cal significance, Murmansk attained oblast status in 1938.28
During World War II, the strategic importance of Murmansk and
the Kola Peninsula was proved again – both as a vital corridor for
supplies during the siege of Leningrad and as the home base for the
Northern Fleet, which had been founded in 1933. During the sub-
sequent Cold War, Murmansk Oblast was one of the two regions
within the Soviet Union that shared borders directly with a NATO
member and was thus given high priority. The peninsula was heav-
ily militarised, and by 1970 the Northern Fleet had become the
largest and most important of the Soviet naval fleets. The military
complex employed a significant part of the population and devel-
oped into a state within the state, endowed with its own infrastruc-
ture, generally superior to the civilian one.
The civilian sector of the post-war economy in the oblast came to
be dominated by heavy industry. Entire towns and cities were built
from scratch around enormous mining, metallurgical, and chemical
enterprises (e.g. Nikel, Monchegorsk, Apatity and Kirovsk). Many
of these industrial centres were constructed along the Murman Rail-
way,29 which still constitutes the infrastructural backbone of the Kola
Peninsula. In coastal settlements, and especially in Murmansk City,
the fisheries and fish processing industry also played a significant
role. The fish processing industry in Murmansk gradually came to
supply the USSR as a whole.
Murmansk is a typical Russian northern region in the sense that
major population growth post-dated the Bolshevik Revolution and
was based on the construction of a relatively small number of mas-
sive industrial enterprises and military complexes. The industrialisa-
tion policies of the 1920s ushered in a period of mass immigration
to the Kola Peninsula, a trend that except for a temporary slump
during World War II continued until 1991. The immigrants were
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attracted by a number of advantages granted to the inhabitants of
the Soviet North, such as higher wages, a lower retirement age, and
subsidised holidays at resorts at the Black Sea. Although the standard
of living in Murmansk Oblast therefore was well above the Soviet
average, many of its inhabitants still regarded it as a temporary place
of residence rather than as their permanent home. Most workers
returned to their former areas of residence upon retirement, if not
before, to live on their generous pensions and the savings that the
northern system of compensation had allowed them to accumulate.
Those working in the military and fisheries sectors, where personnel
turnover is generally high, had an even weaker sense of attachment
to the region. The region’s demographic profile has reflected this sit-
uation; the average age of the population was low, and young males
were over-represented.
The two oblasts of the northwestern Russian periphery, Ark-
hangelsk and Murmansk, represent old and new Russia, respectively.
Whereas Murmansk is a prime example of the Soviet industrial and
military adventure, Arkhangelsk (see Figure 3.3) is a centre of tradi-
tional Russian cultural heritage. Zavolochya, which is the old name
of the region where Arkhangelsk Oblast is now situated, was
colonised by the Novgorodians in the Middle Ages. With the fall of
Novgorod, the territories along the shores of the White Sea came
under Moscow’s control. The population was sparse, and settlement
spearheaded by hermits and monks. At the site where Arkhangelsk
City is located, the Monastery of Michael the Archangel was
founded in 1136, and there were also a number of other important
monasteries in the region, e.g. on the Solovets Islands.
The original administrative centre of the region was the city of
Kholmogory, which in the late sixteenth century, at the time
Arkhangelsk City was founded, had some 1,000 inhabitants. The
immediate reason for the founding of Arkhangelsk was Russia’s loss
of the Baltic port of Narva in 1581, which cut Moscow’s access
to the Baltic Sea. Some thirty years earlier, the English seaman
Richard Chancellor, in a failed attempt to find a northeast passage
to China, had landed in the White Sea. Chancellor was received in
Moscow by Tsar Ivan IV, who granted England favourable condi-
tions for trade with Russia over the White Sea. Commerce devel-
oped rapidly, and after the loss of Narva Ivan the Terrible in 1584
decided to develop a new port to facilitate this trade at the shore of
Northern Dvina, i.e. Arkhangelsk.
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The new city soon became an important harbour for trade in
grain, furs, leather, lard and wax. In 1693, the first state-run ship-
yard in Russia was established in Arkhangelsk – what has later been
commemorated as the founding of the Russian navy. After Peter the
Great opened his ‘Window on Europe’, St Petersburg, in 1703, how-
ever, exorbitant duties were introduced to redirect trade to this new
town, and Arkhangelsk lost some of its importance. In 1708,
Arkhangelsk Guberniya was founded. The guberniya was consider-
ably larger than the present oblast, covering the Russian European
North from the Danish–Norwegian border to the Urals. Although
trade dwindled, Arkhangelsk remained by far the largest city in the
Russian north. Moreover, the building of a railway from Moscow to
Arkhangelsk in 1898 spurred industrial growth in the region.
In the Civil War that followed the October Revolution of 1917,
Arkhangelsk became a centre of resistance against the Bolsheviks and
headquarters of the White Army under General Miller’s command.
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Figure 3.3 Arkhangelsk Oblast and Nenets Autonomous Okrug
In August 1918, British troops landed in the city, and although they
were withdrawn in 1919, Arkhangelsk did not fall into Soviet hands
until the following year. The Soviet development of the Far North
led to new growth in Arkhangelsk. While the population of
Arkhangelsk City was 45,000 at the end of the Civil War, it quadru-
pled over the next decade and peaked at over 425,000 at the end of
the Soviet period. Soviet focus on industrialisation and urbanisation
led not only to an increased share of urban population (from 39.6
per cent in 1939 to 73.4 per cent in 1989) but also to a fall in rural
population in absolute numbers (from 641,800 in 1939 to 417,800
in 1989). Overall, the population of the oblast increased by almost
half a million from 1,062,600 in 1939 to 1,515,800 in 1989.
In 1929, Soviet authorities established the Northern Kray, the
administrative centre of which was Arkhangelsk City. In 1937, the
kray was dissolved and replaced by two oblasts, Arkhangelsk and
Vologda. Nenets Autonomous Okrug remained a constituent part of
the oblast throughout the Soviet period. It is a subject of the Russian
Federation, but still forms part of Arkhangelsk Oblast. Although the
1993 Constitution recognises all subjects of the federation as equal
in relation to the federal centre, it maintains the system of
autonomous districts forming a part of an oblast or a kray. The Con-
stitution does not regulate the legal consequences of this, but merely
states that the legal relations between an autonomous okrug and the
oblast or kray which it forms part of can be regulated either through
federal law or an agreement between the two federal subjects.
Arkhangelsk Oblast and Nenets Autonomous Okrug concluded a
preliminary agreement in 1994 and an extended agreement in 1996.
These agreements did not solved all questions of formal relations
between the two federal subjects, but at least provided a foundation
for working relations between the two.30
Population and industry in the region31
Murmansk Oblast encompasses the geographic area of the Kola
Peninsula, covering a land area of 144,900 km2. Almost all the ter-
ritory is situated north of the polar circle and the oblast covers two
climatic zones – tundra and taiga. During the 1990s, immigration to
the oblast slumped and Murmansk, like most other Russian north-
ern regions, experienced a population decline (11.2 per cent from
1990 to 1999). At present, the population is around 1,034,500. In
spite of the recent fall in population, this still makes Murmansk one
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of the most densely populated areas in the entire circumpolar north
(7.1 people per km2). The overwhelming majority of the population
(92 per cent) is concentrated in the region’s widely scattered urban
settlements. There are 16 cities in the oblast, the largest being Mur-
mansk with 387,400 inhabitants (down from more than 468,000 at
the end of the Soviet period), Apatity (70,600), Monchegorsk
(59,800), Severomorsk (57,100) and Kandalaksha (46,900).
Although immigration to Murmansk came from all over the
Soviet Union, the oblast is predominantly Russian with ethnic Rus-
sians making up 83.8 per cent of the total population. Other ethnic
groups living in Murmansk are Ukrainians (8.3 per cent), Belorus-
sians (3.5 per cent), Tatars (1 per cent), Mordvins (0.4 per cent) and
Chuvashs (0.2 per cent). The aboriginal population, the Saami,
today number approximately 1,600 (0.15 per cent of the total pop-
ulation), and are concentrated to the Lovozero Rayon.
The economic geography of Murmansk Oblast is typical of Soviet
mono-industrial specialisation. Several of the largest towns in the
oblast are dependent on a single or very few enterprises operating in
the same type of industry. Table 3.1 shows that the ‘dependency
rate’, defined as the ratio of the number of employees in the largest
enterprise in each town to the number of inhabitants, is extremely
high in the oblast (more than 20 per cent in all the listed towns).
Table 3.1 Employment by main firm and population in some towns of
Murmansk Oblast
Town Employment in Population in 
main company municipality Main product
Kovdor 5,000 + 2,500a 28,000 Iron concentrate, apatite
Apatity 18,000 82,000 Apatite concentrate
Olenegorsk 5,500 33,800 Iron concentrate
Lovozero 4,000 19,000 Loparthite
Polyarnye Zori 6,000 18,000 Nuclear power
Monchegorsk 10,000 65,500 Nickel
Pechenga 8,500 20,000 + Nickel
22,000b
Source: Maurseth (1997, 2001).
a two firms.
b population in Nikel and Zapolyarnyy.
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Although the industrial sector of Murmansk Oblast performed
better than the Russian average during the economic hardships of
the 1990s,32 industrial production decreased significantly during the
1990s, as reflected in Figure 3.4. The figure shows a dramatic reduc-
tion in agricultural production and the fishing industry. The fish-
processing plant in Murmansk City used to be one of the largest in
Europe, but has operated at a fraction of its full potential since the
mid-1990s. The production of raw materials like iron ore and con-
centrate has decreased less than the overall industrial production.
There has even been an increase in the production of apatite. The
high concentration of mono-industrial towns in the oblast makes
Murmansk particularly vulnerable to economic fluctuations.
Arkhangelsk Oblast – including the archipelagos of Novaya
Zemlya and Franz Josef Land, as well as Nenets Autonomous Okrug
– covers a territory of 587,400 km2. Even if the okrug is excluded
on the basis of constituting a separate federal entity, Arkhangelsk,
with a territory of 410,700 km2, remains one of the larger federal
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Figure 3.4 Output of some industrial products in Murmansk Oblast in
1998 in % of 1993 output
Source: Maurseth (2001) and Murmansk Regional Committee of State Statistics
(1999).
subjects. The present population of the oblast (again excluding
the okrug) is 1,491,900 people; 74.1 per cent of the population live
in urban settlements. There are fourteen cities, the largest being
Arkhangelsk City with 368,900 inhabitants. Other important cities
are: Severodvinsk (239,000 inhabitans), Kotlas (66,800), Novod-
vinsk (48,700) and Koryazhma (44,500).33
Arkhangelsk is a thoroughly Russian oblast: 92.1 per cent of the
population is ethnic Russian.The largest minority groups are made
up by Ukrainians (3.4 per cent), Belorussians (1.3 per cent), and
Komi (0.5 per cent). Local Russians were traditionally known as
Pomors, a subgroup of the Russian ethnos. The Pomors distin-
guished themselves through their occupation (fishing), traditions,
culture and distinct dialect. With the influx of newcomers to the
region in the Soviet period, however, the Pomor culture has all but
disappeared. The aboriginal population (ancient tribes such as the
Chuds and Biarms, as well as the present day Nenets and Saami)
have either been assimilated or pushed aside throughout the cen-
turies of Russian domination and no longer compose distinct ele-
ments (altogether some 750 Nenets live in the oblast).
Historically, forestry has been the most important industry in the
Arkhangelsk region. Until the 1970s, when it was surpassed by Irkutsk
Oblast, Arkhangelsk was the leading producer of timber in the Soviet
Union. Up to two-fifths of the industrial production is still related to
forestry (saw-timber, furniture, paper, pulp etc.). Also shipbuilding
has deep roots in Arkhangelsk. The Sevmash and Zvyozdochka ship-
yards in Severodvinsk serve the military sector (Sevmash builds and
Zvyozdochka repairs and modifies nuclear submarines).
Also Arkhangelsk Oblast was hit by the economic crisis of the
1990s. Figure 3.5 demonstrates that, apart from the oil and gas
industry mainly located in Nenets Autonomous Okrug,34 there was a
significant decrease in industrial output in the region. As in Mur-
mansk Oblast, industries serving the domestic consumer market,
such as the diary and meat industries, were particularly hard hit.
‘Traditional’ production of timber and paper nearly halved in the
period. The fish-processing industry also experienced a serious
decline as a result of lack of raw materials, the local industry unable
to compete either in price, or in location in relation to fishing
grounds and markets. Arkhangelsk Oblast has a more diversified
industrial structure than Murmansk Oblast and is therefore better
suited to meet the challenges of further economic hardships. So far,
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however, Arkhangelsk has been heavily dependent on federal trans-
fers. Among the Northwest Russian federal subjects, only Murmansk
has been a net donor to the federal budget.
Political organisation of the region
The regions of the Russian Federation are organised politically
according to the same principle as the federal level: a sharing of
responsibility between a legislative duma and a directly elected head
of the executive power (a president at the federal level as well as in
the republics, and governors in the other federal subjects). The latter
is not answerable to the former.
The political organisation of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts
is laid out in their Regional Charters of 26 November 1997 and 23
May 1995, respectively. According to the Charters, the Head of
Administration (Governor) is the leading political figure of both
regions. The Governor is elected for four years and can only hold
the post for two periods. The legislative body of Murmansk Oblast,
the regional duma, consists of 25 deputies elected for a four-year
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Figure 3.5 Output of some industrial products in Arkhangelsk Oblast in
1998 in % of 1993 output
Source: Maurseth (2001) and Arkhangelsk Regional Committee of State Statistics
(1999).
period. In Arkhangelsk Oblast, there is a regional sobraniye consist-
ing of 41 representatives (including one from Nenets Autonomous
Okrug). The Governors have rather wide authority over the regional
legislatures inasmuch as they have the right to summon extraordi-
nary sessions of the duma/sobraniye and to reject laws adopted by it.
Hence, political power in Northwestern Russia resides for all prac-
tical purposes with the Governors and their administration. The
Arkhangelsk regional sobraniye is considered as rather co-operative
vis-à-vis its regional administration, the Murmansk legislature more
hostile (Blakkisrud 2001b, p. 74). In February 1998, a new political
structure, the regional government, was introduced in Murmansk
Oblast. It is appointed by the Governor and consists of the Deputy
Governors, i.e. the leaders of all departments of the regional admin-
istration. The First Deputy Governor is appointed premier of the
regional government.35
Until 1996–97, most governors were appointed by President
Yeltsin, among them Yevgeniy Komarov in Murmansk and Pavel
Balakshin and later Anatoliy Yefremov36 in Arkhangelsk, all recruited
from the old party nomenklatura. In the run-up to the gubernatorial
elections of Murmansk Oblast in late 1996, Komarov enjoyed sub-
stantial economic and moral support from the Kremlin. Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin even visited Murmansk on the eve of the
elections with the apparent intention of supporting the incumbent.
Nevertheless, Komarov did not succeed in bringing victory home.
None of the candidates achieved the necessary 50 per cent of the
votes in the first round of the elections. In the run-off, Komarov (40.7
per cent) lost to Yuriy Yevdokimov (43.5 per cent), former First Sec-
retary of the Oblast Committee of the Communist Party and former
Chairman of the Oblast Soviet (1990–93). Yevdokimov’s political
platform was the Congress of Russian Communities, the party for
which General Aleksandr Lebed had ran in the duma elections in
1995, and his candidacy was supported by Lebed’s new Honour and
Motherland movement. Yevdokimov has later been associated with
the Fatherland movement of Moscow’s Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and
threw his support behind Putin after he had been installed as Acting
President.37 In the following elections in March 2000, Yevdokimov
was re-elected with 59.8 per cent of the votes in the first round
of elections. He stands forth as an active and entrepreneurial gover-
nor who succeeds relatively well in defending the interests of
the region vis-à-vis federal authorities. Within the military, he is
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particularly popular for having launched an adoption campaign for
the vessels of the Northern Fleet, whereby other federal subjects,
cities and business enterprises contribute material supplies to the
crisis-ridden fleet.38
In Arkhangelsk Oblast, the incumbent succeeded in securing a
popular mandate in the 1996 election. Anatoliy Yefremov had been
in office for less than nine months and was probably less associated
with the negative impact of economic and social reform on the pop-
ulation. Running against the Communist Yuriy Guskov, he could
also draw on the entire reform-oriented electorate in the run-off. He
won a solid victory, 62.0 per cent as against Guskov’s 28.8 per cent.
In the 2000 election, Yefremov won 49 per cent in the first round to
former oblast Prime Minister Nikolay Malakov’s 32.3 per cent. In
the run-off, Yefremov won 58.5 percent of the vote while Malakov
got 31.6 per cent.
As follows from the first section of this chapter, bilateral power-
sharing agreements between Moscow and the federal subjects
have become an important instrument in filling the legal vacuum
in Russian centre–region relations. Among the Northwest Russian
federal subjects, only Murmansk Oblast has concluded a power-
sharing agreement with federal authorities (Murmansk Oblast
1997a). The agreement was signed by President Yeltsin and Gover-
nor Yevdokimov on 30 November 1997. By this time, the process of
developing Russian federalism through such agreements was on the
wane, and the agreement was not as advantageous to the oblast as
the early bilateral agreements of 1994–95. In addition to declara-
tions on co-operation, it lists a range of areas as joint responsibili-
ties, including the environment and management of natural
resources. Arkhangelsk began drafting an agreement, but negotia-
tions seem to have stalled.39
Federal authorities are heavily represented on the territory of
Northwestern Russia. First, some 40–55 federal agencies have their
representations in each federal subject of the region.40 The North-
western Federal Okrug, which has its main office in St Petersburg, is
also represented. Second, the region is heavily militarised, and as a
result large parts of its territory are under federal (military) control.
In addition to military base areas, there are six so-called closed
towns in Murmansk Oblast – rendering Murmansk the federal
subject with most closed towns in the entire Russian Federation –
and one in Arkhangelsk. These are the direct responsibility of
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federal, not regional authorities. In 1992, a new law, On the Closed
Administrative-Territorial Formation (Russian Federation 1992),
gave some forty-five formerly secret cities in Russia civilian names
and established a division of responsibility between civilian and
military authorities within them. A study by the authors of this book
(Hønneland and Jørgensen 1998, 1999a) concludes that the closed
towns on the Kola Peninsula have not been significantly more inte-
grated into the surrounding civil society since the disintegration
of the Soviet Union; politically, economically and socially, the inhab-
itants and authorities of the closed towns relate more to Moscow
and other parts of the Russian Federation than to the regional centre
of Murmansk.
Finally, it should be observed that the federal subjects of North-
western Russia have tended to be less confrontational towards the
federal centre than Russian regions in general. They have only to a
very limited extent adopted legislation that contradicts federal law,
and the elected governors in the area have generally been eager to
be on a good footing with the Kremlin. There are several possible
explanations for this deference. First, it can be assumed that federal
authorities have more control over such a militarised region as
Northwestern Russia than less strategically important regions.
Second, the abundant natural resources of the region may have
made federal authorities particularly eager to maintain control here.
Third, it can be argued that the economic vulnerability of the region
– Arkhangelsk is a net recipient of the federal budget; Murmansk is
a donor, but its industrial future is insecure due to the large concen-
tration of mono-industrial towns here – reduces its leaders’ wish to
challenge the authority of the federal government.41
Conclusions
The object of study of the present investigation – the implementa-
tion of international environmental agreements in Russia – renders
the status and application of Article 72 in the Russian Constitution
particularly interesting. The management of natural resources and
the environment falls under this article and hence under the joint
jurisdiction of federal and regional authorities. According to Article
76 of the Constitution, federal law has priority over regional law in
areas of joint jurisdiction, but the regional authorities nevertheless
enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre. First, federal legislation
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is still poorly developed, and it can become difficult for federal
authorities to change a practice that for years has been followed in
accordance with regional legislation. Second, there is an almost
unlimited number of approaches to an area of law, and Article 76,
Paragraph 5, refers only to instances of direct contradiction between
legislation of the two levels. In addition to this is the fact that indi-
vidual bilateral agreements have come to fill the legal vacuum
between the federal centre and more than half of the subjects of the
Russian Federation.
More interesting for our investigation than the legal peculiarities
is the political ‘tug-of-war’ between various agencies at various
levels. A main line of conflict clearly runs between the federal and
regional level in general. The former is represented by ministries,
state committees, supervisory agencies and others (see above), the
latter by the regional administrations under the leadership of gover-
nors (in the republics: presidents). We have seen that the governors
strengthened their position during the second half of the 1990s, but
President Putin in 2000 introduced various measures that may curb
their authority. A second line of potential conflict is in the interface
between regional authorities and the representations of federal
agencies located on their territories. There are indications that rep-
resentatives of the latter tend to ‘go native’, becoming primarily
spokespersons of their own geographical entity in relation to federal
authorities. Third, one can imagine conflicts arising between various
agencies at the same administrative level. At the federal level, differ-
ent ministries or state committees may fight over formal powers
since these are normally accompanied by allocations from the fed-
eral budget. This is particularly likely in the functional fields of our
study since the responsibility to manage natural resources often
implies control of revenues from extraction of these resources, and
the management of the environment in recent years has come to
involve considerable transfers of financial assistance from the West.
At the regional level, the number of actors is more limited. A certain
degree of conflict is often found between the regional administra-
tions and the regional legislature. However, this has so far not been
a major issue in Russian regional politics since the authority of the
latter is so limited compared to the regional executive. Finally, the
political clout of the former industry complexes – in Soviet times
performing both economic activities at enterprise level and the
implementation of state politics – and various political bodies at
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both federal and regional level continues to be of interest and will be
reverted to in the case studies of the book.
The implementation of international environmental agreements
in Northwestern Russia takes place in a political and administrative
setting that is still in the making, and in an atmosphere of economic
insecurity. Both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts have been hard
hit by the general economic crisis in Russia during the 1990s. Pro-
duction has fallen markedly in most sectors of the economy; the
result is increased unemployment and decreased population in the
region. Prospects for the future are particularly insecure for the
mono-industrial towns of Murmansk Oblast. Nevertheless, Mur-
mansk is so far the only federal subject in Northwestern Russia that
is a net donor to the federal budget.
The federal subjects of Northwestern Russia have generally
sought a co-operative, rather than a confrontational stance in rela-
tion to federal authorities. This preliminary ‘conclusion’ will be fur-
ther tested in the sector analyses of this book: first, have regional
authorities given federal agencies the upper hand also in matters of
fisheries management, nuclear safety and air pollution control?
Second, how are power relations between regional authorities and
representations of federal authorities in the regions? Little is known
about the relations between these two categories of government in
Northwestern Russia in general. The issue to be raised in the case
studies of the book is whether they tend to side with each other or
represent competing positions. For instance, do regional agencies of
the federal system for fisheries management mainly defend the inter-
ests of the regional fisheries complex? Third, are there conflicts
between different agencies at the same administrative level? The
governors and their regional administrations are by far the most
important political figures in Northwestern Russia, but do the
regional legislatures nevertheless have a certain influence in envi-
ronmental matters? Finally, how is the role of the former ‘industry
complexes’ to be understood? This last question is highly relevant
for all three case studies. Is the old concept of the ‘northern fishery
basin’ – previously gathered under the Sevryba umbrella – still a rel-
evant category in discussions about Northwest Russian fisheries
management? What is the role of the ‘nuclear complex’ – mainly
understood as the power plant at Polyarnye Zori, the nuclear ice-
breaker fleet of Murmansk Shipping Company and the military
nuclear installations – in securing nuclear safety in the region? Is the
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mining and metallurgical complex a significant actor in issues of air
pollution control? And how has the representation of ‘industry-
complex’ directors in the regional duma of Murmansk Oblast
affected regional legislation?
Notes
1 This and the next section are partly adapted from Hønneland and Jør-
gensen (1999a), which in turn was based on Blakkisrud (1997).
2 The Russian empire was organised in gubernii which were ruled by
governors and directly subordinate o the cabinet in St Petersburg. With
a few exceptions, their borders were not drawn in accordance with
ethno-demographic realities.
3 The first federal unity within the RSFSR, the Volga–German
Autonomous Workers’ Commune, was established in October 1918,
but it was only after the end of the Civil War that the federalisation
process gathered momentum.
4 Since their unity was maintained through power at the centre, some
observers have described them as pseudo-federations (Duchacek
1987).
5 There was arguably a fourth hierarchy, that of the central ministries
whose enterprises (each with its own party cell) operated independently
of the Soviets and the executive committees, see Whitefield (1993).
6 Among other things, they included a proposal to dissolve the ethnically
defined entities and create fewer and larger territorially defined federal
subjects. See Hanson (1994) and Sakwa (1993) for a discussion.
7 The Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Birobidzhan) was the only
autonomous oblast not to gain the status of republic. It was, however,
recognised as an independent federal subject separate from the kray of
Khabarovsk, to which it had previously been subordinate.
8 The designations sobraniye (assembly) and soviet (council) could also
be used.
9 This section is based on Risnes (2001).
10 A striking example is the regulation of ownership of land. The federal
authorities were working on drafts of a land code for a number of
years, but succeeded in passing a final code only in autumn 2001. The
reason for this delay was disagreement between the President and the
state duma. In the meantime, more than fifty federal subjects had
adopted their own land codes.
11 There were twenty-four ministries until October 2001, when the Min-
istry of Federation Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policies was dis-
banded. However, in December the same year a new minister without
portfolio was appointed to co-ordinate government institutions on
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nationalities issues (RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 6 December
2001).
12 A system of presidential representatives in the oblasts and krays was
first introduced immediately after the coup attempt in August 1991.
Later, it was extended to the republics, and eventually institutionalised
in the 1993 Constitution. Such representatives were not sent to all fed-
eral subjects. Generally, Yeltsin seemed more reluctant to station his
representatives in ethnically defined than in territorially defined federal
subjects.
13 This section is based partly on Blakkisrud (2001b).
14 A famous statement representing this development is Boris Yeltsin’s,
then newly elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR,
invitation to the autonomous areas of the Union to ‘take as much sov-
ereignty as you can swallow’.
15 Several regional elections were actually held, where heads of adminis-
tration were replaced by representatives of the local elite. See Hanson
(1994) for details.
16 However, the picture is not unambiguous. In general, leaders of the
ethnically defined federal subjects were elected, and they also tended to
escape the interference of presidential representatives.
17 This section is based on Maurseth (2001).
18 During the first years of the existence of the Russian Federation, there
were signs of regional authorities providing services that were obvi-
ously a federal responsibility, like issuing ‘surrogate money’. This seems
to have become less widespread in recent years.
19 The VAT rate was 20 per cent in 2000, tax on profit 30 per cent and
tax on personal income 13 per cent.
20 The Federal Fund for Financial Support of the Regions was set up in
1994 to create a more coherent framework for channelling resources
to the most needy regions. The fund, partly financed by VAT receipts,
still constitutes the major source for federal transfers to the regions.
21 Referred in Maurseth (2001).
22 Keeping the rouble within the predetermined ‘rouble corridor’ was
viewed as essential to deflate the economy. This had been achieved
since 1995, and the economic growth since 1997 was regarded as a
well-deserved result of this monetary stabilisation.
23 These terms are mainly used for statistical purposes.
24 All of Russia’s 89 federal subjects except for Chechnya belong to one
of eight inter-regional economic associations set up between 1992 and
1994, and based on Soviet-era economic-administrative divisions (i.e.
planning regions). The ambitions and work practices differ somewhat
among the associations, but their common goal is to co-ordinate inter-
nal co-operation as well as their relations with the political centre. The
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Siberian Accord is often referred to as the most ambitious, extensive
and successful of the inter-regional associations.
25 For the sake of language variation, the geographical terms are sometimes
used without indication of federation subject category (oblast, republic
or okrug). This might serve to confuse the two oblasts of the region with
the cities of similar names. However, the cities are always referred to
specifically, e.g. as Murmansk City or the city of Arkhangelsk.
26 The presentation is based on Hønneland and Jørgensen (1999a) and
Blakkisrud and Hønneland (2001). Statistical material is from Makfol
and Petrov (1998) and Goskomstat Rossii (1998).
27 The Terskiy Coast (the eastern part of the peninsula) came under the
control of the Republic of Novgorod in the thirteenth century, but
there are no records of permanent Novgorodian settlement on the
peninsula until the first half of the fifteenth century. Following the col-
lapse of the Novgorodian state in 1487, the area became a relatively
neglected northern outpost of the Muscovite Principality. Almost a cen-
tury later, permanent settlements were established along the northern
coast at Kola and Pechenga, the first centred around a new fortification,
the latter around a monastery. In 1708, Kola Uyezd (district) was
included in the new Arkhangelsk Guberniya. In 1883, however, the
uyezd was re-established within the guberniya and subsequently
renamed Aleksandrovsk Uyezd in 1899 after the newly founded town
of Aleksandrovsk (the present closed military town of Polyarnyy).
28 The new oblast consisted of the territory of the former Murmansk
Okrug, as well as Kandalaksha Rayon, which was transferred from
Karelia. In 1945, the former Finnish territory of Petsamo (now
Pechenga) and the port of Liinakhamari were transferred to the oblast.
29 During most of the Soviet period known as the Kirov Railway.
30 See Blakkirud (2001a, 2001b) and Risnes (2001) for discussions of the rel-
ationship between Arkhangelsk Oblast and Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
31 This section is based on Hønneland and Jørgensen (1999a), Hønneland
and Blakkisrud (2001) and Maurseth (2001).
32 At the turn of the millennium, the industrial production of the oblast
had stabilised at 65 per cent of the 1991 level as compared to 50 per
cent for Russia as a whole. The corresponding figure for Arkhangelsk
Oblast was 61 per cent.
33 These cities make up two clusters of urban settlements: Severodvinsk,
which is a centre for the military–industrial complex and the ship-
building industry, and Novodvinsk with its wood-processing industry
are satellites of Arkhangelsk, whereas Koryazhma is a satellite of
Kotlas, the centre of the southern, agricultural region. On the other
hand, Novaya Zemlya and Frantz Josef Land as well as the northern
parts of the mainland are more or less uninhabited.
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34 As seen in Figure 3.5, the production of oil and gas enjoyed a consid-
erable increase in the period. Since energy prices were extremely low
in the Soviet Union as compared to world market prices, the Russian
integration into the world economy boosted the price of oil and gas
dramatically, hence increasing profits and thereby also production of
oil and gas.
35 The introduction of this new institution seems to have had very limited
consequences.
36 Balakshin was removed from office in February 1996, allegedly due to
economic mismanagement.
37 Hedenskog (2000) points out that Yevdokimov displays an astonishing
proclivity to play on the wrong horse among the top politicians in
Russia: as leader of the regional Soviet in 1993, he supported Vice Pres-
ident Aleksandr Rutskoy and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan
Khasbulatov in their struggle with President Yeltsin. Later, he sup-
ported Sergey Kiriyenko in August 1998 and Yevgeniy Primakov in
April 1999, at times when both prime ministers were on the threshold
of being removed from power.
38 When asked in a television interview in October 1999 what had been
his most important achievement as a politician, Yevdokimov referred to
this adoption campaign. For more detailed descriptions of the cam-
paign, see Hønneland and Jørgensen (1999a) or Jørgensen (2001).
39 See Blakkisrud (2001b) and Risnes (2001) for differing views on the
prospects of Arkhangelsk Oblast eventually concluding a power-
sharing agreement with federal authorities.
40 The exact figure varies. In late 1999, the number for Murmansk was 40
and for Arkhangelsk 54 (Blakkisrud 2001; Risnes 2001). No investiga-
tion has been carried out of the degree to which these have ‘gone
native’ (see first section of this chapter). This question will partly be
addressed in the case studies of this book.
41 Relations between Moscow and the federal subjects of Northwestern
Russia are discussed at length in Hønneland and Blakkisrud (2001).
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The Barents Sea fish resources have for centuries constituted a main
foundation for life in the northern parts of Fennoscandia. As follows
from Chapter 1, these resources have since the mid-1970s been
managed by a bilateral Norwegian–Russian regime, which in turn
partly serves to spur the implementation of these countries’ obliga-
tions in accordance with global and regional fisheries agreements.
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss how Russian author-
ities since the break-up of the Soviet Union have implemented their
international obligations in the fisheries sector of the country’s
northwestern region. How have federal and regional authorities co-
ordinated the management of marine resources within the territor-
ial waters of the Russian Federation, which according to the
Constitution is an area of ‘joint jurisdiction’ (Article 72)? Have
regional authorities abstained from interfering with the manage-
ment of resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), since the
Constitution defines this as a federal responsibility (Article 71)? To
what extent is fisheries management still performed by the corporate
structure of the ‘fisheries complex’, as this was done in Soviet times?
Implementation is discussed with reference to more overarching
political developments in the Russian Federation in general and
Northwestern Russia in particular, and also seen in relation to the
nature of the problem at hand and of the obligations to be imple-
mented. A brief overview of the resource basis, with an emphasis on
the joint Russian–Norwegian fish stocks, and main target groups is
given before we embark upon the discussion.
4
Fisheries management
Background: resource basis and industry structure
The Barents Sea fish resources
The Barents Sea contains a rich abundance of fish stocks of a variety
of species. The basis for the abundance of these fish resources is the
high rate of plankton production in these waters, which provide
food for large stocks of pelagic fish – i.e. fish living in the space
between the sea floor and surface. The pelagic fish stocks, first and
foremost capelin and herring, are in turn the prey of ground-fish, like
cod, haddock and saithe. Both pelagic and groundfish serve as food
for sea birds, marine mammals and people. Cod, capelin and herring
are key species in the ecosystem. Cod feed on capelin, herring and
smaller cod, while herring feed on capelin larvae. Periods with good
recruitment to the cod and herring stocks and a reduced capelin
stock tend to alternate with periods when herring is absent from the
Barents Sea, while recruitment to the cod stock is moderate and
capelin abundant.
The Barents Sea capelin (Mallotus villosus) stock used to be
among the largest and most important fish stocks in the northeast
Atlantic. One major trait of this stock is that large variations in indi-
vidual growth from year to year lead to substantial fluctuations in
stock size, which have considerable implications for the whole
ecosystem. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the total
biomass fluctuated from close to 9 million tonnes (1975) to 0.2 mil-
lion tonnes (1986). The capelin stock size was rather stable during
the 1970s; in the 1980s, it decreased profoundly. Overfishing rein-
forced a natural downward fluctuation, bringing the stock close to
total breakdown. Commercial fishing for capelin was halted in
1986, and the stock started to recover. Fishing was resumed again in
1991. A new collapse occurred in 1993. The stock recovered once
again – at least partly. Fishing was resumed in 1999 for the first time
since 1993. The quota that has been established is quite moderate.
The stock of Atlanto-Scandinavian herring (Clupea harengus) was
the largest fish stock in European waters until its collapse in the late
1960s. The normal migration pattern from the North Sea to the
spawning grounds off the Norwegian coast was broken in 1970. The
stock had then been reduced to such an extent that the remaining
fish found sufficient food off the Norwegian coast. The old migra-
tion pattern was only resumed in the mid-1990s. The stock has
increased considerably in recent years, and herring catches in the
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North Sea are approaching those of the 1950s. However, the stock
is now thought to be in decline. The cohort groups from 1993
onward seem to be weak. Some herring fry drift with the Gulf
Stream into the Barents Sea each year, although their numbers are
highly variable. Each age group spends three years here, feeding on
capelin as they drift northward. While contributing to the total her-
ring stock, the young herring of the Barents Sea may be considered
a threat to the capelin. However, the herring also relieves the pres-
sure on capelin, since it is itself preyed upon by cod. Although her-
ring is not commercially exploited in the Barents Sea, its presence
does affect the fishing in the area.
Norwegian–Arctic cod (Gadus morhua) spawn along the coastline
of Norway from the age of seven. After spawning, they return to the
Barents Sea. Fry of this species also drift into the northern parts of
the Barents Sea. From the age of four, cod prey upon capelin as the
latter species moves southward to its breeding grounds. The cod
stock reached a total of some four million tonnes at the end of the
1960s. The stock decreased steadily throughout the 1970s to reach
less than one million tonnes in 1984. Strong age groups were
recruited in the years from 1983 to 1985, but these cohorts were
reduced in 1986–88 due to a lack of food and heavy fishing. Only at
the beginning of the 1990s was the level of the late 1970s regained.
This increase was mainly realised through quota regulation, which
significantly moderated the fishing effort for cod. The stock of cod
has shown a decline since 1993. Furthermore, stock estimates were
regulated to lower levels in 1998, as scientists discovered that the
method used previously had resulted in an overestimation of the
stock. The quota for cod has been cut significantly in recent years.
The development of the Norwegian–Arctic haddock (Melano-
grammus aeglefinus) stock in the Barents Sea tends to follow the
same pattern as the cod. Having reached an all-time low in 1983–84,
an increase was brought about by strong age groups from the years
1982–83. Another decline took place in the late 1980s. From 1990,
recruitment improved markedly until 1995. In recent years, a
modest overall decrease has been observed, but the spawning stock
has increased. Fluctuations in the size of each age group are more
significant for haddock than for cod, and the total stock is also con-
siderably smaller. Thus, it is thought that it will be difficult to sustain
a stable haddock fishery over time.
The Northwest Russian fishing industry
The fishing industry of Northwestern Russia developed rapidly after
the Russian Revolution in 1917. The Murmansk Trawl Fleet was
established in 1920, and a development programme for the fisheries
sector was launched in 1926 by the central Soviet power. The build-
ing of the Murmansk Fishing Combinate, which was to become the
largest industrial fish processing complex in the Soviet Union, was
started via this government initiative. As in other areas of the indus-
trial sector in the Soviet Union, the sector principle was the guide
used to organise the fisheries sector. This implied that the economic
sphere of the union was divided into a certain number of sectors each
of which was subordinated to its respective ministry. Apart from
Khrushchev’s attempts during the period 1957–64 to implement a
territorial organisation of Soviet industry, the sector principle
prevailed until the post-Soviet privatisation project started in 1992.
The association of fishing companies in the northern basin of the
Soviet Union, Sevryba (meaning North Fish), was founded in 1965.
It was given the status of General Directorate of the Soviet Ministry
of Fisheries in Northwestern Russia. Similar bodies were set up in
the Far East (Dalryba), the Baltics (Zapryba), the Caspian Sea
(Kaspryba) as well as the Azov Sea and the Black Sea (Azcherryba,
later re-named Yugryba). After several less comprehensive reorgani-
sation efforts, Sevryba was made into a private joint-stock company
in the autumn of 1992. Twenty-three companies with various core
activities (ranging from shipowners, on-shore processing factories, a
shipyard, research institutions, sales and supply organisations and
various other firms) constituted the founders of the company. In
April 1993, the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North
(Sever) was included in the A/O Sevryba structure. This union,
founded in 1992, comprises more than 130 small private firms
directly involved in or connected to the fishing industry in North-
western Russia. However, only 70 of these are involved in the catch-
ing of fish, and no more than 18 of them have a cod quota in the
Barents Sea. The core activity of most is not fishery; they have
recourse to the catching or selling of fish primarily to raise funds for
other types of production or trade.
The main structure of the fishing companies was upheld within
the new institutional framework, which means that the majority of
the approximately 450 fishing vessels located in Northwestern
Russia are still controlled by a handful of fishing companies. The rest
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are distributed between kolkhozes (the collective fleet) and other so-
called new small private fishing companies. The total number of ves-
sels has been relatively stable since the early 1990s as few old vessels
have been decommissioned (despite exceeding their anticipated life-
time), and few new vessels have been purchased. The existing fish-
ing companies in Northwestern Russia can be placed in five different
categories as seen in Table 4.1.
The old Soviet fleets consist mainly of medium-sized (50–70
metres) and large (over 70 metres) vessels, and each company owns
between 30 and 95 vessels. All in all, there are 250–300 vessels.
Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, their main activity was
the exploitation of pelagic species in distant waters and pelagic and
demersal species in the Northern Atlantic Ocean and the Barents Sea.
Now, they mainly fish for cod in the Barents Sea. The kolkhozes rep-
resent in some respects similar fleet structures as the traditional fish-
ing companies, but have significantly fewer vessels, ranging from one
to ten vessels each. They count around 80–100 vessels altogether.
Nearly all are mid-sized (50–70 metres). An important characteristic
of the fishing collectives is the wider diversification of their business
activities than the other fishing companies and they are more
engaged than the others in the catch of pelagic species. The new
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Table 4.1 The main user groups in the Northwest Russian fishing industry
Inside Sevryba Outside Sevryba
Source: Hønneland and Nilssen (2001).
The old Soviet fleets (Murmansk
Trawl Fleet, Murmanrybprom,
Sevrybkholodflot,
Sevrybpromrazvedka,
Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Base,
Arkhangelskrybprom and
Karelrybflot)
The Union of Private Fishing
Enterprises in the North (about
130 enterprises, of which
approximately 55 are involved
in fishing)
Thirty-one kolkhozes (fishing
collectives) organised in
Roskolkhozsoyuz
Eight kolkhozes organised in the
Union of Fishing Collectives in
the North
The Union of Coastal Fishers
(about 40 enterprises 
conducting fishery with 
passive gear from vessels of 
less than 36 metres)
companies (including the coastal fishing fleet) have the smallest fish-
ing fleet, both in terms of number and size, clearly limiting the cruis-
ing range of the vessels and, in practice, also the geographical sales
markets of the fish. At present, the fleet consists mainly of fresh/salt
fish combination vessels and some round freezer and fresh fish ves-
sels. It counts some 100 vessels in all, including approximately 30
coastal fishing vessels of less than 50 metres. The rest are mid-sized
(50–70 metres). It should be noted that the Russian perception of
‘coastal fishing’ is somewhat different from that found in its neigh-
bouring Scandinavian countries. While a Norwegian ‘coastal’ fishing
vessel normally has a crew of 1–3 persons and goes to port for deliv-
ery of catches each day, a Northwest Russian ‘coastal’ fishing vessel
has a crew of more than a dozen men and stays at sea for a couple of
weeks at a time before returning to deliver the catch.
The fisheries sector of the northern basin employed some 80,000
persons in the 1980s. The Murmansk Fish Combinate alone
accounted for more than 6,000 employees in the land-based process-
ing industry, while the largest fleet, the Murmansk Trawler Fleet,
employed more than 17,000 persons at its peak. A sharp reduction in
catches, and subsequently in employees, set in at the beginning of the
1990s. Throughout the 1990s, the total annual catch of the fishing
fleet based in Murmansk Oblast (accounting for the bulk of the
Northwest Russian fishing fleet) has dropped year by year, from 1.06
million tonnes in 1991 to 0.4 million tonnes in 1997. The main
reason for this catch reduction is a major decline in distant fishing by
the fleet of Northwestern Russia caused in turn by increased fuel
costs. Adding to the problems of the land-based processing industry
in Murmansk, Russian landings of fish abroad increased markedly
during the same period. Russian landings of cod to Norway (fished in
both Norwegian and Russian waters) reached 94,000 tonnes in 1992,
while in 1988 they had only totalled 10,000 tonnes. Thereafter, the
Russian landings in Norway increased further to nearly 150,000
tonnes around the mid-1990s. Since that time, there has been some
reduction, and Russian deliveries of cod to Norway totalled 119,800
tonnes in 1998. The reason for this considerable increase in the
export of fish is twofold. First, it became legally easier to export fish
to Norway. Second, Northwest Russian fishers had to compensate
both for the termination of state subsidies and an overall reduction in
total catches. The main consequence of most Russian-caught fish
being landed in Norway is a loss of job opportunities in Murmansk,
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both in the active fishing fleet and in processing industries ashore.
The Murmansk Fish Combinate has been practically at a standstill
since the mid-1990s. The total employment in the northern fishery
basin is believed to have dropped to some 35–40,000 people.1
Premises for implementation
Before we turn to the implementation activities of public authorities
and others, the premises for implementation in this concrete case
will be briefly discussed. Environmental and resource management
problems vary in their nature; so do the international agreements
aimed at their solution. Problems are of varying malignity; clearly, it
is more difficult to solve a ‘malign’ environmental problem than a
relatively ‘benign’ one, just as it is easier to solve a ‘simple’ than a
‘complex’ problem. The importance of the problem-creating activ-
ity to target groups also influences the potential for problem-solving.
The greater the importance of the activity to the target groups, the
more difficult it becomes, presumably, to make them change their
behaviour. Moreover, one can assume that the potential for success-
ful implementation depends on possibilities for monitoring target
behaviour. It is easier and less costly to detect violations if the activ-
ity is concentrated in one or a few locations than if it is widely scat-
tered. Finally, the nature of the agreements to be implemented
influences the potential for success. In particular, it is more difficult
to achieve full implementation of agreements the more specific and
ambitious they are.
Nature of the problem
As demonstrated above, the Barents Sea contains a variety of fish
species at various levels of the food chain. The state of species at one
level is dependent upon the state of species at levels below and above.
For instance, the state of the ground-fish stocks at any particular time
depends on the level of the pelagic stocks as well as of the marine
mammals in the area. Hence, the size of the Norwegian–Arctic cod
stock decreases in times with little herring and capelin in the Barents
Sea and when the occurrence of seal and whale is high. Moreover, the
different species are sensitive to changes in their natural environ-
ment, e.g. fluctuations in the water temperature. A picture emerges
of a highly ‘complex’ problem area: first, the problem is not influ-
enced by human activity alone. Second, it consists of numerous causal
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connections about which human knowledge is imperfect. Third, to
the extent such knowledge is available, the potential for human
manipulation is limited. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that it
is only human action that can seriously harm the fish stocks in ques-
tion. With the development of ever more efficient catch methods in
the post-World War II era, it has become technically possible to bring
the Barents Sea fish stocks to extinction.
At the moment of writing, the state of several Barents Sea fish
stocks – among them the important Norwegian–Arctic cod stock –
is, if not catastrophic, then at least pretty serious. What is the poten-
tial for their recovery? Are target groups willing to sacrifice rewards
from valuable catches? The most important aspect here is that the
targets of public regulatory measures (emanating partly from inter-
national commitments) are the same people that are suffering from
the problem. This makes the potential for effective implementation
better than in many cases of classical environmental problems where
the polluters are not the same as those suffering from the pollution.
On the other hand, the ‘penalty’ makes itself felt only some time
after the problem has been ‘created’, a circumstance that is supposed
to reduce the willingness of targets to abstain from immediate ben-
efits in order to contribute to implementation.
The problem-causing activity is also of great importance to the
target groups in question. The fishery is a key industry in North-
western Russia, which has concrete and symbolic implications at
both individual and regional level. In Soviet times, Northwest Russ-
ian fisheries were significant in terms of food supplies not only at the
regional, but also at the union level. Today, when much of the fish
caught by Northwest Russian fishing vessels is delivered abroad, the
fisheries are primarily of importance for regional authorities in
terms of employment and revenue. Although both catches and
employment have been significantly reduced since Soviet times, the
fisheries sector is still a cornerstone of the regional economy. Sym-
bolically, many inhabitants of Northwestern Russia still think of
Murmansk as the ‘fishery capital’ of Russia. It might be assumed that
the actual and symbolic importance of the fisheries to the region
reduces the potential for successful implementation of international
obligations that require a reduction in catches, in particular during
the present economic crisis in the region.
At the individual level, the potential for personal economic gain
from fishing activities has increased substantially since the early
78 International environmental agreements in Russia
1990s, when the fishery enterprises were privatised and it became
possible to sell the catches abroad. Hence, it can be argued that the
fishery has become more important to the individual fishers than was
the case in Soviet times, when their wages were only very loosely
dependent on the amount of fish caught.2 The political and eco-
nomic instability in Northwestern Russia since the early 1990s
might have further reduced the propensity of fishers in the region to
give priority to the long-term welfare of the fish stocks over short-
term private gain. The combination of political and economic inse-
curity on the one hand and the possibility of rapid personal profit on
the other significantly increases the ‘malignity’ of the problem at
hand; fishers in such a situation are supposedly far more difficult to
regulate with a view to increasing the long-term common good
(which is most often the objective of regulatory measures at both
national and international level) than fishers with prospects of a
financially secure future.
The potential for monitoring target activities may in this case be
characterised as relatively good.3 The number of targets is limited,
but they do operate over a rather large area. The chance of detect-
ing violations also varies with the actual type of violation.4 Effective
monitoring is possible, but costly. In the current financial situation
in Russia, it has proven difficult. We return to this topic later in
the chapter.
In sum, the problem appears to be not particularly malign in itself,
but present circumstances give grounds for concern. On the one
hand, the problem is complex, but ‘solvable’ by manipulation of
human activities (since natural phenomena alone can hardly bring
the fish stocks to extinction). Moreover, the number of targets is lim-
ited and, most importantly, the targets are also the main ‘losers’ if
implementation fails. On the other hand, the problem-creating
activities are of great importance both to the individual targets and
to the economy of the region, which, presumably, would make it
more difficult to achieve behavioural change that supports the
implementation of Russia’s international obligations in fisheries
management. Political instability and economic hardships may also
increase the propensity of targets to think short-sightedly, reducing
the clout of the authorities’ argument that non-compliance will
eventually lead to a reduction in stock sizes that will not be in the
target groups’ long-term interests.
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Nature of the commitments
Chapter 1 describes the bilateral Norwegian–Russian regime for
fisheries management in the Barents Sea and how it is partly nested
in regional and global instruments. A striking feature in recent years
has been the tendency to co-ordinate a growing number of regula-
tory measures of national responsibility in the bilateral regime. In
particular, the establishment in 1993 of the Permanent Committee
has furthered this end. During the latter half of the 1990s, regula-
tory matters such as the closing and opening of fishing grounds and
satellite monitoring of fishing vessels have been codified by bilateral
agreement in the Permanent Committee. New regulatory measures
such as compulsory use of selection grid by fishing vessels, have also
been introduced by this body. From the start in the mid-1970s, the
bilateral regime has taken care of the most important regulatory
mechanism of the Barents Sea fisheries, namely the establishment of
total allowable catches (TACs) of the most important fish stocks in
the area. All agreements between the two parties are binding.
Hence, Russia’s international obligations related to fisheries man-
agement in the Barents Sea – or to be more precise, to the activities
of the Northwest Russian fishing fleet5 – are quite specific. To a large
extent, the development of concrete regulatory measures takes place
at the interface between obligations following from international
agreements and federal standards to be applied also in the other fish-
ery basins of the Russian Federation. Often, this makes it difficult to
judge whether a particular measure emanates from the international
regime or would have appeared through the national regulatory
process independently of the state’s international obligations. In this
context, we perceive as Russia’s international obligations all concrete
measures codified through some sort of inter-state agreement, rang-
ing from the general provisions of the global fisheries instrument (see
Chapter 1) to concrete regulatory standards agreed upon by Russia
and Norway in the Permanent Committee of the bilateral regime.
Public authorities’ implementation activities
National implementation of international obligations starts with the
incorporation in national legislation of requirements necessary to
bring target behaviour into accordance with these obligations.
Action must thereafter be taken by public authorities to enforce such
requirements; it is this type of action we refer to as ‘implementation
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activities’. In a Russian context, keeping in mind the 1993 Constitu-
tion’s definition of resource management in the territorial waters of
the Russian Federation as a ‘joint responsibility’ between the centre
and federal subjects, these activities are expected to involve both
federal and regional authorities. After a brief comment on the status
of implementation in national legislation, changes in the role of fed-
eral authorities, regional authorities and federal agencies in the
region in the 1990s are set out. Emphasis is on formal and actual
role in the implementation process. The issue of implementation
performance – whether implementation is achieved or not – is occa-
sionally referred to here, but will be more thoroughly discussed in
the last section of this chapter. We remind the reader that unless oth-
erwise specified, all information is based on personal interviews with
representatives of Russian fishing industry and fisheries manage-
ment. In order to protect our interviewees from untoward repercus-
sions, the concrete interviews are not indicated in the text (see pp.
17–18 on methodology in Chapter 1).
Implementation in national legislation
In Chapter 3, we observed that post-Soviet Russian politics have
evolved in a virtual legal vacuum. Although a new constitution was
in place as early as in 1993, the elaboration of a complementing legal
framework has been slow and fumbling, partly as a consequence of
the continuous conflict between the presidential administration and
the Federal Parliament. The centre–region tension has also ham-
pered the legislative process. The Parliament’s upper house, the Fed-
eration Council – consisting of the leaders of the executive and
legislative authorities of Russia’s 89 federal subjects6 – has often
rejected bills after they have passed the necessary readings in the
state duma.
Since the early 1990s, a law on Russian fisheries and the protection
of maritime biological resources of the Russian Federation has been
under preparation by the Federal Parliament. After having been
rejected several times, the bill was finally approved by the state duma
on 7 July 2000. However, the Federation Council a few weeks later
refused to vote over it due to strong disagreement among the leaders
of the different regions. A working group was established to review
the most ‘burning’ issues of the draft. The Governor of Murmansk
Oblast and the President of the Republic of Karelia, who had
both emerged as strong opponents of this version of the bill, were
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represented on the working group. When the Federal Parliament
finally passed the bill in the spring of 2001, the President refused to
sign it due to alleged inconsistency with other federal legislation. The
bill was returned to the Federal Parliament for further clarification.
The centre–region tension was allegedly a main hindrance to
reaching agreement on the Fisheries Act in the Federal Parliament.7
The present draft foresees the continuation of federal control over
fisheries management, including the economically important quota
allocation. It also evoked fear among regional actors of the intro-
duction of payment for quota shares, increase in the amount of
quotas sold to foreign shipowners and stricter control by more
federal agencies than those already involved in the enforcement of
fisheries regulations.
The fact that a federal fisheries act has not yet been adopted does
not imply that Russian fisheries management takes place in a total
legal vacuum. The Law on the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone
was adopted in 1998 (Russian Federation 1998), laying the legal
foundation for state enforcement in the EEZ. More importantly, a
range of fisheries management issues are regulated by presidential
decree, governmental resolution and management decisions at
lower levels of the legal hierarchy.8 The problem is by no means a
lack of transformation of international commitments into national
legislation; on the contrary. An extremely large amount of presiden-
tial decrees and governmental resolutions are issued – in the fisheries
sector as well as other sectors of Russian politics and economy – but
they are simply not enforced. There is abundant anecdotal evidence
of decrees and resolutions concerning fisheries management for
which not even the slightest enforcement attempt has been made;
hence, they can at best be interpreted as symbolic expressions of
political will.9
As observed in the discussion of the nature of the international
commitments above, it is sometimes hard to decide whether a cer-
tain management decision reflects the implementation of interna-
tional commitments or national policy objectives; the two clearly
evolve to a large extent in tandem. We also noted above that the reg-
ulatory measures of the bilateral regime between Norway and Russia
have become ever more specific during the 1990s, and that a grow-
ing number of such measures have been co-ordinated between the
two countries. Many of the decisions in the bilateral regime are
only codified in a form whereby information about the decision is
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distributed by management or enforcement bodies to the fishing
fleet by fax or telex. Typically, Sevryba or the enforcement body
Murmanrybvod will inform all fishing vessels that Norway and
Russia have agreed on a particular regulatory measure, and that
the fishing vessels are obliged to comply with this decision from a
specific date. In sum, the transformation of Russia’s international
obligations into national legislation seems to be characterised by
inertia at the higher levels of the legal hierarchy and a multiplicity of
legal documents at its lower levels. The problem is not so much
inability to produce legal documents as the opposite: the ease with
which presidential decrees, governmental resolutions, orders and
provisions at ministerial level are issued probably reduces the prob-
ability of their enforcement. Hence, sending a telex from Sevryba to
the fishing fleet of the Barents Sea might prove a more effective
‘legal’ measure than having the decision elevated to the level of pres-
idential decree. This is further discussed in the section on target
compliance below.
The role of federal authorities
There are currently two major federal bodies responsible for fisheries
management and enforcement in the Russian Federation: the State
Committee for Fisheries and the Federal Border Service, respectively.
The former is the direct successor of the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries.
The status of the federal body responsible for fisheries was reduced
from that of a ministry to a state committee in connection with the
break-up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian
Federation in December 1991. As mentioned in Chapter 3, ministries
and state committees are different types of ‘independent’ administra-
tive bodies at the federal level; the ministries are placed higher in the
political hierarchy since their leaders are members of the federal
Government, but the state committees are not subordinate to any
ministry. Hence, the federal body for fisheries management was
‘degraded’ in connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
but kept its status as a separate administrative body.
The State Committee for Fisheries is the federal body responsible
for all aspects of fisheries management in the Russian Federation
other than enforcement at sea (see below). Research institutes under
the Committee collect and analyse data on fish stocks in waters
under Russian jurisdiction. The Committee is responsible for regu-
latory action with a view to preservation of these fish stocks. It
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represents the Russian Federation in international fisheries negotia-
tions – the Russian delegation to the Russian–Norwegian Fisheries
Commission is always headed by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman
of the Committee – and has the main responsibility for implementa-
tion of Russia’s international obligations in fisheries. Clearly, the
Committee has taken the task of overseeing implementation of these
obligations seriously, but it is itself only marginally involved in
implementation activities directed towards target groups. Most
importantly, it decides major regulatory principles and has an impor-
tant role in advisory or decision-making bodies where several agen-
cies from both the regional and the federal level are represented.
Moreover, it has the last word in all management decisions where
other agencies are responsible for the practical work leading up to
these decisions. For example, the Russian shares of the Barents Sea
quotas are distributed among the federal subjects of Northwestern
Russia by the so-called Technical-Scientific Catch Council and fur-
ther distributed among shipowners in fisheries councils within
each federal subject. However, the decisions of both the Technical-
Scientific Catch Council and the fisheries councils have to be
approved by the State Committee for Fisheries.10
The most conspicuous issue related to the status, responsibilities
and performance of the State Committee for Fisheries in recent
years is its fight to defend itself against interference from other fed-
eral agencies, in particular the Ministry of Economy and various
‘power agencies’. First, an attempt was made to ‘dissolve’ it by tem-
porarily depriving it of its status as a state committee and incorpo-
rating it into the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs as a
department for fisheries in April 1997. Its status as state committee
was restored in September 1998. Second, responsibility for enforce-
ment at sea was transferred from Rosrybvod, a department under
the Committee until then in charge of all enforcement activities, to
the Federal Border Service in accordance with a presidential decree
from August 1997 (Government of the Russian Federation 1997a).11
The decision to strip the Committee of responsibility for enforce-
ment was followed by a media campaign, obviously arranged by the
presidential administration, depicting it as corrupt and hence unfit
for this type of task.12 However, the decision met with fierce resis-
tance throughout the fishing industry and was only implemented a
year later, on 1 July 1998. Third, the old tradition of appointing
leaders of the Committee from within the fishery complex has
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been broken. During the last years of the 1990s, leaders of the
Committee were changed frequently and primarily selected among
candidates with their professional background from ‘power agen-
cies’. Employees of the Committee complain about the lack of ‘pro-
fessionals’ in its leadership of recent years.13 Finally, the Ministry of
Economy has recently ‘forced’ the State Committee for Fisheries
to carry out a system for the sale of fishing quotas by auction, a
procedure which the Committee is opposed to.14
In sum, the Russian Federation has a centralised system for fish-
eries management with the State Committee for Fisheries responsi-
ble for research and regulation and the Federal Border Service in
charge of enforcement at sea. These federal bodies are responsible
for the implementation of Russia’s international fisheries obliga-
tions, but are only to a limited extent involved in implementation
activities aimed at target groups; the practical work is for the most
part delegated to representing agencies in the regions. The State
Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation is the successor
of the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries and reflects an attempt to con-
tinue the Soviet type ‘industry-complex approach’ to fisheries man-
agement, implying that one federal body is responsible for all aspects
of fisheries. However, it has repeatedly had to defend itself from
attacks aimed at reducing its traditional all-embracing influence on
fisheries management. Its attempts to strike back have been partly
successful. On the one hand, the Committee has succeeded in main-
taining its own existence as a separate administrative body. On the
other hand, it has been deprived of important tasks and had to
accept interference from other federal agencies in areas that have
traditionally been the responsibility of the Committee alone. One
might rightly ask whether the problems of keeping one’s ‘head
above water’ in recent years has led to a displacement of goals: has
survival in itself become the main objective of the Committee?
At the very least, one could speculate whether its insecure existence
has reduced the ability of the Committee to conduct effective
fisheries management.
The role of regional authorities
Regional authorities, in Soviet times totally subordinate to federal
authorities and in turn the CPSU, have traditionally had no role in
the management of Northwest Russian fisheries. The 1993 Consti-
tution also states that the management of natural resources in the
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EEZ is an exclusive federal responsibility. As we saw in Chapter 3,
however, the role of regional authorities, especially the governors
and their regional administrations, has been strengthened quite
markedly during the 1990s. Have the regional administrations of
Northwestern Russia attempted to expand their sphere of influence
to include fisheries management?
The answer to this question is that they have indeed tried to do
so, but that the results are more uncertain. A major attempt by the
Northwest Russian federal subject to gain influence in fisheries man-
agement was made in the early 1990s. Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and
Karelia established fisheries departments under their regional
administrations in 1993–94 and demanded a say in the quota distri-
bution, then dominated by Sevryba, which, in reality, functioned
as a regional representative of the State Committee for Fisheries. In
late 1993, the Governor of Murmansk Oblast boasted about having
reached an agreement with the Committee that the regional admin-
istration was to take over Sevryba’s management responsibilities.
This conclusion appeared to be premature, but the regional admin-
istrations were from now on represented on the bodies where
fishing quotas were distributed.15
The quotas of Russia’s northern fishery basin have in recent years
been distributed in two stages. The Technical-Scientific Catch Coun-
cil divides the catch between the federal subjects and decides how
much of the catch is to be allocated for ‘basin purposes’, i.e. to
finance necessary tasks such as research and monitoring. Roughly 60
per cent of the catch has over the past years been allotted to Mur-
mansk Oblast, whereas Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Republic of
Karelia have received some 20 and 10 per cent, respectively.16 A cer-
tain share of the catch is usually designated for exchange purposes
with the counties of Kaliningrad and Leningrad. Grigoriy Tishkov,17
long-standing managing director of Sevryba, was head of the Tech-
nical-Scientific Catch Council throughout the 1990s. The regional
fisheries councils are led by the head of the fisheries division of the
regional administration (i.e. representing the governor/republican
president), but Sevryba has also largely maintained its position here.
All decisions made in both the Technical-Scientific Catch Council
and in the regional fisheries councils must be approved by the State
Committee for Fisheries.
A central discussion topic in Russia’s northern fisheries commu-
nity at the end of the 1990s was the question of establishing a new
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‘basin management body’, i.e. an official body in charge of manag-
ing the entire northern fisheries basin. Scientists from the Kola
Science Centre proposed creating such an organisation in a memo-
randum to the Murmansk Oblast administration in 1997. The ‘basin
body’ would be based on the remains of Sevryba and be placed
under both the State Committee for Fisheries and the executives of
the four federal subjects in Northwestern Russia. In May 1999, the
Murmansk Oblast administration made a formal proposal to the
State Committee for Fisheries to establish a new ‘basin body’. The
proposal gained support at a meeting of the Northwestern Associa-
tion in early autumn of that year, but it was suggested that the main
office be located in St Petersburg. This led to more intensive lobby-
ing from Murmansk. When Acting Chairman of the State Commit-
tee for Fisheries Yuriy Sinelnik visited Murmansk in October 1999,
he announced to the press that a ‘basin body’ would be established
in Murmansk as a trial project and that similar organisations would
later be created in the other fisheries basins of the country. A possi-
ble outcome would be its creation, thus ‘strengthening’ the regional
fisheries management with an organisation that is ‘stronger’ than
Sevryba and the regional administrations are today, while keeping
federal authorities’ control and sanction possibilities for decisions
made in the region. As of autumn 2001, the ‘basin body’ had not yet
been established.
In conclusion, the regional authorities of Northwestern Russia have
during the 1990s above all displayed great aspirations to get involved
in fisheries management. They have established their own fisheries
departments, although each employs only a handful of people, which
have achieved at least a certain measure of influence over the most
important practical management measures, namely the distribution of
quotas. However, the regional fisheries departments are not involved
in the elaboration of other regulatory measures or enforcement.
Apart from their participation in the regional fisheries councils that
distribute the quotas among shipowners in the region, they above all
seem to perceive their role as an advocate of the fishing industry of
the region articulating its cause in relation to federal authorities. The
regional legislatures of Northwestern Russia have played a very minor
role in fisheries management. The regional Duma of Murmansk
Oblast has passed a law on coastal fisheries (Murmansk Oblast
1997b), but it was later annulled by the regional legal authorities.
Former Director of Sevryba Grigoriy Tishkov was elected to the
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Murmansk regional Duma in 1997, but this does not seem to have
had any influence on fisheries management in the region.
The role of federal agencies in the region
Federal agencies located in the region have traditionally played a
very important role in the management of Northwest Russian fish-
eries. As noted earlier in this chapter, Sevryba was originally created
as the General Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries in
Northwestern Russia. Although its name was changed several times,
it retained its role as both an association of all fishing industry actors
and the main fisheries management body of the region throughout
the Soviet period. Sevryba was the ‘extended arm’ of the Ministry of
Fisheries in the region, in other words: a typical ‘implementing’
body. It ‘governed’ the entire fishing industry of the region down to
the specifics of deciding where each particular vessels was to fish at
any given time. It was in control of the distribution of quotas
between the shipowners (or ‘fishing organisations’, as they were des-
ignated in the Soviet period) of the region and issued other regula-
tory measures on behalf of the Ministry of Fisheries.
The privatisation of Sevryba in 1992 initiated a process that in a few
years rendered the status and competence of the association as both
an industry and a management actor highly unclear. An immediate
consequence of privatisation was loss of control over the enterprises
that formed the association. The administration of Sevryba, having
employed more than five hundred people in the ‘good old Soviet
times’, saw its number reduced to a few dozen in the course of less
than five years, since most financial and ‘industrial’ tasks were now
taken care of at the company level. Hence, in the first years after pri-
vatisation it appeared important for Sevryba, i.e. the administration of
the association, to maintain its role in the management process (since
the other former tasks had been lost to its founding companies). When
the regional administrations of Northwestern Russia in 1993–94
attempted to get involved in the management process, Sevryba retali-
ated vigorously, arguing that the fish stocks in the EEZ are indisputably
a federal responsibility and that practical regulatory experience in the
region lay within Sevryba, not the governors’ apparatus. As the previ-
ous section showed, regional authorities were partly successful in their
aspirations and acquired some influence in the process of quota distri-
bution. However, Sevryba retained considerable power in this area
along with continued responsibility for most other regulatory issues.
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In the mid-1990s, the Sevryba administration acquired its first
vessel purchased on a bare-boat charter basis, the Sevryba-1. The
administration was then in a position to secure favourable quota con-
ditions for its own vessel, registered it in Cyprus, and suddenly
emerged as a small, but lucrative one-boat fishing company. At the
same time, the management tasks were increasingly handed over to
the regional administration (see previous section). The institutional
identity of Sevryba was again changing; with the emerging possibili-
ties for Sevryba-1 and several sister ships already under way, it seemed
increasingly to be ready to let go of management responsibilities.
Another important federal agency located in the region is the
enforcement body Murmanrybvod. It is subordinate to Rosrybvod,
the department of the State Committee for Fisheries responsible for
enforcement. Murmanrybvod has traditionally been in charge of the
enforcement of fishery regulations in the rivers and lakes of Mur-
mansk Oblast, in the Barents Sea and in international convention
areas where the Northwest Russian fishing fleet conducts fishery,
notably NEAFC and NAFO.18 Most of the 300–400 employees of
Murmanrybvod have been involved in the enforcement of fishery
regulations in the rivers and lakes on the Kola Peninsula; only some
twenty inspectors have been assigned to enforcement tasks in the
Barents Sea and the international convention areas.
As follows from the section on the role of federal authorities
above, responsibility for fisheries enforcement at sea in the Russian
Federation was transferred from Rosrybvod to the Federal Border
Service in August 1997, a decision made effective as of July 1998. In
the northern fishery basin, the Murmansk State Inspection of the
Arctic Regional Command of the Federal Border Service was estab-
lished to take care of fisheries enforcement. The main argument put
forward by supporters of the reorganisation in Northwestern Russia
was that the Border Service had far more and far faster vessels than
Murmanrybvod’s two old rebuilt fishing vessels. As in the rest of
Russia, the decision to strip the traditional enforcement body of
responsibility for enforcement at sea met with fierce resistance also in
the northwestern region. Both the fishing industry and the rest of the
fishery management apparatus supported Murmanrybvod in its battle
with the ‘intruders’ from the ‘power agency’ of the Border Service.19
As in Sevryba’s battle with the regional administrations, Murmanry-
bvod’s main argument was that the necessary expertise and experi-
ence were to be found in the ‘traditional’ body. Murmanrybvod
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turned out to be less successful than Sevryba – the Federal Border Ser-
vice was obviously a stronger opponent than the regional adminis-
trations – and was forced to relinquish responsibility for enforcement
at sea. However, it is only responsibility for physical inspections at
sea that has been transferred to the Border Guard. Murmanrybvod is
still in charge of keeping track of how much of the quotas has been
caught by the individual shipowner at any one time.20 It has also
retained its responsibility for the closing of fishing grounds in areas
with excessive intermingling of under-sized fish, a very important
regulatory measure in both the Russian and Norwegian part of the
Barents Sea. Finally, Murmanrybvod is still responsible for enforce-
ment in international convention areas. In practice, Murmanrybvod
places its inspectors on board Northwest Russian fishing vessels that
intend to fish in the NEAFC of NAFO areas.
A fisheries department has been established under the Northwest-
ern Federal Okrug, the new administrative layer introduced by Pres-
ident Putin in May 2000 (see Chapter 3). This department, located
in St Petersburg and mostly occupied with the co-ordination of fish-
eries research, has not been given a role in the regulatory process. It
is not represented in the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Com-
mission or the Technical-Scientific Catch Council.
In sum, federal agencies located in the region appear as the main
participants in Russian public authorities’ efforts to manage the
Northwest Russian fishing fleet, including efforts to implement the
country’s international obligations. The federal bodies themselves
interfere only to a limited extent in the management process, and
regional authorities have not proven ‘strong’ enough to gain any sig-
nificant influence. The old general directorate, Sevryba, retained
much of its influence well into the 1990s notwithstanding its ever
more dubious formal status in the regulatory process. Murmanryb-
vod has been stripped of its enforcement tasks at sea, but is still an
important actor in the regulation and enforcement of Northwest
Russian fisheries. A new federal agency has been established in the
region in connection with the enforcement reorganisation, the Mur-
mansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command of the Fed-
eral Border Service. Hence, most practical ‘implementation
activities’ directed towards the target groups of Northwest Russian
fisheries take place in Murmansk – by Sevryba, Murmanrybvod and
the Border Service’s Murmansk State Inspection – although they
have to be approved of by federal authorities.
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The role of others
The distinction between public authorities and others might be
somewhat blurred in the former Soviet Union since much of the
administrative structure of the plan economy has been maintained,
formally or informally, into the era of the Russian Federation. The
experience with Sevryba is a good case in point. Formally, Sevryba
was an association of all major fishing enterprises in Northwestern
Russia; more or less informally, it has during the 1990s emerged at
times as the ‘extended arm’ of the State Committee for Fisheries in
Northwestern Russia and at times primarily as a small fishing com-
pany pursuing purely commercial interests. The ‘traditional’ actors
of Northwest Russian fisheries – i.e. all parties involved except
‘intruders’ of recent years, notably the Federal Border Service and
the regional administrations – are in Russia clearly perceived as
above all belonging to the ‘fishery complex’. The division between
governmental agency and ‘user group’ hence becomes less relevant.21
Nevertheless, we will in the following attempt to give an overview
of how actors other than public authorities have influenced the man-
agement of Northwest Russian fisheries during the 1990s.
Target groups
It should be fairly obvious by now that target groups – i.e. the
region’s fishers and their representative bodies – have traditionally
been highly involved in the management process of Northwest Russ-
ian fisheries. Sevryba has at one and the same time been the main
fisheries management body in the region and the association of its
fishers. The 1990s showed how organisational constructions like
Sevryba have had to struggle in the post-Soviet period to defend
their existence; partly they have clung on to their old functions,
partly they have adapted to the new environment and created a
‘commercial’ basis for themselves. It seems fair to conclude that
Sevryba’s role in fisheries management in recent years has been sig-
nificantly reduced. At the same time, Sevryba no longer emerges as
a representative of the large shipowners in the region; although for-
mally still constituting the association Sevryba, these enterprises
now appear as independent industry actors. Hence, to the extent
that Sevryba maintains its old management tasks, it represents the
‘lucrative, small fishing company’ that its administration has created
for itself in recent years, rather than the larger shipowners of the
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region. On the other hand, these industry actors – Murmansk Trawl
Fleet, Murmanrybprom, Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Base etc. (see
above) – have increased their direct influence on fisheries manage-
ment. Whereas they were earlier mainly represented through
Sevryba, they now participate in their own right in the bodies
responsible for quota distribution in Russia’s northern fishery basin.
Table 4.2 shows which governmental bodies and user groups are
represented at various levels in the quota distribution process. A
main observation is that all large shipowners, as well as the Union of
Private Fishing Enterprises in the North – representing the smaller
shipowners – are represented at international, inter-regional and
regional level. However, these bodies are occupied mainly with
quota distribution; the influence of user groups on other manage-
ment issues is limited. It is also unclear how ‘strong’ user groups
emerge vis-à-vis governmental agencies in these corporate bodies.
A conspicuous trend of late has been the increased influence of
some of the small shipowners organised in the Union of Private Fish-
ing Enterprises in the North. Probably the most famous example is
shipowner Vladimir Gusenkov. He used his position as a nouveau
riche to gain broad popular support though his cheap fish pro-
gramme, an initiative aimed at providing fish products at reasonable
prices to the population of Northwestern Russia. In 1997, he was
elected to the regional duma. Two years later, he succeeded in becom-
ing one of two deputies from Murmansk Oblast to the state duma.
Before ending up in Moscow, Gusenkov had become an influential
person in Northwest Russian fisheries. Allegedly, he paid for much of
the costs of organising negotiations in the Russian–Norwegian Fish-
eries Commission in Murmansk in November 1999 and was in return
given representation in the Russian delegation.22 After very difficult
negotiations – Norway wishing to follow the recommendation of the
ICES scientists to reduce the cod quota drastically, and Russia to dis-
regard the scientific advice – the cod TAC was set at nearly four times
above the scientists’ initial recommendation. Negotiations stalled for
several days, and Norway eventually agreed on the high quota level
only with reference to ‘the importance of fisheries to the crisis-ridden
population of Northwestern Russia’ (Ministry of Fisheries 1999,
Article 5.1). In the subsequent negotiations between Russia and
Norway in November 2000, Gusenkov allegedly emerges as an infor-
mal leader of the Russian delegation, again insisting on a quota far
above the scientific recommendations. This not only reflects the
increased influence of Russian target groups and regional actors in
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The Joint
Norwegian–Russian
Fisheries Commission
(responsible for
establishing TACs for
the joint stocks in the
Barents Sea)
Technical-Scientific Catch
Council (responsible
for distributing quota
shares between
Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk and
Karelia)
The regional fishery
councils (responsible
for distributing quota
shares between
individual companies
in the respective
regional entities)
The State Committee for
Fisheries (head of
delegation)
The Oblast/republican
administrations of
Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk and
Karelia
VNIRO (federal fisheries
research institute)
Regional fisheries
research institutes
from Murmansk and
Arkhangelsk (PINRO,
SevPINRO)
Regional control bodies
in Murmansk and
Arkhangelsk
(Murmanrybvod and
Sevrybvod)
Sevryba
Sevryba (leader)
The Oblast/republican
administrations of
Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk and
Karelia
Regional fisheries
research institutes in
Murmansk and
Arkhangelsk (PINRO,
SevPINRO)
Regional control bodies
in Murmansk and
Arkhangelsk
(Murmanrybvod and
Sevrybvod)
The oblast/republican
administration in the
respective regional
entities (leader)
Sevryba
Research and control
bodies from the
respective regional
entities
The administration of
Sevryba
Murmansk Trawl Fleet
Murmanrybprom
Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet
Karelrybflot
Murmansk Collective
Fishing Fleet
The Union of Private Fishing
Enterprises in the North
The administration of Sevryba
Murmansk Trawl Fleet
Murmanrybprom
Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet
Karelrybflot
The collective fishing fleets
of Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk and Karelia
The Union of Private Fishing
Enterprises in the North
The administration of
Sevryba
The largest fishing
companies in the
respective regional entities
The collective fishing fleets
of the respective regional
entities
The Union of Private
Fishing Enterprises in the
North
Table 4.2 The main decision-making bodies of Northwest Russian fisheries
and governmental bodies and user groups represented in them
Decision-making body Represented Represented user-
governmental bodies groups
Source: Hønneland (2001).
the formulation of the Russian position in the bilateral negotiations
with Norway;23 more than anything, it reflects the growing ‘malig-
nity’ of the problem at hand (see the section above on the nature of
the problem). With increased political and economic insecurity on
the one hand and the possibility of rapid personal profit on the other,
target groups might end up less willing to think about their own and
their community’s long-term interests. We return to this question in
the discussion on implementation performance below.
NGOs and research institutes
The number of external agents, i.e. those other than governmental
bodies and user groups, involved in Russian fisheries management is
very limited. NGOs are practically absent in Northwest Russian fish-
eries. The only exceptions are labour unions and various types of
fishers’ associations, but they have no role in fisheries management,
nor in implementation of international obligations.24
The main ‘external’ agents in Northwest Russian fisheries man-
agement are fisheries research institutes at the federal and region
level, notably the All-Russian Scientific Institute for Fisheries and
Oceanography (VNIRO) in Moscow and the Knipovich Scientific
Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (PINRO) in
Murmansk. It is indeed doubtful whether these institutions should
be labelled ‘external’; they are both directly subordinate to the State
Committee for Fisheries.25 While VNIRO is the main supplier of
scientific input to the Committee at the federal level, PINRO is the
major participant in the management process at the regional level in
Northwestern Russia. The state of the fish stocks in the Northeast-
ern Atlantic and the Barents Sea are constantly assessed by PINRO
researchers, often in co-operation with Norwegian marine scientists.
The results of their investigations are discussed by ICES’ Advisory
Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM) and further chan-
nelled to national authorities as assessments of the fish stocks and
recommendations for their exploitation. Hence, the advice that
Russian and Norwegian authorities receive concerning the Barents
Sea fish stocks is based on the work of both Russian (primarily from
PINRO) and Norwegian scientists. In other words: the State Com-
mittee for Fisheries, as the main governmental agency responsible
for Russia’s fisheries management, receives scientific input from an
international organisation (ICES) which is based on the work of
scientists from an institution administratively subordinate to itself.
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The most striking feature of PINRO’s role in the management
process in recent years is the disregard by Russian authorities of
ICES’ scientific advice. The Joint Russian–Norwegian Fisheries
Commission has increasingly since the mid-1990s established TACs
well above the scientific recommendations after pressure from the
Russian party. This clearly demonstrates the impotency of Russian
scientists in the face of government authorities and other pressure
groups within the Russian delegation.
The role of PINRO scientists in the management process is not
reduced to their co-operation with foreign colleagues in ICES.
PINRO is highly integrated in the ‘day-to-day’ management of the
Barents Sea fisheries. Most importantly, PINRO’s research ships
assist the exploration fleet Sevrybpromrazvedka in finding concen-
trations of fish for the fishing fleet. The unclear distinction between
government and user groups discussed above is also reflected in the
way fishers perceive the role of marine science and enforcement. In
the West, it is generally considered legitimate (or even preferable)
for the two to have somewhat divergent interests from the user
groups (being obviously more concerned about protection of the
resource base than exploiting it), at least to the extent that user
groups are thought to be solely concerned with their own interests
(see above). In Northwest Russian fisheries, marine science and
enforcement bodies still largely seem to be perceived by fishers as
belonging to the same unity – the fishery complex – as themselves.
For instance, to the extent one sees discontentment among Russian
Barents Sea fishers about marine science, it seems to be directed
towards the alleged inability of scientists to predict the presence of
fish in a short-term perspective.26
Joint implementation
Joint implementation in this context denotes implementation activ-
ities directed towards Russian targets and performed by Russian
agents in co-operation with foreign nationals. A problematic aspect
of discussing joint implementation in Northwest Russian fisheries is
that decisions made at one level can be regarded as implementation
of decisions made at higher levels. For instance, should research and
regulatory activities between Russians and Norwegians under the
framework of the bilateral regime be perceived as joint implementa-
tion? We are inclined to answer this question in the negative, but
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maintain that co-operation between representatives of the two coun-
tries in efforts to implement decisions made at the bilateral level
should indeed be regarded as such.
Throughout the 1990s, joint implementation between the fisheries
enforcement bodies of Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea has
expanded consistently. The Permanent Committee under the Joint
Commission was established in 1993 as a response to Russian over-
fishing in the Barents Sea.27 When most Russian vessels started to
deliver their catches in Norway, the old system for quota control in
Russia – based mainly on catch control in port – proved inadequate.
The Permanent Committee established a system for exchange of
catch data between the enforcement bodies of the two states which
reintroduced a mechanism for effective quota control in Northwest
Russian fisheries. Co-operation with their Norwegian counterparts
seems to have remained an important component of the work of
Northwest Russian fisheries enforcement bodies throughout the
1990s. First, most Russian vessels still deliver their catches in
Norway, so Russian enforcement bodies depend on data from Nor-
wegian authorities to keep track of how much of their quotas the ves-
sels have fished. Second, Norwegian enforcement bodies regularly
assist their Russian counterparts in organising physical catch controls
when Russian vessels land their fish in Norwegian ports.28 Third,
many enforcement tasks – such as routines for closing and opening
of fishing grounds – have been co-ordinated between the authorities
of the two states. Fourth, Norwegian enforcement bodies have partly
assisted their Russian counterparts materially and financially. Inter-
estingly, federal agencies in the region predominate in the Russian
delegation to the Permanent Committee: the State Committee for
fisheries was only represented in connection with the establishment
of the Committee in 1993.29 Enforcement co-operation between
Norway and Russia can generally be characterised as successful. As
far as problem-solving is concerned, the effects are uncertain, but the
manner in which co-operation functions today clearly represents an
improvement over the earlier situation (Hønneland 2000b).
Implementation performance and target compliance
The main question to be asked in this section concerns the degree to
which Russian authorities have succeeded in implementing their
international obligations related to the activities of the Northwest
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Russian fishing fleet. First, have Russian authorities succeeded in set-
ting up a system for fisheries management in accordance with their
international obligations? Second, if so, has this system functioned
as intended? Can any tendency be traced as to the type of manage-
ment body (e.g. at what level of governance) that functions most
satisfactorily? Third, have implementation activities affected the
behaviour of target groups? Another major issue to be analysed is
whether problems in implementation can be ascribed to the nature
of the problem or the quality of implementation activities.
From global agreements Russia has concluded derive obligations,
inter alia, to manage fisheries in the country’s 200-mile EEZ in
accordance with the principle of MSY, to establish TAC for each fish
stock within the EEZ, to co-operate with other coastal states in the
management of shared stocks, and to promote compliance with fish-
ery regulations among all vessels under Russian flag. Already prior
to the conclusion of the LOSC, the Soviet Union had a system in
place for fisheries management and enforcement, which could now
be adjusted to contribute to Soviet implementation of the new inter-
national obligations. Naturally, the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries was
the central actor at the federal level. As far as the northern basin is
concerned, a regulatory body existed in Sevryba, an enforcement
body in Murmanrybvod and a fisheries research institute in PINRO.
The tasks of these bodies were now adapted to the new surround-
ings, reflected mainly in the specific research, regulatory and
enforcement obligations following from the newly established bilat-
eral regime with Norway. PINRO’s scientific results were already
integrated in the work of ICES and were now used as a basis for rec-
ommendations to the regulatory authorities of the two countries.
Sevryba was already the main regulatory body in the region and was
now given the task of implementing regulations agreed upon in the
Joint Fisheries Commission, notably to oversee the distribution of
Russian quota shares. Murmanrybvod was already involved in mon-
itoring of fishing activities, but was now given responsibility for
enforcement in the entire ocean area up to 200 miles from shore.
Hence, the Soviet Union took the necessary administrative steps to
adjust the existing system for fisheries management to the new inter-
national obligations. Although data on the functioning of this system
during the Soviet period are poor, it seems fair to assume that
research, regulatory and enforcement bodies were well suited (in
terms of competence and material resources) for their respective
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tasks, that they performed these tasks quite satisfactorily, and that
target compliance was generally high.30 The command system of the
plan economy generally implied a high degree of control over the
activities of target groups. Moreover, the latter had less incentive to
cheat than they would have had in a market economy. Notably, all
involved agencies belonged to the ‘fishery complex’, administra-
tively subordinate to the Ministry of Fisheries.
In the post-Soviet period, three features stand out in the develop-
ment of Northwest Russian fisheries management, one partly fol-
lowing from the other: the diffusion of management responsibility;
the degeneration of implementation performance; and the reduc-
tion in target compliance. We have seen throughout this chapter
how the established fisheries management system during the post-
Soviet period has been challenged from different angles. Various
‘power agencies’, notably the Federal Border Service, have success-
fully challenged the task of the State Committee for Fisheries and its
subordinate regional agencies to conduct enforcement at sea. The
Ministry of Economy has interfered in the quota allocation process
through its introduction of a system for auctions of fish quotas. The
regional administrations of Russia’s federal subjects have, somewhat
less successfully, attempted to take over the management role of
federal agencies located in the region.
A decline in implementation performance has followed partly
from the fact that the ‘newcomers’ are less fit for their tasks than the
traditional agencies, and partly from confusion following unclear
division of responsibility between ‘new’ and ‘old’ management
bodies. The former refers to poor standards in both competence
and material resources. The regional administrations have had only
a handful of persons of varying backgrounds employed in their
fisheries departments; in comparison to Sevryba’s large and well-
experienced staff they have had little to show for their efforts. More
apparent is the lack of experience and resources in the Border Service
(whose tasks have also come to be more extensive than those of the
regional administrations). For one thing, officers in the Murmansk
State Inspection of the Federal Border Service generally lack experi-
ence in fisheries management and enforcement; this has partly been
compensated for by transfer of some of Murmanrybvod’s inspectors.
More apparent is the lack of material resources to maintain presence
at sea. Quite contrary to the intentions of the reorganisation of the
enforcement system, the presence at sea by monitoring vessels
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declined since the Border Guard took over this duty in 1998. Precise
data for presence at sea and inspection frequency are not available,
but Jørgensen (1999, pp. 88–90) estimates that the Border Guard
performed around 160 inspections at sea in 1998, which represents
a significant reduction compared to an estimated 700–1,000 annual
inspections at sea by Murmanrybvod prior to the reorganisation. For
several months on end during 1998, not a single enforcement vessel
was present on the fishing grounds in the Russian part of the Barents
Sea. Officials of the Border Service explain this as lack of funds to
purchase fuel. Critics question the genuineness of the Border Ser-
vice’s will to play a role in fisheries management. The result of the
reorganisation has in any event so far been a tangible reduction in the
effectiveness of Russian enforcement in the Barents Sea.31
Unclear task delineation might also have led to a reduction in
implementation performance although it is more difficult to point
to concrete effects here. Again the conflict between Rosrybvod/
Murmanrybvod and the Federal Border Service is the most striking
example. After the decree prescribing the reorganisation was issued
in 1997, both agencies continued for a long period to perform
enforcement duties, but at a low intensity and without co-ordination
between them. A lack of co-ordination has remained a problem also
after the decree was actually implemented – i.e. when a clear delin-
eation of duties was established – in 1998. The same can partly be
said about the relationship between Sevryba and the Murmansk
regional administration, particularly in the early and mid-1990s,
when a pretty fierce battle was going on between the two institu-
tions. A kind of ‘peace’ was settled towards the end of the decade
when Sevryba proved ‘stronger’ than its opponent but at the same
time conceding to the latter a certain influence in quota allocation.
The ‘confusion’ again mounted when Sevryba started to lose inter-
est in management issues as its role as ‘lucrative, small ship-owner’
became more important. As mentioned, it is difficult to point to con-
crete management deficiencies as a result of the ‘confusion’; we can
only assume that a certain reduction in performance took place.
Data on target compliance in Russian fisheries are not publicly
available. We assumed above that target compliance was generally
high in the Soviet period, partly as a result of lacking incentives to
cheat. It seems fair to conclude that the overall compliance level in
the Russian part of the Barents Sea has decreased in the post-Soviet
era. For one thing, Norwegian authorities in 1992 took extra steps
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to calculate the total Russian catch in the Barents Sea that year.32 The
figures indicated over-fishing by the Russians at a rate of more than
100,000 tonnes. Over-fishing hence constituted one quarter of the
total cod quota in the Barents Sea in 1992. Russia had 170,000
tonnes at its disposal, of a TAC of 396,000 tonnes, after internal
quota exchanges with Norway. This estimate was supported by
export statistics, which indicated that close to the total Russian cod
quota in the Barents Sea had been exported to Norway. At the same
time, considerable quantities had been exported to other Western
countries. Some cod had also been landed in Murmansk. The
sudden rise in over-fishing coincided with Russian fishers starting to
deliver the bulk of their catches abroad, primarily in Northern
Norway. At the same time, the direct export of their product
increased the incentives for fishers to underreport their catches
(since they were paid better abroad), and reduced the chance for
Russian authorities to keep track of the catches since control had tra-
ditionally been conducted in connection with landings of fish in
Russian ports. The joint implementation (i.e. enforcement) practice
described above halted as anticipated the opportunity for Russian
fishers to conceal their real catches for Russian authorities when
delivering in Norway. Nevertheless, the increased incentive to vio-
late the regulations as compared to Soviet times has probably led to
a reduction in target compliance. Combined with the significant
reduction in performance of the Russian enforcement system –
notably the absence of monitoring vessels at sea for considerable
periods – there is reason to assume that the fall in target compliance
is not insignificant. Interviews with Norwegian and Icelandic fishers
who operated in the Russian part of the Barents Sea in 1997–99
indicate that a considerable illegal fishery of undersized fish took
place in periods when enforcement vessels were absent (Jørgensen
1999, pp. 105–6).
In conclusion, a certain degeneration in implementation capabili-
ties and performance among Russian authorities has taken place in
the northern fishery basin throughout the 1990s. The traditional
‘fishery complex’ management bodies, which had taken care of
implementation in a satisfactory way until the break-up of the Soviet
Union, were now challenged by other governmental agencies want-
ing a piece of the budgetary cake and a growing ‘malignity’ of the
problem. So far, the ‘traditional’ agencies – mainly the State Com-
mittee for Fisheries, Sevryba and Murmanrybvod – emerge as more
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successful in their implementation activities than the ‘newcomers’,
notably the Federal Border Service and the regional administrations.
The former are far better off in terms of competence and, to some
extent, also material resources than the latter. To the extent that
‘newcomers’ have taken over, this seems to have led to a reduction
in implementation performance and target compliance. On the
other hand, with rumours of corruption in the State Committee for
Fisheries and Sevryba having become more of a commercial actor
than a management body, it seems rash to simply regard the various
reorganisations as errors of judgement.
Notes
1 See Nilssen and Hønneland (2001) for a recent overview of the post-
Soviet restructuring of the Northwest Russian fishing industry.
2 Admittedly, Soviet fishers were rewarded for over-fulfilling the produc-
tion plans, but their personal economic gains were far smaller than is
the case today. Moreover, since goods were considerably scarcer than
purchasing power, the minor extras paid for this were probably of little
significance.
3 Of course, this depends on what you compare with. Our point is that
this case lies somewhere between cases where the target is either three
pipelines or a million cars.
4 For instance, it is relatively easy with modern surveillance equipment
to detect a vessel operating in an area closed for fishing. The under-
reporting of a few tonnes of fish is, on the other hand, relatively diffi-
cult to discover due to the difficulty of conducting precise physical
checks of the catch once it is stored in the ship’s hold.
5 The Northwest Russian fishing fleet operates mainly, but not exclu-
sively, in the Barents Sea.
6 As of 2002, the regional leaders will not themselves take place in the
Federation Council; instead, they will appoint their representatives.
This change was part of Putin’s ‘spring reorganisation’ of 2000 (see
Chapter 3), but has not been implemented at the time of writing.
7 The contents of the draft Fisheries Act has not been made public. How-
ever, some details are known from Russian media, and the authors have
also received some information in conversations with involved actors.
8 For instance, quota allocation has in recent years been regulated by a
preliminary provision issued by the State Committee for Fisheries
(State Committee for Fisheries 1999a) while monitoring and enforce-
ment activities are regulated by a so-called ‘order’ from the same com-
mittee (State Committee for Fisheries 1999b).
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9 Famous is the story of Yeltsin’s presidential decree that presidential
decrees are henceforth to be complied with. In the fisheries sector,
there are numerous decrees and orders aimed at redirecting the deliv-
eries of fish to the home market, which have not been enforced.
10 In practice, the decisions of the Technical-Scientific Catch Council and
the regional fisheries councils are almost always approved by the State
Committee for Fisheries.
11 A ‘service’ (sluzhba) is also an independent federal agency immediately
below ministry level. Although often referred to as a ‘military’ agency,
the Federal Border Service is not answerable to the Ministry of
Defence.
12 An example is the major headline on the front page of Izvestiya on 12
September 1997: ‘The Mafia Has Beaten the Fishery Inspection. Can
the Border Guard Beat the Mafia?’
13 It should be mentioned that this new strategy is more like the Western
tradition of using political all-rounders for ministerial posts. For most
Russians, used to ministers who are specialists in their field of respon-
sibility, this is a new thing.
14 This is an example of how more general legislation appearing before
the Fisheries Act reduces the scope of action for fishery management
authorities. The provision on quota auctions is printed in Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, 13 January 2001.
15 See Hønneland (1998) for a more detailed presentation of these events.
16 See Hønneland and Nilssen (2001) for a discussion of quota allocation
in Russia’s northern fishery basin.
17 Tishkov was ousted as director of Sevryba in late 2000.
18 Similar bodies are found also in Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Republic of
Karelia, Sevrybvod and Karelrybvod, but these are responsible for
enforcement of fishery regulations in rivers and lakes only (as well as the
White Sea in the case of Sevrybvod). Responsibility for ocean fisheries
by the Northwest Russian fishing fleet is wholly under Murmanrybvod.
19 A representative of the fishers in Murmansk made the following state-
ment to Polyarnaya Pravda (19 September 1997, p. 1): ‘The situation in
our fishing industry is still difficult. The last six months’ disintegration
of the federal management bodies renders it extremely alarming, too.’
20 Fish quotas are in Russia given to shipowners, not to individual vessels.
21 See Hønneland and Nilssen (2000) for a further discussion of this
dilemma.
22 In the protocol from the session, Gusenkov is identified as member of
Murmansk regional duma (Ministry of Fisheries 1999). It seems rather
odd to include deputies from the regional legislatures in the delegation
since these have no role in fisheries management. Representatives from
the legislatures of the other federal subjects of Northwestern Russia are
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not included. This supports the argument that his role as shipowner and
economic benefactor was more important for his inclusion in the Russ-
ian delegation than his status as representative of the regional duma.
23 Interview data indicate that representatives of federal authorities in the
Russian delegation were more prepared to make a compromise with
Norway than were representatives from Northwestern Russia.
24 Both labour unions and fishers’ associations are mainly engaged in wel-
fare work.
25 So-called ‘departmental’ (vedomstvennye) research institutes are very
common in Russia. They are subordinate to various governmental agen-
cies and intended to serve their needs. More basic scientific research is
carried out at institutions under the Russian Academy of Science.
26 In an article in the newspaper Polyarnaya Pravda, fishers from Mur-
mansk complain that they were not warned by the scientists that the big
cod had already migrated into the Norwegian zone: ‘If no fish is found
in the ocean, then fishers are convinced that science is to blame’ (Pol-
yarnaya Pravda, 18 February 1998, p. 1). The message is: the main task
of marine scientists is to help us fishers.
27 See Hønneland (1998, 2000b) for a more detailed account of these
events.
28 These inspections are defined as Norwegian while the Russia inspectors
participate as observers. However, Russian authorities may file charges
against a vessel for violations discovered during such an inspection.
29 During the greater part of its existence, the Russian delegation to the
Permanent Committee has been headed by the director of Murmanryb-
vod. Sevryba and PINRO are also represented. In 1999, a representative
of the Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command of
the Federal Border Service was given a place in the delegation.
30 One could discuss whether the decisions of the Joint Fisheries Com-
mission are in accordance with international obligations of the two
countries (e.g. whether they reflect international principles for fisheries
management), but we limit our discussion here to decisions made at
national level in Russia.
31 The reader might ask: ‘Why did Russia choose this solution when the
old system functioned well enough?’ We see two possible answers to
this question. One is that it indeed makes sense to transfer responsibil-
ity for enforcement to an agency independent of the rest of the fisheries
management system as long as the latter is surrounded by allegations of
corruption. Another answer is that there is probably no uniform strat-
egy behind the decision to strip the State Committee for Fisheries/
Rosrybvod of its enforcement capacity; rather, the reorganisation was
the result of a fight over budget funds. With increased responsibility
come increased funds, and the Border Guard was more interested in
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the latter than the former, the argument – often employed by repre-
sentatives of the ‘fishery complex’ – goes.
32 The Norwegian inspectors used the catch logs of the Russian vessels to
calculate the individual vessel’s total catch that year. Normally, they
would only have been interested in catches taken in Norwegian zones,
but on this occasion they included catches taken in the Russian EEZ.
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As pointed out in Chapter 1, the threats posed by the nuclear com-
plex of Northwestern Russia have attracted no little attention in
recent years, not least from neighbouring Western countries. Thus,
the issue of nuclear safety stands forth as the most highly profiled
problem area among the three we have chosen to focus on in this
study. It also differs from the other two by way of being far more
heterogeneous in nature: some of the activities under scrutiny are of
a civilian nature; others take place within the military sphere. Partly,
the focus is on ‘actual’ polluting activities, such as the dumping of
waste; partly it is on the risk of accidents in connection with activi-
ties that do not result in contamination under normal circumstances.
Moreover, in the area of nuclear safety, environmental and security
concerns tend to be closely intertwined. As will be shown in this
chapter, the complexity of the problem area itself tends to be mir-
rored both in the multitude of international efforts undertaken to
address it and in the related implementation processes.
Background: the ‘nuclear complex’ and radiological hazards
The build-up of the ‘nuclear complex’ in Northwestern Russia was
linked partly with the nuclearisation of the Soviet Armed Forces,
and also with civilian needs in transportation and energy produc-
tion. Its history dates back to the late 1950s, when the Soviet
Union’s first nuclear-powered submarines and icebreakers were con-
structed and stationed on the Kola Peninsula. Well over a decade
later, in 1972, the construction of the largest nuclear installation in
the area, the Kola Nuclear Power Plant, was completed. Thus, the
5
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nuclear-powered vessels of the Northern Fleet, the icebreaker fleet
of Murmansk Shipping Company and the Kola Nuclear Power Plant,
together with their service and storage facilities, constitute the main
elements of the Northwest Russian nuclear complex. A brief descrip-
tion of the development of each of these elements and their state
today is given in the first sub-section below.
Perhaps contrary to popular belief, the extent of radioactive con-
tamination in the region is relatively low and mainly due to external
sources and practices that have been permanently or temporarily
discontinued, e.g. atmospheric nuclear tests and the dumping at sea
of radioactive waste (Bergman and Baklanov 1998; Lønne et al.
1997). The issue of contamination and its sources is elaborated in
the second sub-section. While the release of radioactive substances
is negligible in the normal operations of the nuclear installations in
Northwestern Russia, an accident or other unforeseen incident at
one of the installations, service or storage facilities could have very
serious implications. The risks posed by the nuclear complex are
addressed in the third sub-section below.
The ‘nuclear complex’ of Northwestern Russia
The Soviet Northern Fleet was officially established as late as in
1933, despite the fact that the strategic potential of the Kola Penin-
sula, with its year-round ice-free harbours, had been recognised in
Russian naval circles as early as in the second half of the nineteenth
century (Skogan 1986). The fleet headquarters were originally based
in Polyarnyy on the western shore of the Kola Fjord, but subse-
quently moved to Severomorsk across the fjord. For more than two
decades, the Northern Fleet remained the smallest of the Soviet
Navy’s four fleets. In the 1950s, however, a period of expansion set
in, which coincided with the onset of the Soviet Union’s struggle to
achieve nuclear parity with the United States. The country’s first
nuclear-powered submarine was completed at a submarine con-
struction facility in Severodvinsk in Arkhangelsk Oblast in 1957 and
stationed at Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula in 1958. The
Northern Fleet’s expansion continued in the following decades, and
the fleet acquired a large number of nuclear-powered submarines.
The fleet’s prize possessions are its strategic submarines. They are
armed with long-range ballistic missiles able to reach targets on
the American continent from the Russian coast. The strategic
submarines are protected by multi-purpose submarines, which
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are also nuclear-powered. The tactical missiles of these submarines
may be equipped either with nuclear or with conventional warheads.
Russia has declared that the multi-purpose submarines will not
carry nuclear warheads in peacetime. In addition to the submarines,
the Northern Fleet has a large number of surface vessels, many of
which are armed with nuclear weapons and three of which are
nuclear-powered.
The Northern Fleet reached the height of its power in the mid-
1980s. Since 1988, the number of ships taken out of service has
exceeded the number of new ships acquired, a tendency that has
intensified since 1991 (see Table 5.1). This was due to the combined
effect of a climate of economic downturn and the need to implement
obligations laid down by the START I treaty. In addition, the nuclear
submarines of the first generation started to reach the end of their
service life from the late 1980s. A total of about seventy nuclear-
powered submarines were removed from service in the Northern
Fleet during the period 1991–98. This gave the Northern Fleet a
new challenge: to dismantle a huge number of nuclear-powered sub-
marines in a very short period of time. The process is very costly, and
so far only a fraction of the submarines removed from service have
actually been dismantled. The majority are stored afloat awaiting
dismantlement, and many have not even been de-fuelled, i.e. the
spent nuclear fuel has not been removed from the reactors. Some of
these submarines are in a poor condition, and some observers claim
there is a real danger of them sinking. Moreover, international co-
operative programmes so far only cover the dismantlement of strate-
gic submarines. Hence, there is no dismantlement capacity left for
multi-purpose submarines, which are mostly at the end or have
passed far beyond their service life.1
Table 5.1 Number of ships in the Northern Fleet in 1991 and 1998
Category 1991 1998
Strategic submarines 36 13
Other submarines 90 43
Large combatants 83 45
Smaller combatants 73 27
Landing- and amphibious vessels 20 12
Source: Hønneland and Jørgensen (1999a).
The full dismantlement of a nuclear-powered submarine involves
several steps. The first step – and the most important from an envi-
ronmental point of view – is the de-fuelling of spent nuclear fuel
from the submarine’s reactor. Afterwards, the reactor compartment
is removed, and subsequently the rest of the hull can be cut up for
scrap. The process generates a certain amount of spent nuclear fuel
and other liquid and solid waste (including the reactor compartment
itself) which has to be transported to special facilities for further
treatment and/or intermediate storage. Spent nuclear fuel may either
be stored as it is or reprocessed. The Russian policy with regard to
spent nuclear fuel favours reprocessing, if possible. Reprocessing
generates large amounts of high-level liquid waste. Liquid waste is
usually solidified before storage, and some forms of solid waste can
be compressed.
The Northern Fleet has limited capacity in all stages of the disman-
tlement process. First, the existing infrastructure has only allowed for
the de-fuelling of a handful of submarines a year. Second, existing
intermediate storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and for liquid and
solid waste are long since filled to capacity, which means that large
amounts of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste are stored under
unsatisfactory conditions. Third, the spent nuclear fuel that is sup-
posed to be reprocessed is leaving the region very slowly, partly
because Russia only has two special train carriers for spent nuclear fuel
transportation, partly due to constraints at the reprocessing facility,
Mayak in Siberia, and to the Northern Fleet’s limited capability to pay
for such shipment.
Up to 1992, although the situation was less critical then, the
Northern Fleet disposed of large amounts of radioactive waste by
dumping it at sea. Since 1993, Russia has observed a voluntary
moratorium on such dumping, but the lack of capacity to deal with
spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste has, according to Russian
authorities, rendered it impossible for Russia to ratify the parts of
the London Convention that deal with the dumping of radioactive
substances. The problems related to the decommissioning of
nuclear-powered submarines is the most urgent nuclear safety issue
in the military sector. However, as demonstrated by the Kursk
and Komsomolets accidents, there are risks associated with nuclear-
powered submarines in operation as well. Moreover, nuclear-
powered submarines normally have to have their reactors refuelled
twice in the course of their service life; thus, active submarines also
108 International environmental agreements in Russia
contribute to the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel and to binding
up de-fuelling infrastructure. These issues will be discussed further
towards the end of the section.
In 1959, the Soviet Union’s first nuclear-powered icebreaker – the
Lenin – was stationed in Murmansk. Over the following years, a
whole fleet of nuclear icebreakers was built.2 The main task of the
icebreakers was to escort vessels navigating the Northern Sea Route
(i.e. the Northeast Passage), which stretches along the northern
shores of the Eurasian continent from the Barents to the Bering Sea.
Thus, the icebreaker fleet played an important role – and to some
extent still does – in securing the severnyy zavoz, i.e. the transporta-
tion of foodstuffs and other important goods to outlying northern
areas, as well as the transportation of various raw materials out of
these areas, mainly from Siberia.
The icebreaker fleet is a subsidiary of Murmansk Shipping Com-
pany, one of the largest enterprises in Murmansk Oblast. This fleet,
which in 1998 counted seven icebreakers and one nuclear-powered
container ship, was needed less and less during the 1990s because
transport volumes on the Northern Sea Route fell significantly. The
remaining ships are approaching the end of their service life. Like
the nuclear-powered submarines, the icebreakers have to have spent
nuclear fuel removed and the reactors refuelled at regular intervals.
Murmansk Shipping Company has three service ships of its own,
Imandra, Lotta and Lepse. Spent nuclear fuel from the icebreakers
used to be stored for an initial six months on board the Imandra and
then moved to one of the other ships for further storage. However,
by 1993 all three ships were filled to capacity. As for Lepse, the
whole ship is now considered nuclear waste, since a large portion of
the spent nuclear fuel on board is classified as ‘damaged’ and the ship
itself is also contaminated. This damaged fuel stems mainly from
the nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin, which suffered a reactor
accident in 1966.
The Kola Nuclear Power Plant, located in the town of Polyarnye
Zori in the southern central part of the Kola Peninsula, was put into
operation in 1972. The plant is by far the largest employer in Pol-
yarnye Zori with approximately 6,000 employees (out of a popula-
tion of some 18,000). As was customary in the Soviet Union, the
company provided a large share of the local social and technical
infrastructure, and many of these functions have been retained. The
Kola Nuclear Power Plant and the eight other nuclear power plants
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currently in operation in Russia are joined together under the Rosen-
ergoatom umbrella. Rosenergoatom is a subsidiary of Minatom, the
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, which reportedly wants to see
closer integration of the enterprises of the Russian nuclear energy
sector. In June 1999, then Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy
Adamov decided to let Rosenergoatom have direct control of the
revenue generated by all nuclear power plants. Plans to continue the
reorganisation of the nuclear power sector towards full integration
have met with considerable opposition at the regional and local
levels. Workers at the Kola Nuclear Power Plant fear that both their
pay cheques and general industrial rights will suffer, while local as
well as regional authorities expect the merger process to result in
significant cuts in revenue from the Kola Nuclear Power Plant to the
local and regional coffers.
The Kola Nuclear Power Plant plays a significant role in the total
supply of energy in Murmansk Oblast. Total yearly output is approx-
imately 12 TWH. Altogether, the Kola Nuclear Power Plant provides
some 60 per cent of the electric power consumed annually in the
oblast (Hansen and Tønnessen 1998). Most of this is consumed by
the industry, since electric power accounts for only a marginal share
of the energy consumed by private households. In addition, the Kola
Nuclear Power Plant exports energy to the Republic of Karelia. The
plant has four nuclear reactors, each of which yields an effect of 440
MW. The two oldest ones, contained in one building, came on line in
1973 and 1974, respectively, while the two reactors contained in the
other building have been in operation since 1981 and 1984. The two
oldest reactors in particular are viewed with concern by the interna-
tional community. The locations of some important nuclear safety
sites in Northwestern Russia are displayed in Figure 5.1.
Radioactive contamination of the environment
The level of radioactive contamination of the terrestrial environment
in Northwestern Russia is relatively low and comparable to that of
neighbouring countries (AMAP 1997, 1998; Bergman and Baklanov
1998; Lønne et al. 1997). As in Norway, Sweden and Finland, the
main sources of contamination are fallout from atmospheric nuclear
tests and the Chernobyl accident. A total of 87 atmospheric tests
were carried out on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago between 1955
and 1963 (Stortinget 1994, p. 31). Since 1963, subsequent to the
conclusion of the partial test ban treaty prohibiting atmospheric
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and underwater nuclear tests, all nuclear tests have been carried out
underground.3
Despite the low contribution to the average level of contamination
by regional sources, the localised character of such contamination
must be taken into consideration. While fallout both from the
nuclear tests and Chernobyl was dispersed over vast areas, more
recent activities – particularly inadequate storage of waste – have
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Figure 5.1 Important Northwest Russian sites in a nuclear safety context
resulted in a number of delimited areas where contamination levels
are significant. On the Kola Peninsula as a whole, though, the main
anthropogenic source of radiation affecting the population is radio-
therapy, followed by radiation from construction materials. By
contrast, production of nuclear energy and fallout from weapons
testing and the Chernobyl accident make up less than 3 per cent of
the average yearly individual doses to the population (State Commit-
tee for Environmental Protection 1998).
Compared to the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, the Barents and
Kara Seas are very clean. This goes for radioactive contamination as
well as for pollution in general. Besides fallout from atmospheric
nuclear tests, the main sources of radioactive substances in these
waters are routine releases from European reprocessing plants, first
and foremost Sellafield in Great Britain. In recent years, contamina-
tion levels have been reduced, primarily due to a sharp reduction in
releases from Sellafield. Releases from Russian facilities are also
believed to have contributed to contamination increases via the Ob
and Yenisey rivers. The total radioactivity of materials dumped by
the Northern Fleet (until 1992) and Atomflot (until 1986) is com-
parable to the accumulated radioactivity of the Sellafield releases.
However, all investigations carried out thus far have concluded that
very little of this has actually leaked out. Moreover, even in the
event of a worst-case scenario, with a simultaneous and rapid release
of the remaining radioactivity to the environment, radiological con-
sequences would be relatively low (Bergman 1997).
Radiological hazards associated with the nuclear complex
The principal radiological hazards to the region as well as to areas
beyond it are posed not by previous activities but by potential future
accidents or incidents. The risks posed by a release of radioactive
substances to the life and health of humans fall into two main cate-
gories, depending on the distance to the site where the accident or
incident takes place. Persons at or near the site will probably be in
acute danger from intense radiation, as well as from other effects of
the accident, such as fires and explosions. At greater distances from
the site, the main dangers are usually related to long-range effects
of more moderate exposure, for instance increased frequencies of
certain forms of cancer in the exposed population.
It is problematic to distinguish between environmental risks and
health risks where radioactive pollution is concerned. For a nuclear
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accident to constitute a real threat to the environment as such – that
is, to the continued existence of various species of flora and fauna in
a given area – the accident would have to have almost unimaginable
dimensions. Usually, the main problem is that the presence of radioac-
tive pollutants in the natural environment may pose a risk to people’s
life and health. The most seriously affected areas may be rendered
uninhabitable. Moreover, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident,
the problem of radioactive pollutants entering and accumulating in
the food chain may affect vast areas, making certain foodstuffs – typ-
ically the meat of grazing animals – unfit for human consumption.
Thus, in addition to the risks to life and health, radioactive contami-
nation of the environment may have grave economic consequences,
and it may even threaten the culture and way of life of certain people,
notably those of indigenous peoples and fishers.
One study (Bergman and Baklanov 1998) substantiates the Kola
Nuclear Power Plant’s position as the most hazardous industry in
the Kola–Barents region. Several operational incidents have taken
place since the plant was put into operation, among them a loss-of-
cooling incident in 1993, which might have resulted in a meltdown
incident in the oldest reactor. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has calculated the probability of a serious meltdown
in the oldest reactors to be 25 per cent over a period of twenty-three
years. Such an accident would not have Chernobyl dimensions, since
the reactors are of a different and less dangerous design. Neverthe-
less, the local effects would be grave, and deposits of radioactive
matter in parts of Russia and neighbouring countries would proba-
bly be high enough to influence both cancer statistics and patterns of
food consumption.
Bergman and Baklanov (1998) identify submarines during refu-
elling as another high-risk possibility, although the consequences of
an accident would be less far-reaching. In 1985, radionucleids were
released to the atmosphere and ten people were killed following an
explosion during refuelling of a submarine in Chazma Bay in the Far
East. For submarines in operation, submarines under decommis-
sioning or scrapping, and stored spent nuclear fuel and radioactive
waste, the risks are less certain. These are all classified by Bergman
and Baklanov (1998) as sources of potential high risk.4 Where the
submarines are concerned, the main dangers are linked to criticality
accidents (i.e. uncontrolled chain reactions) in reactors with releases
of radionucleids to air. De-fuelling of decommissioned submarines
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may involve the same risks as refuelling. Accidents involving inade-
quately stored spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste may ensue as
a result of fire breaking out at a storage facility and/or a criticality
accident if spent nuclear fuel elements are stored in too close prox-
imity to one another and without sufficient barriers between them.
Spent nuclear fuel and other waste dumped at sea, as well as the
sunken submarine Komsomolets and leakage from underground test
sites, are all categorised as low-risk sources by Bergman and Bak-
lanov (1998). Finally, their study identifies some potential risks
where the consequences are as yet undetermined due to insufficient
research of the problem. They include transportation of spent
nuclear fuel and waste, accidental nuclear explosions and releases
from underwater test sites.
Premises for implementation
The nature of the problem
At first glance, the problem of nuclear safety in Northwestern Russia
appears to be relatively complex, with respect to the prospects of
solving it. The activities that give rise to radiological threats in the
region are linked to crucial sectors of society: defence, energy pro-
duction and transportation. The ‘nuclear objects’ themselves are
controlled by two very powerful agencies, the Ministry of Defence
and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (see discussion below). More-
over, the costs related to problem-solving are generally high. For
instance, the economic cost of transporting a reactor with damaged
spent nuclear fuel to Novaya Zemlya and dumping it there is next to
nothing compared to the cost of safe removal, transportation and
storage of the spent nuclear fuel. In some cases, intervention is
hardly feasible at all if this is taken to mean a reduction of risk to an
acceptable level. This would certainly seem to apply to the prospect
of securing the safe functioning of the two oldest reactors at the Kola
Nuclear Power Plant.
On the other hand, the consequences of a large nuclear accident
would be devastating, both in terms of life and health and economi-
cally. The dramatic progress of a nuclear accident and the arbitrariness
and sneaking nature of the long-term health effects make the public
much more sensitive to radiological threats than to ‘classic’ environ-
mental problems. The sensitivity of people to these issues may not be
as high in Russia as in Western countries, but the ‘Chernobyl effect’ is
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nevertheless thought to have contributed significantly to postponing
the finalisation of at least one Russian nuclear power plant (Darst
2001). One must assume, then, that even the most cynical Moscow-
based decision-maker will be interested in reducing radiological
threats in the region as much as possible. Still, we must keep in mind
that while down-scaling costs are large and sure to occur, it is, after all,
less probable that an accident will occur than not. The attitude
towards risk-taking is decisive in this respect; one might assume that
more people are more willing to take risks in the uncertain political
situation of contemporary Russia than is the case in Western countries.
This general discussion does not capture the full complexity of the
nuclear safety issue, which, as demonstrated in the preceding sec-
tion, involves a number of more or less interrelated problems that
may well differ among each other with respect to their ‘malignity’.
Consequently, a brief examination of each problem area seems to
be warranted.
The military sphere As follows from the preceding section, the
threats that emanate from the day-to-day operations of Russian
nuclear submarines are difficult to evaluate. The responsibility for
the safe functioning of the submarines rests with the military author-
ities,5 and this issue is not addressed by the international arrange-
ments discussed in this book. However, threats in this category are
likely to fall off in the years to come, since Russia is committed to
further cuts in the number of submarines. The flip-side of the coin
is, of course, the accumulation of even larger stockpiles of spent
nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste that will result from the
continued decommissioning of vessels. No one is presumably inter-
ested in a further aggravation of this situation, but nevertheless the
problem is a tough one to solve. As described in the preceding sec-
tion, the dismantlement chain consists of a number of operations,
from de-fuelling of submarines to final storage of the waste, and a
bottleneck at one stage may frustrate the whole process. Moreover,
the debates on where to locate temporary and permanent storage
facilities have proven difficult and time consuming. Finally, large
investments in infrastructure are necessary to solve the waste prob-
lem, and the operations involved are costly to run.
The nuclear icebreakers The categories of risks related to the
nuclear icebreaker fleet are the same as for the nuclear submarines.
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Accidents may occur during day-to-day operation of the vessels,
during refuelling/de-fuelling or in connection with inadequately
stored spent fuel or radioactive waste. The most serious accidents
known to have happened with Russian civil nuclear vessels affected
the icebreaker Lenin in 1966 and 1967.6 The largest risk of radioac-
tive contamination from the icebreaker fleet is probably that posed
by the storage vessel Lepse, not least because of its location in the
Murmansk harbour in the immediate vicinity of a city of some
380,000 inhabitants.
The icebreaker fleet has played an important role in the Russian
North for decades since they make the Northern Sea Route naviga-
ble outside the short summer season. They also seem to have an
important symbolical function: they are considered by many as the
ultimate symbol of the conquering of the north as well as the pride
of the city of Murmansk. Even in today’s constrained economic con-
ditions, it is likely that the Murmansk Shipping Company will try to
keep as many of them in operation as long as possible.
The Kola Nuclear Power Plant As pointed out above, the Kola
Nuclear Power Plant is considered the most dangerous component
of the Northwest Russian nuclear complex. In the opinion of the
neighbouring countries, it should be shut down as soon as possible.
At the same time, the plant is of great importance to the region, both
as an energy provider,7 as an employer and as a contributor to the
regional and local budgets. Those who stand to gain most by a clos-
ing of the enterprise – e.g. the inhabitants of Polyarnye Zori – are
the same people whose daily existence is most directly dependent
on its continued operation. Moreover, the most important energy
customers are large industrial complexes with great influence – if
not direct, then at least indirect – on regional politics, partly with
company leadership in Moscow.
The nuclear complex in Northwestern Russia is viewed with great
concern by a number of Western countries. This enhances the
prospects of practical problem-solving since these countries are will-
ing to contribute money and expertise in order to alleviate the situa-
tion. At the same time, the active involvement of other states implies
that they would probably want to have a say in defining and grading
the threats, and to influence priorities where implementation of
international commitments is concerned. Thus, for the USA the mil-
itary threat from the nuclear submarines and possible proliferation
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threats are the main issues. For the European countries, and for the
Nordic countries in particular, the Kola Nuclear Power Plant is seen
as the most pressing problem, although the focus on nuclear waste
has been higher. For Norway, a large exporter of fish, it has been an
important goal to ensure that the Barents Sea remains free of radioac-
tive pollution. Even the slightest rumour of radioactivity in fish could
have grave economic consequences for the country.
The nature of the commitments
The picture of international agreements and other co-operative
measures that Russia participates in, pertaining in some way or other
to nuclear safety, is highly fragmented (see Chapter 1). While fairly
strict commitments exist in the adjacent areas of disarmament and
non-proliferation, commitments aimed at enhancing nuclear safety
and protection of the environment are generally ‘softer’.
Under the IAEA regime, a comprehensive framework for interna-
tional co-operation on nuclear safety has been set up. The agency
has worked out a detailed set of internationally recognised safety
norms and standards (Nuclear Safety Standards – NUSS), which are
continuously reviewed and updated. The IAEA’s International
Nuclear Event Scale (INES) is used to classify nuclear events and
accidents according to seriousness. Upon request, the IAEA sends
advisory and review teams to member states to observe and help
improve safety standards and activities. Within the IAEA regime,
‘hard’ mechanisms have largely been avoided. The agency has been
oriented mainly towards recommendatory norms and standards,
rather than binding ones. Inspections are carried out on a voluntary
basis, and enforcement procedures are generally non-existent. The
safety obligations under the Convention of Nuclear Safety, which
are legally binding upon the parties, are mostly of a very basic and
general nature. For instance, parties are required to maintain a leg-
islative and regulatory framework, including specific national safety
requirements, a licensing procedure and inspection, assessment and
enforcement policies.
In the course of the last decade, Russia has concluded a number of
bilateral and multilateral agreements with Western states in the area
of nuclear safety and security. Many of these are framework agree-
ments aimed at facilitating co-operation with and assistance to
Russia, e.g. by removing obstacles linked to issues like liability, taxes
and access to sites and installations. The agreement on Co-operative
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Threat Reduction (CTR) between Russia and the USA was set up in
order to help Russia fulfil its disarmament obligations under the
START I treaty. However, CTR also has environmental implications:
since the problems with removal and storage of spent nuclear fuel
threaten the speedy dismantlement of strategic submarines, some
projects specifically addressing these issues have been included
under CTR. Article I of the CTR agreement (US Department of State
1992) specifies that the parties shall co-operate in order to assist
Russia in destroying nuclear and other weapons, in ensuring their
secure transportation and storage, and in establishing measures
against proliferation. Under the agreement, the US is exempted from
liability (Article VII) and taxes (Article XI). Immunity is granted to
government personnel (Article X), and the US has a right to ‘exam-
ine the use of any material, training, or other services provided [. . .],
if possible at sites of their location or use’ (Article XIII).
The AMEC declaration – as the word ‘declaration’ implies – does
not specify any such obligations for any of the parties. The docu-
ment itself is simply a confirmation of the parties’ intentions to
co-operate in solving a rather broad and non-specific set of environ-
mental problems, i.e. those resulting from military activities. In
practice, AMEC has been directed first and foremost towards the
issue of military nuclear waste in Northwestern Russia. Like CTR,
AMEC is supposed to provide a framework for co-operation on con-
crete projects. However, since the parties have not yet been able to
negotiate a set of legal protections for the non-Russian participants
similar to those provided for in the CTR agreement, AMEC has not
functioned as intended (Sawhill 2000; Sawhill and Jørgensen 2001).
BEAR is a non-binding co-operative framework, directed, inter
alia, towards assisting implementation of other international envi-
ronmental accords in Russia. Concrete assistance is provided by
Western countries under various bilateral arrangements, notably the
Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission on Nuclear Safety.
As follows from the above, a meaningful analysis of Russia’s imple-
mentation of its international commitments in the area of nuclear
safety requires a broad approach to the concept of ‘commitments’,
i.e. one that includes more than the formal obligations laid down by
treaties and conventions. Only within the IAEA regime, and only in
recent years, have formal obligations been included as a mechanism
in international efforts to enhance nuclear safety. At the same time,
international co-operative arrangements directed towards capacity-
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building and assistance play a very important part in Russia. Thus, in
the subsequent sections on implementation activities and perfor-
mance, we include in the discussion Russian actors’ will and ability
to facilitate co-operation and assistance under CTR, AMEC and the
bilateral arrangements, as well as their part in implementing concrete
projects initiated under these framework arrangements.
Public authorities’ implementation activities
According to the Russian Constitution, protection of the environ-
ment as well as implementation of international agreements belong
to the category of issue areas that are subject to the joint jurisdiction
of federal and regional authorities (see Chapter 3). However, the
Constitution also states that nuclear energy and fissile materials are
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction (Para. 72, Article 1, section
i). Naturally, the same applies to the armed forces. In practice, this
means that federal authorities and their representative bodies in the
regions according to the Constitution should have a greater say rel-
ative to regional authorities in matters concerning nuclear safety
than in more general environmental matters. This extends also to
the implementation of international agreements. Moreover, the
Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Defence are both
bureaucratic ‘heavyweights’, also compared to other federal bodies
of governance.
Implementation in national legislation
Unlike in the case of fisheries management (see Chapter 4), Russian
authorities have succeeded in putting in place a legislative frame-
work for nuclear safety at the level of law. A law on the use of
nuclear energy (Russian Federation 1995a) was adopted by the State
Duma, 20 October 1995, and signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 21
November of the same year. The law is a large framework docu-
ment, consisting of seventy articles. Its Preamble states that:
The present Federal law defines the legal basis and principles for
regulating issues arising in the use of nuclear energy. It is aimed at
protection of the health and life of people, the environment and
property in relation to use of nuclear energy. It shall contribute to
the development of nuclear science and technology and to the
strengthening of the international regime for safe use of nuclear
energy. (Our emphasis.)
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Article 3 defines the objects of nuclear energy use as, among other
things, nuclear installations, radiation sources, storage points for
nuclear materials and radioactive substances, storage facilities for
radioactive waste, nuclear materials, radioactive substances and
radioactive waste. Article 4 lists the range of activities covered by
the law:
● siting, design, construction, operation and decommissioning of
nuclear installations, radiation sources and storage points;
● development, production, testing, transportation, storage, dispo-
sition and use of nuclear charges for peaceful purposes and their
handling;
● handling of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, includ-
ing handling in exploration and mining of materials containing
those materials and substances, in production, use, reprocessing
and storage of nuclear materials and radioactive substances;
● safety assurance in the use of nuclear energy;
● oversight of assurance of nuclear and technical safety, radiation
and fire protection of nuclear installations, radiation sources and
storage points, of the sanitary-epidemiological well-being of citi-
zens in the use of nuclear energy;
● physical protection of nuclear installations, radiation sources,
storage points, nuclear materials and radioactive substances;
● control of and accounting for nuclear materials and radioactive
substances;
● export and import of nuclear installations, equipment, technolo-
gies, nuclear materials, radioactive substances, special non-nuclear
materials and services in the use of nuclear energy;
● state radiation monitoring within the territory of the Russian
Federation;
● training of specialists for the use of nuclear installations, radiation
sources, storage points, nuclear materials and radioactive sub-
stances;
● performance of other activities in the use of nuclear energy (Russ-
ian Federation 1995a, Article 4).
A law on radiation safety of the population (Russian Federation
1995b) was adopted by the State Duma on 5 December 1995 and
signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 9 January 1996. Radiation safety
is here defined as conditions under which present and future gener-
ations are protected against ionising radiation harmful to their
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health (Article 1). The law establishes principles for standardisation,
grounding and optimisation in radiation protection assurance (Arti-
cle 3) and basic hygienic standards for exposure caused by the use of
ionising radiation sources on Russian territory (Article 9). Other
important federal laws and normative acts in the sphere of nuclear
safety include the laws on certification of production and services
(Russian Federation 1993) and on the administrative liability of
organisations for the violation of legislation in the use of nuclear
energy (Russian Federation 2000) as well as the provision on licens-
ing of activities in the use of nuclear energy (Government of the
Russian Federation 1997b).
As the first among Russia’s federal subjects, Murmansk Oblast
acquired its own regional law on nuclear safety in 1997 (Murmansk
Oblast 1997c). Referring to the federal laws on the use of nuclear
energy and on radiation safety of the population, the regional law
specifies, among other things, the authority of the regional duma
(Article 8) and the regional administration (Article 9), and the rights
and obligations of citizens and public organisations in matters of
nuclear safety. The law states the major responsibility of various fed-
eral agencies to perform regulation and monitoring in the field, but
lists a range of activities in which regional authorities can participate
(Articles 8 and 9). Among these are the elaboration and implemen-
tation of federal nuclear safety programmes, monitoring of the radi-
ological situation in the oblast, the location of nuclear objects
(including storage of nuclear waste) and decision-making in the
event of a nuclear accident.
It is difficult to judge precisely to what extent the legislative
framework related to nuclear safety has evolved in response to the
Russian Federation’s international obligations in the field, and to
what extent it is the result of internal political processes. However,
one can assume that the international obligations of the state at least
to some extent have influenced developments. The specific reference
to the international nuclear safety regime in the preamble to the law
on the use of nuclear energy speaks to this effect.
The role of federal authorities
The most important among the federal executive agencies partici-
pating in the implementation of nuclear safety measures and of
international commitments in that area are the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, Gosatomnadzor and the Department for Environmental
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Protection under the Ministry of Natural Resources. In some co-
operative arrangements, notably AMEC, the Ministry of Defence
plays an important role.
The Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) was established in 1986
as a Soviet ministry and merged in 1989 with the powerful Ministry
of Medium Machine-Building, responsible for development and con-
struction of nuclear weapons and reactors in the Soviet Union.
Minatom was assigned responsibility for all aspects – civilian and mil-
itary – of the nuclear energy industry and had about a million
employees within its structure. This set-up continued when Minatom
was reorganised into a Russian ministry in 1992. In 1998, responsi-
bility for nuclear waste from military establishments was also trans-
ferred to Minatom. Minatom is a gigantic organisation and in many
ways still epitomises a soviet-type industrial sector ministry. Far from
being a mere regulatory body, it controls and co-ordinates the work
of a large number of state enterprises, including nuclear power
plants, weapons production facilities and research institutes. By par-
ticipating in legislative processes and working out policy concepts
and programmes, Minatom plays a key role in carving out the federal
policy in the field of nuclear energy. At the same time, at least in prin-
ciple, the ministry is in a position to implement this policy directly by
issuing the necessary orders to its own subsidiary organisations.
Minatom participates actively in international processes related to
nuclear energy management, nuclear safety, non-proliferation and
disarmament, and in the implementation of international obliga-
tions in these areas. The ministry is a key Russian participant in the
IAEA regime, and is responsible for fulfilling Russian obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the Joint Russian–Norwegian
Commission on Nuclear Safety, it is counterpart to the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minatom is in charge of all fissile mate-
rials outside nuclear weapons, also of nuclear warheads once they
are taken out of service, and of decommissioned nuclear submarines.
This gives Minatom the central role in the implementation of pro-
jects under CTR, despite the programme’s ‘military’ profile. It also
means that the lack of a formal role for Minatom in AMEC may
complicate the implementation of that agreement.
While Minatom represents the Russian Federation in bilateral and
multilateral fora dealing with atomic installations and nuclear waste
and also oversees the implementation of co-operative projects with
other states, the concrete implementation of such projects is largely
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delegated to subsidiary or associated bodies, one of the most impor-
tant being the Interbranch Co-ordination Centre Nuklid. This body
was established in 1990 to co-ordinate attempts at commercialisa-
tion within the nuclear sector of the Soviet Union. It is not formally
part of the structure of Minatom, but it is part of the ‘Minatom
system’ and is organised as a so-called state unitary enterprise (gosu-
darstvennoye unitarnoye predpriyatiye). In practice, this means that
it works on contracts with the Ministry and that ties between the
two are tight. Nuklid’s main office is in St Petersburg; branch offices
are located in Moscow, Murmansk and Vladivostok. It has a staff of
55, but approximately 1,500 people work on a contractual basis for
Nuklid. The major tasks of Nuklid are technology development
(mainly of containers), certification in relation to IAEA and the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) and innovation. In
1995, the director of Nuklid was assigned the task of elaborating a
programme for nuclear waste treatment, and in 1998 the organisa-
tion was appointed main contractor for the AMEC projects and for
the majority of the ten co-operative projects with Norway identified
in the Framework Agreement between the two states.
In the Soviet Union, there existed no independent control agency
in the field of nuclear safety. All functions pertaining to nuclear
energy and weapons construction, including both regulation and
control, were performed by various divisions within Minatom and
its predecessors. In 1991, however, the Federal Inspectorate for
Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) was established in
the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and endowed with
the task of controlling and licensing activities related to the applica-
tion of nuclear energy. From then on, Russia was in compliance with
a central requirement of the IAEA Convention of Nuclear Safety,
which states that the body which implements the regulatory function
be separate from other bodies concerned with the promotion and
utilisation of nuclear energy.
Gosatomnadzor was established as an executive body under the
President. It is responsible for safety regulations in the use of atomic
energy. Among its most important tasks are licensing of activities that
involve the use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials, the devel-
opment of standards for and monitoring of such use, non-proliferation
of nuclear technology and materials, physical protection of nuclear
installations and control of Russian implementation of relevant inter-
national agreements. The military sector has been excluded from its
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control since 1995. With the establishment of Gosatomnadzor, part of
Minatom’s control and licensing functions were removed from the
ministry and placed with the new agency, making the latter, in effect,
an outside ‘watchdog’ vis-à-vis Minatom’s activities. As might be
expected, this has created a lot of tension between the two agencies.
Some of the conflicts have arisen around issues where the delimitation
of competence between Minatom and Gosatomnadzor is unclear. In
principle, as follows from the provision spelling out the functions
of the agencies, Minatom is responsible for the implementation of
rules and regulations in the field of nuclear safety, while Gosatomnad-
zor is responsible for implementation control (Ministry of Atomic
Energy 1997). Thus, with regard to international obligations, one of
Gosatomnadzor’s main functions is to control the implementing activ-
ities of Minatom and other relevant agencies. Like Minatom,
Gosatomnadzor participates in processes related to the IAEA regime,
it controls implementation of requirements under the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty, and the agency is a participant in several projects under
CTR as well as under the bilateral Russian–Norwegian regime.
The Russian environmental agency has experienced considerable
ups and downs since it was first established in 1988. Until then, there
had been no specialised agency responsible for environmental pro-
tection. However, as green issues came gradually to the forefront of
public debate, the need arose for political responses, and a State
Committee for Environmental Protection was created. In 1991, the
Committee was elevated to the rank of a Ministry of Environmental
and Natural Resources Protection. The agency retained this status
until 1996, when it became, once more, a State Committee. Then,
in 2000, came the final blow: as part of President Putin’s bureau-
cratic spring-cleaning, which involved the reshuffling and merging
of several ministries and was allegedly undertaken in order to
streamline the bureaucracy, the State Committee for Environmental
Protection was disbanded. The remains were incorporated into the
Ministry of Natural Resources as a Department for Environmental
Protection. Where nuclear safety is concerned, the main roles of the
environmental agency are to carry out environmental impact assess-
ments for facilities and installations prior to their construction, and
to carry out inspections to ensure that environmental regulations
pertaining to nuclear safety are observed.8
The most conspicuous trait in the Russian federal organisation of
nuclear safety issues is the well-known Russian lack of horizontal
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integration between various agencies and the high level of conflict
between them. A major line of conflict seems to run between
Minatom and, in particular, Nuklid, on the one hand, and the
‘softer’ agencies of the State Committee/Department for Environ-
mental Protection and Gosatomnadzor on the other. The two latter
have seen their status reduced in recent years, both formally and
informally. The federal agency for environmental protection lost its
ministerial status in 1996. Gosatomnadzor has seen its major task to
issue licences threatened by new regulations that provide Minatom
(in practice: Nuklid) with the right to license activities related to the
use of nuclear energy for military purposes (Government of the
Russian Federation 1999). Hence, the loss of status of the environ-
mental protection and nuclear safety supervisory agencies has taken
place at the same time as Minatom and Nuklid have expanded their
spheres of influence.
Working relations between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ agencies seem to
be characterised partly by a modus vivendi between people who
have been forced – for example, for the sake of international projects
– to maintain a certain level of contact with each other. This seems
to characterise relations between the representatives of Minatom
and the State Committee/Department of Environmental Protection
that are involved in co-operation with Norway (Hønneland and
Moe 2000). Between others, i.e. Nuklid and Gosatomnadzor, the
schism seems more volatile. There are also signs of internal conflict
inside Minatom.9
The role of regional authorities
The formal role of regional authorities in relation to nuclear instal-
lations on their territory, as well as nuclear safety issues, is spelt out
in the federal law on the use of atomic energy (Russian Federation
1995a). The law states that the regulation and exploitation of fed-
eral nuclear installations are a federal responsibility. The same
applies to the implementation of international obligations and the
co-ordination of international co-operation in this area (Article 9).
However, a number of functions are defined as being the joint
responsibility of federal and regional authorities, including decisions
on the location of nuclear installations, environmental impact
assessments and protection of people and the environment. More-
over, authorities at both levels are jointly responsible for working
out and implementing ‘complex programmes for the social and
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economic development and ecological safety of territories where
nuclear energy installations are located’ (Article 10). The joint
responsibility of federal and regional authorities on these issues in
the case of Murmansk Oblast is confirmed in the regional law on
nuclear safety (Murmansk Oblast 1997b).
In practice, the vast dimensions of the nuclear-related problems as
well as the bureaucratic strength of Minatom and the Ministry of
Defence imply that the role of regional authorities remains essentially
reactive rather than pro-active. The authorities of Murmansk Oblast
have occasionally criticised the two ministries for the problems their
activities have created in the region, but their main strategy has been
to support federal attempts to deal with the situation and to lobby for
stronger commitments in this field. The federal bodies, for their part,
mostly recognise that regional support makes policy implementation
an easier task. An agreement between Minatom and the regional
administration of Murmansk on co-operation in the treatment
of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel was concluded in 1998
(Murmansk Oblast 1998). A more general agreement on co-
ordination of activities within the sphere of nuclear safety between
Murmansk regional administration and a range of federal agencies
present in the region, including Minatom, the State Committee for
Environmental Protection, Gosatomnadzor and the Russian Navy
(the Northern Fleet) was signed in early 2000 (Murmansk Oblast
2000). Being rather vague and non-specific, these agreements should
perhaps be seen more as an expression of the parties’ will to co-oper-
ate than as an operative framework for joint problem-solving. When
concrete issues are to be tackled or conflicts of interest arise, repre-
sentatives of the various interested parties are often invited to discuss
the issue jointly. An example is the discussions of the suitability of
Sayda Bay in the vicinity of the closed military town of Skalistyy as a
storage site for submarine reactor compartments. The local authori-
ties were sceptical about these plans and wanted to hold a referen-
dum in Skalistyy on the day of the presidential election – 16 March
2000 – allowing the inhabitants to give their opinion.10 When their
right to do this was questioned, they turned to the regional adminis-
tration, which agreed to invite all interested parties to discuss the
issue, and to act as mediator between the local authorities on the one
hand and the Northern Fleet and Minatom on the other.
Among the issues discussed at the meetings concerning Sayda Bay
was that of material compensation to the inhabitants of Skalistyy. This
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is a question that could affect the policy of regional authorities as
well. Increasing nuclear safety in the region is seen as very important,
but in the current conditions economic considerations tend to take
precedence over most other matters. So to the extent that regional
authorities have to accept risks in the future too – for instance in the
form of storage sites on their territory – they are likely to try to get as
much economic mileage out of it as possible. Pushing for direct com-
pensations is one way of achieving this. Efforts to improve nuclear
safety could also spawn positive spin-off effects in the region through
investments in infrastructure and increased demand for labour. In
1999, a Committee for Conversion and Nuclear Safety was set up
under the regional administration to co-ordinate activities in the field
of nuclear safety. The name of the committee reflects the dual objec-
tive of the administration, enhancing nuclear safety and simultane-
ously reviving the struggling naval shipyards.
A large share of the funds currently available for nuclear safety pro-
jects in Northwestern Russia comes in the form of assistance from
abroad. As pointed out above, co-ordination of such co-operative
measures are the prerogative of federal authorities. However, regional
authorities are taking quite an active part in attracting and negotiating
agreements of this kind. For instance, the Murmansk regional admin-
istration is represented in the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission
on Nuclear Safety.
The role of federal agencies in the region
As mentioned in Chapter 3, some forty federal agencies are repre-
sented in Murmansk Oblast and even more in Arkhangelsk Oblast.
Some of them are relatively independent with regard to policy
choices, including choices related to the implementation of Russia’s
international obligations. As noted in Chapter 4, federal agencies
located in the region act as the main representatives of Russian
public authorities in the efforts to manage the Northwest Russian
fishing fleet, including implementing the country’s international
obligations. On the other hand, the autonomy of most federal agen-
cies located in the region is probably rather limited vis-à-vis head
offices in Moscow. This seems to be the case with the federal bodies
involved in nuclear safety. Minatom and Gosatomnadzor have their
representations in the region, but the ‘balance of power’ between
federal and regional offices differs from what we found in fisheries
management. While important decisions in fisheries management
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are made by federal agencies located in the region and normally
sanctioned by the federal offices, the latter seem to have a greater
thrust in the nuclear safety area or, put differently, the agencies
located in the region are less autonomous in nuclear safety issues
than in fisheries management. In addition to the presence of
Minatom and Gosatomnadzor, the State Committee/Department for
Environmental Protection has regional branches in each federal sub-
ject, including Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts (see Chapter 6).
The Murmansk branch of the committee consists of several depart-
ments, including the State Control and Radiation Security Depart-
ment, which is charged with addressing nuclear safety issues. In the
military sphere, the Directorate of Ecological Security of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation has ‘regional’ units, including one
in the Northern Fleet. However, the responsibility for nuclear safety
in the Northern Fleet rests with another body, the Radiological,
Chemical and Biological Protection Service.
A recent addition to the measures already in place to organise the
scrapping of submarines, treatment of nuclear waste and rehabilita-
tion of submarine bases in the northern areas is the planned estab-
lishment under Minatom of a state enterprise, Sevrao, to handle
these tasks (Northern Enterprise for the Treatment of Nuclear
Waste) (Government of the Russian Federation 2000). Altogether
nine such regional enterprises are planned in the Russian Federation.
The first will be Sevrao and Dalrao (Far Eastern Enterprise for the
Treatment of Nuclear Waste) in the Far East. An overarching federal
structure, Rosrao, might also be set up under Minatom. Sevrao will
have its head office in Murmansk and branch offices in Andreyeva
Bay and Gremikha. It was supposed to be on track by March 2000,
but was hampered by changes in Russian property regulations (Høn-
neland and Moe 2000).
Implementation performance and target compliance
To what extent have Russia’s international nuclear safety commit-
ments been implemented in Northwestern Russia? Due to the com-
plexity of the problem, implementation of global, regional and
bilateral commitments are discussed separately. We look in particu-
lar at the London Convention, the CTR and AMEC agreements and
the bilateral agreements with Norway, respectively.11 This section
also covers aspects of the discussion found in Chapters 4 and 6
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under the headings ‘the role of others’ and ‘joint implementation’.
The former refers mainly to the participation of target groups in the
implementation process.12 The latter involves construction projects
financed by the US and Norway under the CTR and AMEC agree-
ments and the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety in
Northwestern Russia.13
The global level
Soviet/Russian implementation of the London Convention, here
related to the dumping of radioactive waste that had taken place in
the Barents and Kara Seas since the 1960s, is studied by Stokke
(2000b). He distinguishes four stages in terms of access and partici-
pation patterns in the Soviet/Russian ‘implementation game’: (1) a
period of military self-regulation until the late 1970s; (2) a time of
gradually expanding participation during the 1980s; (3) a stage of
acute politicisation at the beginning of the 1990s; and, lastly, (4) the
mildly ambiguous situation in recent years in which domestic
involvement in nuclear affairs is contracting while foreign participa-
tion is on the rise.
Since the 1960s, the Northern Fleet and the Murmansk Shipping
Company experienced a widening gap between their needs and
actual capacity to store radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. As
a result, they resorted to dumping waste matter into the adjacent
Arctic waters. During the 1960s and 1970s, dumping was secret,
closed to public scrutiny and under the sole regulation of the mili-
tary authorities. An interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel had
been built for the Northern Fleet as early as in 1962, but it was
plagued by constant operation problems. In 1973, the Northern
Fleet and the Murmansk Shipping Company started to transport
spent nuclear fuel to the reprocessing plant at Mayak in the Urals.
The Soviet Union ratified the London Convention in 1976, and in
1979 the Soviet Council of Ministers passed Resolution 222 on Mea-
sures to Ensure Performance of the Soviet Side’s Obligations Follow-
ing from the 1972 [London] Convention (Stokke 2000b, p. 490).
The resolution prohibited the dumping of high-level waste and made
the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental
Monitoring (Goskomgidromet)14 responsible for issuing permits to
dump low- and medium-level waste and for reporting permit alloca-
tion to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). According to
Stokke (pp. 491–492), the resolution – intentionally designed to spur
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Soviet implementation of the London Convention – transformed the
Soviet implementation game by shifting executive involvement to
other levels of government, by prohibiting the dumping of high-level
waste and by introducing a regulatory newcomer regarding low- and
medium-level waste. All these measures were in line with the regula-
tory provisions of the London Convention and would be difficult to
account for in the absence of the convention.
During the 1980s, Goskomgidromet confirmed its role as an inde-
pendent agency with its own ambitions in the dumping issue. It par-
ticipated in the elaboration of new standards for the dumping of
radioactive waste; it permitted the Northern Fleet to continue dump-
ing low- and medium-level waste on the condition that it built a waste-
processing plant; and, when this did not happen, it withdrew its
dumping permit. Murmansk Shipping Company, which had less waste
to handle than the Northern Fleet, had already built a processing plant
and stopped dumping liquid waste in 1984 and solid waste in 1986.
The Northern Fleet, for its part, disregarded the instructions of
Goskomgidromet and even increased the amounts of dumped waste
towards the end of the 1980s. The newly established State Committee
for Environmental Protection replaced Goskomgidromet at the head
of the Soviet delegations to the London Convention in 1989.
Largely as a result of the Chernobyl accident, nuclear safety became
a major issue in Soviet/Russian politics at the end of the 1980s and
early 1990s. The barriers to involvement in nuclear safety issues were
dramatically lowered as institutional rivalry during the transition from
the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation enhanced participation in
the decision-making process. Implementation of international nuclear
safety obligations went from being a process involving a handful of
regulatory bodies to a key issue at the highest political level with broad
societal scrutiny and activity. However, during the 1990s interest in
environmental affairs levelled off as the economic crisis claimed most
ordinary citizens’ attention. At the same time, foreign assistance
directed towards nuclear safety in Russia increased. This foreign
involvement, mainly at the regional and bilateral level, generally took
the form of financial assistance to Russia to help the country comply
with its obligations at the global level. Hence, implementation of
obligations at the global level became linked to implementation at the
regional and bilateral level (discussed below). The Kola Nuclear
Power Plant’s ability to comply with the IAEA standards and the
Northern Fleet and Murmansk Shipping Company’s ability to process
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radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in accordance with Russia’s
international obligations are in a major sense dependent upon the suc-
cess of various bilateral projects under the Joint Russian–Norwegian
Commission on Nuclear Safety.
The regional level
A thorough study of the implementation of the CTR and AMEC
programmes is found in Sawhill and Jørgensen (2001).15 The main
objective of the CTR programme is to eliminate strategic weapons
and their launching systems in Russia in order to enable the country
to comply with its arms reduction obligations under START I. By
2007, 41 ballistic missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) and their asso-
ciated missiles and missile launchers are to be eliminated through the
CTR programme. While Russia would comply with the START II
treaty by removing the missile compartment from submarine hulls
and cutting the missile tubes in half, this is only one step in a com-
prehensive process of dismantling the entire submarine quota. In
particular, the rate of the scrapping depends on how quickly the
reactor fuel can be removed. In 1995, the rate was four submarine
reactor cores (or two submarines) annually. The main obstacle was
lack of capacity to handle spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
In its initial years, the CTR programme provided mainly heavy
industrial equipment to Russia, such as cutting tools, cranes and other
things necessary for removing the missile tubes and scrapping sub-
marine hulls. As the Russian shipyards from the mid-1990s became
increasingly unable to pay their workers and maintain basic opera-
tional procedures, the CTR programme shifted from providing
equipment and technology to signing direct contracts with Russian
shipyards to dismantle submarines. The first contract was signed with
the Zvyozdochka shipyard in Arkhangelsk Oblast in 1997. In addi-
tion to this shipyard, the Nerpa shipyard in Murmansk Oblast was
later included in the scheme. After infrastructure improvements pro-
vided by the CTR programme, Nerpa can now dismantle two to
three submarines and Zvyozdochka six per year. Spent fuel from six
SSBNs will be reprocessed at the Mayak Chemical Combine. For
spent fuel from the remaining SSBNs, the CTR programme is pur-
chasing some 100 40-tonne storage casks, developed under the
AMEC programme (see below), that can safely store the fuel for up
to fifty years. Due to continued difficulties in getting the casks
licensed, the problem of spent nuclear fuel remains a serious obstacle
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to submarine dismantlement. Nevertheless, 18 of the projected 41
SSBNs were dismantled by February 2001, see Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 CTR accomplishments and projections (as of February 2001)
Original Eliminated
inventory February Eliminated 2004 Eliminated 2007 
baseline 2001 (projection) (projection)
Submarine-
launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBM) 936 184 503 661
SLBM launchers 728 308 480 612
Ballistic missile-
firing submarines 
(SSBNs) 48 18 32 41
Source: Sawhill and Jørgensen (2001).
The AMEC programme comprises seven project groups, five of
which deal with spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste manage-
ment, see Table 5.3. Most importantly, a 40-tonne prototype con-
tainer suitable for interim storage and transportation of spent
nuclear fuel has been developed under the programme (project 1.1).
The prototype was completed in late 1999, but the cask’s certifica-
tion has been complicated by disagreement between Minatom and
Gosatomnadzor concerning which of these organisations should be
the certifying agency. Concrete storage pads, of which up to fifty
casks may be temporarily stored, should have been ready by mid-
2001 (project 1.1-1). However, the construction of the pads has
been delayed due to difficulties in obtaining land-use permits from
regional authorities.
Project 1.2 aims at reducing the growing volume of low-level
liquid radioactive waste through the development of a mobile waste-
processing facility. The facility is intended to serve submarines at
remote sites on the Kola Peninsula. The first mobile unit is under
construction at the time of writing. Projects 1.3 and 1.4 are related
to solid radioactive waste stemming from the dismantlement of sub-
marines. Several facilities are scheduled to be completed during the
years 2001–2.
In summary, the CTR and AMEC projects – mainly aimed at the
scrapping of submarines and the development of infrastructure
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necessary for the unloading, transportation and storage of spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste – are in the process of being imple-
mented, but largely behind schedule. Delays are caused by a mixture
of internal Russian factors and factors found in the interface between
donor states and Russia. The major problem among the latter is slow-
ness in the elaboration of an international legal framework, in partic-
ular related to indemnity against liability, access to nuclear sites,
personnel immunity and tax exemptions. The internal Russian factors
are mainly related to institutional controversies: cf. the disagreement
between Minatom and Gosatomnadzor as to which agency has the
right to license the 40-tonne cask developed under the AMEC
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Table 5.3 Nuclear safety projects in the AMEC programme
Project number Project description
Naval spent nuclear fuel management
1.1 Design and construct interim storage and
transportation container
1.1-1 Design and construct temporary storage pad for
spent nuclear fuel cask
Naval liquid radioactive waste treatment
1.2 Design and construct mobile liquid radioactive
waste processing facility
Solid radioactive waste volume reduction
1.3-1 Assess technology for waste volume reduction
1.3-2 Manufacture a mobile pre-treatment facility
1.3-3 Manufacture a decontamination unit for metal
wastes
Solid radioactive waste storage
1.4-1 Assess surface coating technologies
1.4-2 Manufacture steel radioactive waste containers
1.4-3 Manufacture concrete radioactive waste
containers
Radiation monitoring and personnel and environmental safety
1.5 Equipment transfer, training and exchange of
monitoring strategies
1.5-1 Radiation control at facilities
Source: Sawhill and Jørgensen (2001).
programme. Apart from open conflict, the lack of co-ordination
between various Russian agencies has reportedly created serious
problems for the implementation of both CTR and AMEC. More-
over, there seems to be a positive correlation between the potential
for financial gain for the institutions involved and implementation
success. For instance, the enthusiasm of Minatom and the Ministry of
Defence is related to the financial support channelled through these
agencies by the programmes. Likewise, the defence industry gained
substantially from the agreements, which enhanced their supportive
attitude. Furthermore, Minatom’s interest cooled off markedly when
the ministry in the mid-1990s acquired control of the lucrative
nuclear export market (and was thus no longer so ‘dependent’ on
financial support from abroad). The Ministry of Foreign affairs, for its
part, has often put on a tougher stance towards the US in CTR nego-
tiations than other Russian agencies, which can probably be
explained, at least partly, by the fact that this ministry has only had a
co-ordinating role in the CTR process. Finally, the overarching polit-
ical controversies of the Russian Federation – between the executive
and the legislative and between the federal centre and the regions –
have also hampered co-operation under the CTR and AMEC agree-
ments. The key to the solution of the most pressing unresolved issues
affecting AMEC co-operation – tax exemptions, liability and immu-
nity – rests largely with the Federal Parliament. As far as centre–region
relations are concerned, there are examples of projects having been
exempted from taxes by federal authorities, yet having to face
demands for taxes at the regional level.
The bilateral level
The Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety in Northwestern
Russia provides further infrastructure to facilitate implementation
of the agreements at global and regional level. The Plan of Action
was evaluated in 2000 by one of the authors of this book (Høn-
neland and Moe 2000).16 Project participants were interviewed at
various levels of government in both countries.
The evaluation comprised five of the projects covered by the
Framework Agreement on Nuclear Safety between Russia and
Norway, see Table 5.4. Project 202 involved the upgrading and
expansion from 1200 m2 to 5000 m2 of the effluent treatment facil-
ity for liquid radioactive waste at the facility serving nuclear-pow-
ered icebreakers in Murmansk. The project was conceived in 1994
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as a bilateral Norwegian–Russian initiative; the USA joined the
project in 1995. The facility will serve both the nuclear-powered
icebreaker fleet and the Russian Northern Fleet. The opening of the
facility was postponed several times, but finally took place in June
2001. Main project participants in Russia were Nuklid and RTP
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Table 5.4 Projects financed by the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear
Safety in Northwestern Russia and included in the Framework Agreement
on Nuclear Safety between Norway and Russia
Project number and description Funding in USD
Defence-related spent nuclear fuel projects
211: Build ship for transport of spent naval nuclear fuel 376,000
212: Build four railway cars for transport of spent naval 
nuclear fuel 2,963,000
216: Empty/decommission spent naval nuclear fuel at 
Andreyava Bay 733,000
217: Establish interim storage facility for spent naval 
nuclear fuel at Mayak 186,000
230: Develop transportable storage cask for spent naval 
nuclear fuel 610,000
232: Build pad for temporary storage of spent naval 
nuclear fuel casks 595,000
Defence-related radioactive waste projects
213: Modernise liquid radioactive waste storage facility 
in Severodvinsk 4,185,000
214: Deliver mobile equipment for processing liquid 
radioactive waste 0
215: Build temporary storage facility for solid radioactive 
waste at Andreyava Bay 8,578,000
226: Build system for processing solid radioactive waste 
from submarines 75,000
Civilian nuclear safety projects
101: Enhance operational safety at the Kola Nuclear 
Power Plant 9,668,000
202: Modernise liquid radioactive waste treatment facility 
in Murmansk 1,996,000
203: Dismantle the floating technical base Lepse 2,852,000
229: Develop transportable storage cask for spent nuclear 
fuel 472,000
Source: Sawhill and Jørgensen (2001).
Atomflot, on whose premises the facility was built. A major goal for
the Norwegian side was to sway Russia to accede to the London
Convention’s prohibition on the dumping of nuclear waste (includ-
ing low-level waste) at sea. In the interviews, this was mentioned by
all Norwegians who had something to say about this project, but by
none of the Russians. They, instead, stressed the need to solve the
increasing problem of liquid radioactive waste, and to expand activ-
ities and secure revenues at RTP Atomflot (by selling services to the
Northern Fleet). The Russians and Norwegians agreed that the goals
of the project had been ‘nearly achieved’. The Norwegians here
probably referred to the finalisation of the facility, not to Russian
accession to the dumping ban in the London Convention. To explain
the delays in finalising the facility, the Russian project participants
referred to changes in the Russian security norms twice during the
project period (in 1996 and 1998). On the Norwegian side, ‘Russ-
ian bad [management] culture’ and ‘the culture clash between Amer-
icans and Russians’ were given as reasons for the delays. Both parties
mentioned the Russian need for pre-payment as a major obstacle.
Nevertheless, bilateral co-operation between Norwegian and Russ-
ian project participants was generally perceived as unproblematic.
The project has had a relatively high profile and was also mentioned
frequently in evaluation interviews we had with people other than
those directly involved in it. Most seemed to perceive it as ‘partly
successful’. For some time, it was clearly viewed as something close
to an exemplary project since the parties did manage to get some-
thing done here. With the repeated delays in finalising it, however,
enthusiasm dwindled. Several of the Russian interviewees peripheral
to the project referred to it as ‘too golden’, indicating that the abun-
dant financing dampened Russian enthusiasm to finalise it. Some
said outright that the Norwegian side should have stood more firmly
on its position and demanded the finalisation of the project with the
funds initially allotted.
A Norwegian initiative resulted in the establishment of an inter-
national advisory committee to work for the solution of the envi-
ronmental threat posed by Lepse, the nuclear-powered icebreaker
fleet’s old storage vessel for radioactive waste (project 203). The
committee is led by Norway; the other participants are Russia,
France, the USA, the European Commission and the Nordic Envi-
ronmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO). Major participants on
the Russian side include Minatom, Nuklid, Murmansk Shipping
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Company (the owner of Lepse), the State Committee/Department
for Environmental Protection, Gosatomnadzor and various research
institutes and enterprises. The vessel was docked in the summer of
1999 and is assumed by Russian experts to be safe for another ten
years. Documentation is being elaborated on the whole process of
removing the damaged fuel and liquidating the vessel; the present
project only embraces the former aspect. There has been very little
progress in the project so far, except for a fruitful sub-project on
licensing. From the point of view of the Norwegian leadership of the
project, practical work cannot start until all Western parties involved
have been secured tax freedom and indemnity against liability
through framework agreements with Russia. Such agreements are
still lacking for NEFCO and the USA. An agreement between Russia
and France was signed in June 2000. During the interviews, Russian
actors at both the project level in Murmansk and the co-ordinating
level in Moscow showed little understanding for the Norwegian
stance and complained about the lack of progress in the project.
It has long been acknowledged that Russia will need a specialised
vessel for safe transport of spent nuclear fuel and possibly also other
radioactive waste from decommissioned nuclear submarines from
remote locations in Northwestern Russia to transfer terminals in
Murmansk and the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. Spent fuel is
transported in containers too heavy to be transported by road. The
ship will be required to have independent propulsion machinery, a
double hull and other safety features. The firm Moss Maritime was
responsible for an elucidation (project 211); the main actors on the
Russian side were Minatom and a co-ordinating body for Russian
shipyards Morskoye Korablestroyeniye (Maritime Ship-Building).
The original plan was to build a new ship. However, in 1998 the
Russian party announced that it would instead reconstruct an old
vessel, the Amur, arguing that it would be a less expensive solution.
The Norwegian position was that the cost of reconstructing Amur
would hardly be lower than that of building a new vessel. It also
argued that Amur would not be fit to fulfil the tasks of the required
specialised vessel. Separate expert groups were established in
Norway and Russia in 1999, and in the autumn of that year they
came to a joint conclusion: building a new vessel would be the better
alternative. At the beginning of 2000, Minatom formally informed
the Norwegian party that it would go in for a new vessel. Since then,
planning has progressed rapidly. The Norwegian project participants
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assumed that external concerns were delaying the project. Minatom
was out of ideas about how to rid itself of the old and polluted vessel,
the Amur, and the planned specialised vessel for transport of spent
nuclear fuel was perceived as a possible way of solving this problem.
The Russian project participant viewed the Norwegian approach to
the project as constructive and acknowledged that the delay was
indeed due to problems on the Russian side.
In order to transport spent nuclear fuel from terminals in Mur-
mansk and Severodvinsk to interim storage or reprocessing in
Mayak, Russia will need specialised railway rolling stock able to pro-
vide safety-approved transport for the 40-tonne casks developed
under the AMEC programme. Project 212 in the Norwegian Plan of
Action involved procurement of four such specialised wagons, of
which Russia already had four. The Norwegian firm Moss Maritime
was responsible on the Norwegian side while Nuklid was main Russ-
ian contractor of the project. The wagons – finalised in March 2000
– were built at Tver Railway Factory in Central Russia. All subcon-
tractors were also Russian. Negotiations on the realisation of the
project started in September 1998. The Norwegian project manager
claimed that they were ‘forced’ by the Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs to accept Nuklid as main contractor on the Russian side.
They would have preferred to control all activities in Russia itself,
selecting subcontractors by means of tenders. Nuklid does not use
tenders; it selects subcontractors on the basis of fixed prices. Accord-
ing to the agreement between the Norwegian project leader and
Nuklid, the former has no right even to be informed of financial dis-
positions by the Russians. The only reason Moss Maritime accepted
the idea was because it was a concrete project, with easily moni-
torable progress. The wagons were built without any particular
problems. However, a major problem arose when they were being
completed in spring 2000. The Norwegian project manager was
informed that the Russian main contractor had changed ownership
of the wagons. Moss Maritime’s agreement with Nuklid states that
the wagons shall be owned by the Mayak facility. However, it turned
out that they had been transferred to a newly established firm, Atom-
spetstrans. Moss Maritime requested further information on this
matter and immediately stopped remaining payments to Nuklid.
Moss Maritime was concerned for the lack of respect shown to con-
cluded agreements by the Russian party. They claimed not to have
been informed about the change of ownership, nor about the status
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of Atomspetstrans. During the interviews, representatives of other
agencies in Russia claimed that Atomspetstrans did not exist and that
if it had in fact been established, it would be a ‘paper firm’ only per-
forming an unnecessary middle-man role, leasing the wagons to the
Mayak facility. The following interview extracts illustrate the antag-
onism between the Norwegian project management and Russian
main contractor of this project:
As far as our relationship with Moss Maritime is concerned, our func-
tions are quite similar, but we’re interested in the end result, and we
know Russian management culture; Moss Maritime exaggerates its
function; they’re only interested in making money, which is quite
understandable, but they shouldn’t have been given so much money
for doing it; they have only been a financial agent for the [Norwegian]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; I don’t know how much Moss Maritime
took from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it really doesn’t inter-
est me, but I proposed to manage the project on my own and inform
Moss Maritime of its progress; [. . .] it would have been financially
beneficial also for Nuklid only to be a financial agent and receive
money from Moss Maritime for our intellectual services, but it
wouldn’t have been beneficial for Russia. (Russian project participant
and co-ordinator)
[The Russians] view themselves as responsible for the project and us
as donors; Nuklid thinks of itself as contractor, but they’re not able
to manage projects; the [Norwegian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs
should support us here . . . , they should at least insist on professional
project management; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could avoid
using Nuklid by arguing that experience from other projects is not too
good, for instance in [Project 202]; [. . .] Norway displays naivety in
relation to Nuklid, if the authorities suspect that not all money goes
to the agreed measures, it’s wrong to continue. (Norwegian project
participant)
In contrast to project 212, Moss Maritime was given the opportunity
to carry out the upgrading of storage tanks for liquefied radioactive
waste at the Zvyozdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk (project 213)
without the involvement of Nuklid. The project involved the upgrad-
ing of two existing tanks and the modernisation of piping systems
and control equipment at the premises. The tank facility is located
next to a planned effluent treatment facility for liquid radioactive
waste and will primarily function in connection with the dismantling
of nuclear submarines at the shipyard. The project was started in May
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1998 and completed in August 1999. It is generally perceived of as
one of the most successful under the Plan of Action. It involved inten-
sive work for fourteen months and ended in the completion of the
modernised tank facility. Moss Maritime used a Russian employee as
project manager. He remained for most of the project period in
Severodvinsk. In contrast to several other projects under the Plan of
Action, this one was completed without delay. The total costs
amounted to NOK 5.7 million less than budgeted. In explaining the
success of the project, Moss Maritime stressed its freedom to select
Russian subcontractors itself, i.e. non-interference by Nuklid. At an
early stage in the project, it discovered that payments from the Nor-
wegian side had been used by the shipyard for other purposes than
agreed upon. The project leader warned the Zvyozdockha leadership
that he would have to report this to the Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. The shipyard then decided to take up loans to pay for
the agreed equipment. Another problem was to make workers at the
shipyard actually work. A rather unconventional measure by the pro-
ject management was to physically show up at the yard and promise
to pay the workers a reward if they performed the work they were
supposed to do anyway. The project manager circumvented the
requirement (in line with the provisions of the Framework Agree-
ment) that inputs to the project be tax and customs exempted, by
simply buying materials in the Russian market at whatever price was
offered. The director of Nuklid – who was initially appointed by the
Russian side as ‘leader of the project’s working group’ – took excep-
tion to the project’s objective. She recognises that the project was suc-
cessfully implemented, but disputes its rationale, arguing that it was
‘basically unimportant, [. . .] far too expensive, and directed towards
a completely irrelevant goal’. However, her position seems to be in
direct contradiction to her own government’s nuclear safety priori-
ties as presented to the international community: that Russia requires
additional capacity to collect and process liquid radioactive waste
from the Northern Fleet, the Murmansk Shipping Company and
the shipyards that are dismantling decommissioned submarines
(Gubanov and Akhunov 1995; Semenov and Bonne 1999).
The bilateral co-operation at state level between Norway and
Russia in areas covered by the Plan of Action has found its form,
although some problems and difficulties remain. Co-operation
between environmental and nuclear safety authorities functions to
the satisfaction of both parties. The signing of the Framework
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Agreement and establishment of the Joint Commission for its imple-
mentation in 1998 represent major achievements at the highest
political level in the two countries. Current problems, such as the
inclusion of new projects under the provisions of the Framework
Agreement, are mainly to be found on the Russian side. However,
where the Norwegians feel that their Russian counterparts are
moving too slowly, some Russians miss a more profound under-
standing by the Norwegians of the difficulties on the Russian side.
Regional actors in Northwestern Russia also complain that the Nor-
wegian party relies too heavily on contacts with federal agencies in
Moscow. Collaboration at project level between the two nations can
generally be characterised as very good. In our interviews, no major
differences in the perception of goals, processes and results were
revealed – except in some of the projects where Nuklid was
involved. The role of this co-ordinating body in nuclear safety pro-
jects is highly disputed in both Norway and Russia, which is even
more explicitly reflected in the analysis of concrete projects. First,
Norwegian project managers object to the lack of financial trans-
parency seen when Nuklid stands for project management on the
Russian side. Second, working relations between Norwegian and
Russian project participants are reported to be far more problematic
when Nuklid is involved than when it is not.
Conclusions
If we compare the above with fisheries management, the nuclear
safety sector is far more complex both with regard to issues and
actors involved. We noted in Chapter 4 that Northwest Russian fish-
eries during the 1990s were characterised by a fragmentation of
management responsibility, degeneration in implementation perfor-
mance and a reduction in target compliance. For both the fisheries
and nuclear safety sectors, we assumed implementation capacity to
be quite good during the Soviet period. Implementation perfor-
mance and target compliance in the fisheries decreased during the
1990s mainly as a result of bureaucratic controversies as well as
changes in the targets’ incentive structure brought about by the end
of the command economy. In the area of nuclear safety, most of the
Russian obligations we have reviewed in this chapter came into being
in the post-Soviet period, and several of the problems met in the fish-
eries sector were encountered here too. In particular, bureaucratic
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controversies – notably between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulatory
agencies at the federal level – have clearly hampered implementa-
tion. Moreover, foreign assistance has come to dominate the imple-
mentation of Russia’s international nuclear safety commitments
during the post-Soviet period. Some of the most serious problems
encountered in implementation efforts can be ascribed to unresolved
issues between Russia and the Western donor states, relating, i.e., to
indemnity against liability, access to nuclear sites, personnel immu-
nity and tax exemptions. So while there is some progress in the
implementation of Russia’s international nuclear safety commit-
ments at the present moment, it is slow and it is fumbling.
Notes
1 On the other hand, strategic submarines sometimes go to dismantle-
ment well before the expiration of their service life.
2 The icebreaker fleet also includes conventionally powered ships.
3 However, even underground tests, both US and Soviet, have been
known to cause radioactive fallout on the territory of other states
(Stortinget 1994).
4 The Kola Nuclear Power Plant and submarines at refuelling are both
classified as sources of known or probable risks – i.e. ‘release is known
to have occurred or [. . .] significant probability for release has been
confidently estimated’ (Bergman and Baklanov 1998, p. 55). Sources of
potential risk are ‘those expected to constitute a risk for considerable
release provided the outcome of further analysis for certain steps in the
event chain’ (ibid.).
5 Nevertheless, the regional branch of the State Committee/Department
for Environmental Protection (see section on implementation by fed-
eral authorities below) allegedly has the right to inspect some military
objects; see the section below on the role of federal agencies in the
region.
6 In 1966, there was a major discharge of radioactivity from the reactor
section, and as the fuel assemblies in the reactors were to be replaced
the same year, it was discovered that several of them had expanded due
to overheating. Forty per cent of them were removed and transferred
to the Lepse. In 1967, there was a major leakage in the cooling system
of one of the vessel’s reactors (Bergman and Baklanov 1998, p. 32).
7 The possibility of substituting electricity from Norway for the nuclear
energy has been discussed, but it soon became clear that Norway could
not provide the necessary amounts. Substituting various forms of alter-
native energy for nuclear power, or solving the problem by way of
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energy-saving measures will take a long time, if at all feasible. In a long-
term perspective, gas from the Shtokmanovskoye field in the Barents
Sea may prove the most realistic option.
8 Other federal agencies engaged in the implementation of international
nuclear safety agreements are the State Committee/Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control (see Chapter 6 for fur-
ther information about this agency), the Russian Ship-Building Agency,
the Ministry of Economy and the continuously changing agencies for
defence industry. However, their role is of a more peripheral character
compared to those federal agencies discussed in this section.
9 For example, it turned out at the second session of the joint Russ-
ian–Norwegian Commission for Nuclear Safety that the Russian dele-
gation leader did not know that a joint Russian–Norwegian secretariat
for the joint commission had been set up at the premises of Minatom.
An employee of Nuklid was paid through a bilateral Russian–Norwe-
gian project to run the secretariat. The director of Nuklid claimed that
not having been informed of the secretariat was a case of ‘simple fraud’
(Hønneland and Moe 2000). She fired the employee, and the Russian
part halted the project. The secretariat could not have been established
without Minatom’s knowledge and acceptance. By other Russian inter-
viewees in the Norwegian evaluation of the bilateral nuclear safety co-
operation, these events were referred to as ‘another attempt at
centralisation by [the director of Nuklid]’ (2000, p. 26).
10 Later, the regional electoral commission declared the referendum plans
illegal, and it was not carried out.
11 The BEAR co-operation has mainly served to relate environmental con-
cern to broader foreign policy issues (Stokke 2000a). This regime has
not contributed funds and engaged in practical nuclear safety projects
to the same extent as CTR, AMEC and the Norwegian Plan of Action.
12 Environmental NGOs are generally few and weak in Murmansk
Oblast. The most important NGO in nuclear safety issues in North-
western Russia is the Norwegian organisation Bellona, which has an
office in Murmansk. However, Bellona’s role has been more important
in agenda-setting than in implementation of Russia’s international
agreements.
13 The title of the Plan of Action does not specifically refer to Northwest-
ern Russia, but to ‘areas adjacent to our northern borders’ (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 1995).
14 See Chapter 6 for details on this agency.
15 This section is based mainly on Sawhill and Jørgensen (2001). Under-
lying documentation is found in Shields and Potter (1997) and
Safranchuk (2000a). See, in particular, Orlov (1997), Pikayev (1997)
and Safranchuk (2000b).
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16 This section provides a summary of the report’s evaluation of project
implementation; see the report for a detailed account (Hønneland and
Moe 2000).
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Norilsk Nickel is one of Russia’s leading producers of non-ferrous
and platinum-group metals and the country’s largest air polluter.
Three of the company’s six subsidiaries are located on the Kola
Peninsula: the Pechenganickel Combine at Zapolyarnyy and Nikel,1
the Severonickel Combine at Monchegorsk and the Olenegorsk
Mechanical Plant at Olenegorsk. Pechenganickel and Severonickel
emit large quantities of sulphur dioxide (SO2) which causes consid-
erable acid precipitation both on the Kola Peninsula and in the
neighbouring Fenno-Scandinavian countries. This chapter reviews
the problem of air pollution on the Kola Peninsula, the status of the
area’s mining and metallurgical complex – with an emphasis on the
Norilsk Nickel combines – and the role of various actors in the
implementation of Russia’s international obligations related to air
pollution control.2 Implementation performance and target compli-
ance are reviewed mainly with reference to the LRTAP regime (see
Chapter 1). Given the peculiarities of this case compared to fisheries
management and nuclear safety, the section on implementation per-
formance and target compliance is presented before the discussion
of various actors’ implementation activities.3
Background: polluters and pollution on the Kola Peninsula
The mining and metallurgical complex
RAO4 Norilsk Nikel was founded in 1994 by joining six companies
under a corporate umbrella. It has four main operation facilities: a
mining and metal-processing facility at Norilsk in northeastern
Siberia (see Figure 6.1); a metal-processing facility at Monchegorsk;
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mining and metal-processing facilities at Zapolyarnyy and Nikel;
and a precious-metals processing plant at Krasnoyarsk in central
Siberia. In addition, the company has a research institute (Gipronikel
Planning and Design Institute) in St Petersburg and a mechanical
plant at Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula. Norilsk Nikel is the
world’s leading producer of nickel and palladium, and the com-
pany’s sales constitute approximately USD 3 billion annually (Bond
and Levine 2001).
The Pechenganickel Combine operates four small mines and a
smelter in the northern parts of the Kola Peninsula, close to the Nor-
wegian border. Mineral production in the region dates back to the
early 1940s, when it was a part of Finland. At the end of World War
II, the Petsamo (Pechenga) district was annexed by the Soviet Union,
and mining and smelting operations were resumed at Nikel in 1946.
In the mid-1960s, the focus of mining activities was shifted to the
Zhdanov deposit near Zapolyarnyy. Eighty-five per cent of the com-
pany’s mine output comes from two open pits of this deposit, sched-
uled to be worked out by 2005–6. The remaining output comes
from three underground mines, which are projected for depletion at
various times during the period 2005–15 (Bond and Levine 2001).
The metallurgical operations of Pechenganickel take place at the
company’s plant at Nikel. The plant processes ore concentrates from
the mines near Zapolyarnyy and raw materials shipped over the
Northern Sea Route (see Figure 6.1) from Norilsk. These shipments
started in the late 1968s when local ores began to decline. During
the Soviet era, Norilsk Nickel shipped approximately one million
tonnes of ore from Siberia to its Kola facilities every year (Kotov and
Nikitina 1998b). The shift to a market economy has forced the com-
pany to reduce these shipments and rely more heavily on its deposits
on the Kola Peninsula. Consequently, annual shipments have been
more than halved since Soviet times (1998b).
Pechenganickel sends its smelter output to the Severonickel Com-
bine at Monchegorsk in the central parts of the Kola Peninsula. The
combine has both smelting and refining facilities for processing
nickel and copper. Production started in 1939, and since the late
1960s the combine has relied on non-local feedstocks, e.g. ore from
Pechenganickel and Norilsk. Today, Severonickel operates Russia’s
largest capacity nickel refinery (Bond and Levine 2001).
Norilsk Nickel was privatised in 1993, although 51 per cent of the
voting shares were to remain in government hands for another three
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years. However, Kotov and Nikitina (1998b) argue that the govern-
ment soon lost actual control over the company as a result of the
general chaos of the period, and that the company’s directors,
largely free from shareholder control, consolidated their hold on the
enterprise and restructured it to further their own interests:
In the chaotic period following the company’s privatization, neither
the Russian government nor the other nominal owners of Norilsk
Nickel were able to exercise effective control over the enterprise.
Largely unaccountable to anyone, Norilsk’s management (the so-
called red directors) ran the company for personal profit rather than
long-term viability. Naturally, they were not interested in making cap-
ital-intensive investments to benefit the environment. This situation
highlights the crucial distinction between Norilsk’s leadership and its
owners. In the West, ownership implies that a company’s managers
are ultimately accountable to the company’s owners, and thus will
pay attention to promoting that company’s long-term interests. Man-
agers whose primary goal is to increase the value of their company
will make the investments (including environmental investments)
necessary to enhance its prospects. In Norilsk’s situation, however,
exactly the opposite occurred. (1998b, p. 565)
Figure 6.1 Location of the RAO Norilsk Nickel companies and shipment
route from Norilsk to the Kola Peninsula
In recent years, Norilsk Nickel has increasingly oriented its produc-
tions towards exports, which now account for more than 50 per cent
of the company’s sales and nearly 85 per cent of all Russian exports
of nickel (1998b). The company consolidated its economic position
considerably during the 1990s. Like many other natural resource-
producing companies in Russia, it got through the general economic
crisis in the country fairly well. Since export taxes have become
an important source of revenue for the Russian government, the
authorities also have a vested economic interest in the company.
Pollution from the smelters
The Norilsk Nickel company towns have routinely ranked among
the most polluted cities in Russia. Since the late 1980s, they have
also become increasingly famous in the West as areas of environ-
mental catastrophes. As Bond (1996) says:
Anecdotal accounts are sufficient as an indication of the general mag-
nitude of the problem [. . .]. On the Kola Peninsula, forests within a
20-km radius of the city of Monchegorsk were reported to be com-
pletely dead, with vegetation stress detectable as far as 60 km away in
Apatity and across international borders in Finland [. . .]; at Nikel’,
nearly half the workforce was reported to be suffering from respira-
tory ailments [. . .], life expectancy is estimated at 42 years, and a
‘black desert’ spreading outward from the Pechenganickel smelter
was wreaking sufficient havoc across international borders to compel
Norwegian officials to undertake initiatives to reduce emissions at the
Combine. (Bond 1996, p. 307)5
During the period from 1980 to 1987, the annual SO2 emissions
from Pechenganickel fell from 384,000 tonnes to 337,000 tonnes
while emissions from Severonickel rose from 200,000 tonnes to
224,000 tonnes (Darst 2001). In 1994, Pechenganickel emitted
132,900 tonnes and Severonickel 111,000 tonnes of air pollutants
(Kotov and Nikitina 1998b). In 2000, the corresponding figures
were 160,860 tonnes and 57,397 tonnes (State Committee for Envi-
ronmental Protection 2001).
The location of the Kola Peninsula smelters north of the Arctic
Circle compounds the environmental problems as the Arctic ecosys-
tems are more fragile and lack the assimilative capacity of those at
lower latitudes. Hence, the activities of the Norilsk Nickel plants
have led to wide-ranging environmental degradation and acidifica-
tion. Close to the smelters, the forest is completely dead. According
148 International environmental agreements in Russia
Air pollution control 149
Figure 6.2 Approximate forest damage zones in the vicinity of
Monchegorsk and Nikel and the visible-damage zones on the Kola
Peninsula and in Finnish Lapland
Source: AMAP (1998).
to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme’s report on the
state of the Arctic environment (AMAP 1997), the forest-death area
around Monchegorsk covers 400–500 square kilometres and
extends ten kilometres south and fifteen kilometres north of the
smelter complex. The zone is expanding at a rate of half a kilometre
per year. The area severely affected by air pollution around Nikel
and Zapolyarnyy is considerably larger than the one around
Monchegorsk. It increased in size from 400 square kilometres in
1973 to 5,000 square kilometres in 1988 (1997). The outer visible-
damage zone extends into the eastern parts of Inari in Finland. Also
on the Norwegian side of the border, trees and other vegetation have
been damaged (see Figure 6.2).
Premises for implementation
Nature of the problem
The problem at hand seems in many respects to be a typically
‘malign’ one. First, the mining and metallurgical complex of the
Kola Peninsula is of crucial importance financially to the regional
authorities of Murmansk Oblast and is extremely important to the
local authorities in the settlements where the plants are located –
both as taxpayers and as employers. As noted above, the Norilsk
Nickel companies weathered the economic crisis in Russia during
the 1990s fairly well and extract good revenues from the export of
their products. In turn, federal, regional and local authorities have a
reliable source of income from the various taxes paid by the enter-
prises. Mainly as a result of the mining and metallurgical activities
taking place on its territory, Murmansk Oblast is one of the few fed-
eral subjects in Russia that are net donors to the federal budget (see
Chapter 3). Moreover, the main victims of the pollution are also
those who have most to lose from a close-down of the enterprises.
These factors will probably reduce their propensity to comply with
international commitments that infringe on operations at the com-
bines. Second, to the extent that the authorities are interested in
manipulating enterprise operations to align them with the country’s
international obligations, public control over company operations
has decreased drastically during the 1990s. As noted above, not only
were the Norilsk Nickel companies privatised in the early 1990s, the
influence of their nominal owners over their management was also
far less than is normally the case in more developed market
economies. Moreover, the Kola Peninsula combines are not only
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‘big’ in a regional context; even more important is the fact that they
form part of a company that is large and powerful enough to have
influence at the highest political levels in the country. Norilsk Nickel
is owned by one of the most powerful Russian oligarchs, Vladimir
Potanin, who through his bank, Oneksimbank, acquired control
over Norilsk Nickel in the mid-1990s.6
On the other hand, there are factors that reduce the impression
of air pollution control on the Kola Peninsula as particularly malign
compared to other environmental problems in the region. The
polluters are concentrated within a few locations, and their activities
are fairly easy to monitor. This seems particularly clear when we
compare, for instance, the case of fisheries management, where the
target group is made up of hundreds of individual fishing vessels con-
stantly moving around a vast fishing area. Further, the results of bad
implementation are in this case highly visible (in the form of lifeless
forest),7 and the problem at hand may also benefit from the fact that
wealthy Western neighbours are affected by the polluting activity.
Nature of the commitments
The commitments of the LRTAP Convention and its protocols are
both binding and relatively precise. Concrete reductions in annual
emissions are set, and the contracting parties have obliged them-
selves to comply with these requirements. It can be argued that this
makes implementation more difficult than is the case when agree-
ments are vague and non-binding. The first concrete obligation,
following from the first Sulphur Protocol (see Chapter 1), was to
reduce the annual sulphur emissions or the transboundary fluxes by
at least 30 per cent by 1993, using 1980 levels as the baseline. Since
only a very small part of all sulphur emitted in the European part of
the Soviet Union crossed the Union’s western border, the Soviets
chose – after having pressed for this to be an option – to reduce
transboundary fluxes, not emissions.8 Also, the signing of the LRTAP
Convention and adoption of the first Sulphur Protocol coincided
with several developments at the national level in the Soviet Union,
which facilitated Soviet implementation of these international
accords. Notably, Soviet energy policy was restructured towards the
end of the 1970, implying a transition to natural gas, an increase in
nuclear power production, the development of an energy complex
in Siberia and a shift towards low-sulphur coals (Darst 2001; Kotov
and Nikitina 1998a).
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The second Sulphur Protocol incorporated a more integrated
approach allowing wide variations in the reduction requirements
made of different countries. For the first time, the concept of critical
loads was used as a reference point to establish such requirements;
critical loads are the pollution threshold above which sensitive
ecosystems experience significant damage. The ceilings for emissions
from the European part of Russia were set at 4.44 million tonnes
in 2000 and 4.297 million tonnes in 2005. At the time the second
Sulphur Protocol was signed, Russia was already in compliance with
it; SO2 emissions from European Russia constituted 2.98 million
tonnes (Darst 2001). Hence, to the extent that implementation activ-
ities would be necessary, it would be in the form of measures to
ensure that emissions did not increase beyond the targets set.
Other instruments at the regional or bilateral level – the AEPS/Arctic
Council, BEAR and bilateral agreements with Finland and Norway –
are of a programmatic and non-binding character, partly designed to
facilitate implementation of the LRTAP commitments.
Implementation performance and target compliance
As indicated in the section on the nature of the problem above, there
are factors both facilitating and hampering implementation of
Russia’s LRTAP commitments. However, in reviewing implementa-
tion performance and target compliance, all factors contributing
to the malignity of the problem are offset by one simple fact: during
the 1990s, the productivity of Russian industry decreased to such
an extent that the country’s LRTAP commitments were achieved
without any particular effort. In addition comes the fact, already
mentioned in the section on the nature of the problem above, that
the signing of the LRTAP Convention and the first Sulphur Protocol
coincided with several structural changes in the Soviet energy sector,
which in sum reduced the emissions of SO2. In accordance with the
30 per cent reduction target of the first Sulphur Protocol, SO2 emis-
sions from European Russia had by 1993 decreased by 51.7 per cent
from their 1980 level (Kotov and Nikitina 1998a). Also as noted
above, Russia was already in compliance with the second Sulphur
Protocol when it was signed in 1994. Since then, SO2 emissions from
the Kola Peninsula smelters have been further reduced.
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Public authorities’ implementation activities
In Soviet times, implementation of the country’s international envi-
ronmental obligations was generally secured by including the com-
mitments in the sector ministries’ five-year production plans. There
was no overarching governmental body responsible for the country’s
environmental policy. Moreover, regional authorities, in general
politically impotent, had no influence on this sector of politics. All
important decisions were made within the axis running from the
sector ministries at the federal level to the enterprise leadership in the
regions (which, in turn of course, were subordinate to decisions made
by the CPSU). The main question to be asked in this section is how
various federal and regional agencies have been involved in the
LRTAP implementation of post-Soviet Russia, in particular related to
the activities of the Kola Peninsula smelters.
Implementation in national legislation
Soviet participation in the LRTAP regime transferred the acid rain
issue from general air-protection management to an independent
element within Soviet environmental politics (Kotov and Nikitina
1998a). The first openly published Soviet national middle-term
environmental programme, published in 1990, contained concrete
requirements reflecting Soviet obligations under the first Sulphur
Protocol and the NOX Protocol (1998a). These have been repeated
in several subsequent federal plans and programmes.
A new Soviet law on air pollution, prescribing a significant reduction
in emissions and transboundary flows of the pollutants covered by the
LRTAP regime, was adopted in 1982 (OECD 1999).9 This law is still
in effect, but after 1991 a gradual revision of Soviet environmental leg-
islation has taken place. The single most important legal act is the 1991
law on environmental protection (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic 1991). The law calls for a shift to economic instruments in
environmental politics, such as charges for polluting emissions and the
establishment of environmental funds independent of the federal
budget. A separate federal provision on the system for environmental
funds was adopted in 1992 (Government of the Russian Federation
1992). The federal environmental fund of the Russian Federation is an
independent institution responsible to the government. The regional
duma of Murmansk Oblast adopted a law on the regional environ-
mental fund (already in existence) in 1997 (Murmansk Oblast 1997d),
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and according to regional environmental authorities this fund is the
most important economic mechanism of environmental protection in
the oblast (State Committee for Environmental Protection 2001). The
income of the fund mainly comes from payments for emissions from
the polluting enterprises and fines for violations of environmental
regulations. Ten per cent of payments from the enterprises goes to the
federal environmental fund, 30 per cent to the regional and 60 per
cent to the local environmental fund of the municipality where the
enterprise is located.
The role of federal authorities
Soviet implementation of the LRTAP regime commitments was co-
ordinated by a governmental interdepartmental commission, headed
by the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental
Monitoring (Goskomgidromet) (Kotov and Nikitina 1998a).10 The
Commission had both a territorial form of representation – includ-
ing representatives of the Soviet republics that contributed to west-
ward transboundary pollution – and sector representation from
various federal agencies. It issued orders to the industrial ministries
responsible for polluting enterprises. The ministries in turn set
standards for emission reductions for the enterprises, incorporating
them into the national plans for economic and social development.
Hence, the LRTAP standards were part of a more general mechanism
of political and economic governance. For the most severe sources of
transboundary pollution, among them the Kola Peninsula smelters,
the Commission itself participated in setting the standards at the
enterprise level (1998a).
As reviewed in Chapter 5, a State Committee for Environmental
Protection was created in 1988, elevated three years later to the rank
of Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources Protection.
The responsibility for co-ordinating LRTAP implementation was
transferred from Goskomgidromet to the new State Committee once
it was established.11 Kotov and Nikitina (1998a) claim that the insti-
tutional framework for Soviet/Russian implementation of the
LRTAP regime disintegrated as a result of this reform, arguing that
the new environmental agency lacked the political authority and
financial clout enjoyed by the interdepartmental Commission. This
problem was compounded as the federal environmental agency grad-
ually lost its formal status during the latter half of the 1990s, being
deprived of its ministerial status in 1996 and disbanded altogether
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in 2000. The agency continues its activities as a Department for
Environmental Protection under the Ministry of Natural Resources
(see Chapter 5). The division of responsibility between the federal
and regional level is further discussed in the next sub-section.
The role of regional authorities and federal agencies in the region
A general trait of the evolving Russian environmental legislation is that
it foresees an increase in the role of regional authorities in environ-
mental management. As we saw in Chapter 3, according to the 1993
Constitution this area of politics is the joint responsibility of the fed-
eral and regional level. The 1997 bilateral agreement on the sharing
of responsibility between the Government of the Russian Federation
and Murmansk Oblast (Murmansk Oblast 1997a, Article 2) states that
the federal level is responsible for conducting a uniform state policy in
the area of environmental protection (including the elaboration and
implementation of national environmental plans), while the regional
level is responsible for the actual regulatory measures, for instance
issuing of permits to emit polluting substances (Article 4).
We saw in Chapters 4 and 5 that the Murmansk regional admin-
istration established departments for fisheries and nuclear safety
within its own structure during the 1990s (in 1993 and 1999,
respectively). Interestingly, the regional administration does not
have its own department for environmental regulation. Rather, it
seems as if the regional representation of the State Committee/
Department for Environmental Protection (in the following referred
to as the ‘regional environmental committee’) functions as an imple-
menting agency not only for its superior federal office in Moscow,
but also for the regional administration, in itself an interesting obser-
vation.12 The regional administration determines environmental pol-
itics for the oblast by elaborating programmes, action plans and
concrete regulations. The annual report of the Murmansk regional
environmental committee (State Committee for Environmental Pro-
tection 2001) states that the regional environmental legislation is
largely produced by the regional administration and only partly by
the regional duma. Hence, although the Murmansk regional admin-
istration has established departments for fisheries management and
nuclear safety, though not for environmental affairs, it seems more
active in regulative measures in the latter case than in the two former
(where such measures are almost exclusively designed by federal
authorities). Moreover, the relations with the federal agencies in the
Air pollution control 155
region also seem to differ in the three cases. In the fisheries man-
agement, relations have at times been quite confrontational while
the most important decisions have continued to be made at the fed-
eral level. In the field of nuclear safety, the regional authorities have
aimed only at a co-ordinating role and not fundamentally contested
the authority of federal agencies. In the case of air pollution control
and environmental management more generally, there has indeed
been a certain transfer of responsibility to the regional level. How-
ever, the regional administration has not found it necessary to estab-
lish a department for environmental protection within its own
structure, but has continued the traditional close collaboration with
the regional environmental committee, which formally speaking is a
representation of federal authorities located in the region.
In addition to the elaboration of environmental programmes and
regulatory standards, as well as the monitoring and enforcement
activities performed by the regional environmental committee, the
regional authorities are responsible for the regional environmental
fund.13 Table 6.1 demonstrates the income sources of the fund
during the period 1995–2000. The major part of the fund’s income
comes from charges paid by enterprises for being allowed to con-
tinue pollution-creating operations. There was a dramatic increase
in these payments in 1997, 1999 and 2000.
Table 6.1 Income of the environmental fund of Murmansk Oblast during
the period 1995–2000 (in 1,000 roubles)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Payments for 
pollution 4,868.0 3,641.7 16,068.6 10,504.0 23,005.7 44,567.4
Fines and 
confiscation 1,788.0 936.0 1,114.2 989.3 1,787.1 1,685.4
Interests from 
the fund 381.3 113.7 38.4 282.5 146.2 241.4
Other sources 1,892.9 1,074.9 974.3 432.5 2,294.2 1,530.3
Total 8,186.9a 5,766.3 18,195.5 12,208.3 27,233.2 48,024.5
a This is the total as given in the original source.
Source: State Committee for Environmental Protection (2001).
The money coming from enterprises as contributions for being
allowed to conduct polluting operations or in the form of fines is
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first deposited into a special account controlled by the regional envi-
ronmental committee. From there, 10 per cent is distributed to the
federal environmental fund, 30 per cent to the regional environ-
mental fund and 60 per cent to the local environmental funds of the
oblast (Murmansk Oblast 1997d). The municipalities where the
Kola Peninsula smelters are located, Monchegorsk and Pechenga
Rayons, received 30.1 and 34.7 per cent, respectively, of this money
in 2000 (State Committee for Environmental Protection 2001). Fur-
ther, the regional fund in 2000 contributed financially to five envi-
ronmental programmes at the regional level. One of them was aimed
at the restoration of the environment around the Pechenganickel
and Severonickel smelters. The programme was given 329,000 rou-
bles from the fund in the period 1997–2000 (State Committee for
Environmental Protection 2001).
Monitoring of air quality in the oblast is performed by another
federal agency in the region, the regional branch of Rosgidromet
(see note 10). The monitoring agency has seventeen control posts
in nine of the municipalities of Murmansk Oblast. A significant
problem in recent years has been the recurring destruction and
looting of the control posts, reducing the ability to perform reliable
measurements of the air quality.
The role of others
As the Soviet system for implementation of the country’s interna-
tional environmental obligations (led by the interdepartmental
commission) dissolved, as the federal environmental agency gradu-
ally lost its authority, and as public authorities increasingly lost con-
trol of industrial enterprises, it can be argued that the enterprises
themselves became the most important players in the Russian
implementation game. There is little evidence that the manage-
ments of the Kola Peninsula smelters have been overly concerned
with implementation activities related to the LRTAP regime. One
obvious explanation, as already mentioned, is that the Russian com-
mitments to this regime soon fulfilled themselves (see the section
on implementation performance and target compliance above).
Hence, there was no real need to engage in such activities. More-
over, the primary concern of the leadership of the smelters – apart
from enriching themselves as quickly as possible, as noted by Kotov
and Nikitina (1998b)14 – has been to keep the enterprises profitable
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and sustain jobs in the mono-industrial towns of Monchegorsk,
Zapolyarnyy and Nikel.
As noted by Darst (2001), Russian environmental NGOs had their
heyday in the early 1990s. Along with the rising economic crisis of
the country, the environmental concern of the Russian population
has more or less vanished – at least in its organised form. Despite the
grave environmental problems of Murmansk Oblast, environmental
NGOs – apart from ‘official’ public organisations like children’s
‘green clubs’ – are practically absent. To the extent that environ-
mental NGOs have had any influence on air pollution control in
Northwestern Russia, it has been in the form of Nordic NGOs (cf.
the slogan ‘stop the death clouds!’ referred to in Chapter 1) pressing
their own governments to contribute to the financing of purification
equipment at the Kola Peninsula smelters.
Joint implementation
Foreign participation in the modernisation of the Kola Peninsula
smelters first became an issue in the mid-1980s.15 The immediate
background was the economic co-operation between the Soviet
Union and Finland that had taken place on a clearing–trade basis
since the late 1940s. Metallurgy was one of the focused areas of
Soviet–Finnish economic co-operation, and the Soviet delegation to
the Soviet–Finnish Economic Commission in 1985 proposed that
Finland take part in a modernisation project at the Kola Peninsula
smelters. A Finnish engineering firm proposed completely refitting
the Pechenganickel, permitting the recovery of over 95 per cent of
the sulphur contained in the ore. In the end, nothing came of the
project since the participants were unable to attract the estimated
USD 600 million necessary for its completion. In 1993, a Norwe-
gian-led consortium won an international competition for tenders to
modernise the Pechanganickel plant organised by the Russian gov-
ernment. The costs were this time estimated at substantially less,
approximately USD 257 million. Norway had already offered to
contribute NOK 300 million (at the time some USD 50 million);
Sweden and Finland also promised to contribute, although much
less than Norway. When President Yeltsin visited Oslo in 1996, he
finally declared that the Russian party was ready to contribute the
remaining sum necessary to get the project off the ground. However,
the project was temporarily halted by the final takeover of Norilsk
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Nickel by Oneksimbank in 1997. The new leadership was more sen-
sitive to the costs and benefits of various investment projects and less
interested in subsidising the Pechanganickel smelter. The latter per-
formed poorly compared to the combines at Monchegorsk and
Norilsk, and there was insecurity as to its further viability due to the
exhaustion of the local ore and the increasing costs of shipping ore
from Norilsk. Hence, the new owners chose to concentrate on
exploring the further resource basis of the plant rather than on mod-
ernising its nickel smelting facilities. Contrary to expectations, the
project was suddenly revived in early 2001, and on 19 June that year
the Norwegian Minister of the Environment and the Russian Minis-
ter of Economy signed an agreement on a modernisation project that
would involve a 90 per cent reduction in emissions of SO2 and heavy
metals (Ministry of the Environment 2001). Norway promised to
contribute NOK 270 million (approximately USD 30 million). The
project, including a testing period of two years, is scheduled to be
finalised in 2006–7.
Conclusions
The case of Russia and the LRTAP regime is clearly one of ‘compli-
ance without implementation’. The Russian commitments ‘imple-
mented themselves’, rendering ‘implementation activities’ on the part
of public authorities, target groups and others superfluous. Kotov and
Nikitina (1998a) argue that the LRTAP regime contributed to certain
behavioural changes domestically in the Soviet Union, mainly in the
areas of planning, research and monitoring, but had little effect on
actual emissions. It is also an open question whether Russian author-
ities during the 1990s would have been capable and willing to actively
contribute to the implementation of the country’s commitments
under the LRTAP regime had emissions not been reduced to accept-
able (according to the commitments) levels due to exogenous factors.
First, the federal environmental agency was seriously weakened
during the 1990s, culminating in its total dissolution and the subor-
dination of its remnants under the Ministry of Natural Resources – a
typical ‘user agency’ – in 2000. Second, the regional administration
of Murmansk Oblast – although having significantly increased its
political authority since Soviet times – would be expected to prioritise
further industrial activity in the mono-industrial towns of the oblast
(contributing both employment and considerable revenues for the
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regional budget) over environmental issues. Third, the capacity of
public authorities to influence decisions in private enterprises was
significantly reduced during the 1990s. Finally – and partly related to
the latter circumstance – it is doubtful whether the authorities’ com-
pliance mechanisms (here: fines) are compelling enough to induce
compliance among the nickel plants on the Kola Peninsula. In sum,
Russia can show a high degree of formal compliance with its LRTAP
commitments in the 1990s, but a correspondingly poor implementa-
tion record in the same period.
Notes
1 The urban-type settlements of Nikel and Zapolyarnyy are the largest
settlements of Pechenga Rayon (district); see Chapter 3. There is also
an urban-type settlement named Pechenga belonging to the rayon with
the same name; this is considerably smaller than Nikel and Zapol-
yarnyy. For the sake of simplicity, the two latter are in this chapter
referred to as towns.
2 This chapter is to a lesser extent than the two preceding chapters built
on primary research by the authors. The material on the Norilsk Nickel
combines derives mainly from Bond (1996) and Bond and Levine
(2001); the presentation of air pollution on the Kola Peninsula builds
on AMAP (1997, 1998); while data on implementation performance
and target compliance are mainly from Darst (2001) and Kotov and
Nikitina (1998a, 1998b).
3 As follows from this chapter, Russia’s LRTAP commitments have ‘imple-
mented themselves’, i.e. there has been no need for conscious efforts to
achieve compliance in this case. In fisheries management and nuclear
safety, compliance has been more imperfect, which warrants first a
description of the various actors’ efforts to reach compliance, then an
assessment of actual implementation performance and target compliance.
4 Rossiyskoye aktsionernoye obshchestvo (Russian stock holding com-
pany).
5 We were recently reminded of how shocking it often is for people from
the West to arrive in these areas: Passing Monchegorsk in a car on our
way from Apatity to Murmansk, our Norwegian co-passenger noted:
‘When I first came to this area in the late 1980s, I was simply unable to
absorb the extent of environmental degradation. The only thing I could
think of was that this was probably what it would look like after a
nuclear war.’
6 See Freeland (2000) for an account of Potanin’s takeover of Norilsk
Nickel.
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7 Compare again with the fisheries sector: poor fisheries management
may lead to the depletion of stocks, but it is far more difficult to state
beyond reasonable doubt that this has taken place than it is to demon-
strate that forests are dead. If catches are not good, it could be argued
that fishing gear or techniques are unsatisfactory, or that the migration
patterns of the particular stocks have changed.
8 Since only the European part of the Soviet Union was covered by the
LRTAP regime, some heavily polluting industries were moved east-
wards, thus increasing air pollution in Siberia.
9 According to Kotov and Nikitina (1998a), this law came into force in
1980.
10 The Soviet State Hydrometeorological Service (Gidromet) was given the
status of state committee and renamed the State Committee for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Goskomgidromet)
in 1978, being elevated from a lowly meteorological service to the most
prominent environmental protection agency of the Soviet Union (Darst
2001). Today, the institution has the status of a ‘federal service’ and is
usually referred to by the acronym Rosgidromet. As follows from the
discussion in both this chapter and Chapter 5, this agency is no longer
among the most important bodies of governance in Russian environ-
mental and nuclear safety management.
11 Goskomgidromet remained responsible for the monitoring of air pol-
lution, but all other main functions related to air-quality control were
transferred to the State Committee for Environmental Protection.
12 In an interview with a representative of one of the leading environ-
mental NGOs in Murmansk Oblast, it turned out that our interviewee
did not know that the regional environmental committee was formally
subordinate to the State Committee/Department for Environmental
Protection and not to the regional administration. This reflects how
well integrated the regional environmental committee is in the overar-
ching structure of regional politics despite its federal subordination.
13 Members of the fund’s board are nominated by the Governor and con-
firmed by the regional duma. A Deputy Governor, the leader of the
regional environmental committee and the Deputy Chairman of the
regional duma have permanent seats on the board of the regional envi-
ronmental fund (Murmansk Oblast 1997d, Article 8, sections 4–5).
14 Admittedly, the authors apply this formulation in speaking of enterprise
leaderships in the post-Soviet ‘market economy’ in general. However,
they also refer to how the managements of the Kola Peninsula smelters
– at least up to the takeover of Oneksimbank in 1995–97 – were not
responsive to the company’s owners and mainly concerned with short-
term profit. Towards the end of the 1990s, the situation changed some-
what and the managements of the Kola smelters tried to undertake
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some measures towards air pollution control, partly to improve their
environmental image as the smelters were turning into international
companies (Elena Nikitina, pers. comm., December 2001).
15 This section builds mainly on Darst (2001). It is an open question
whether Nordic attempts to modernise the Pechanganickel smelter
should be labelled ‘joint implementation’ since the efforts are not
directly aimed at the implementation of specific international commit-
ments but rather geared at environmental protection in general; cf. com-
ments on the use of the concept ‘joint implementation’ in Chapter 2.
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We started this book by asking how Russian authorities have gone
about implementing their international environmental commitments,
noting that we were more interested in the political processes initiated
with a view to achieving such implementation than in meticulously
mapping the exact level of actual compliance in the various cases.
This chapter sums up the major findings of our three case studies. Our
primary focus is on the ‘implementation activities’ carried out in each
case: what has been done to implement the various commitments,
and how can the success or failure in each individual case best be
explained? As a point of departure for this discussion, we set out
some of our main conclusions from the case studies on implementa-
tion performance and target compliance. Rounding up the chapter,
we attempt to extract some lessons of a more general nature from
our study.
Implementation performance and target compliance
In Chapter 4, we observed that Northwest Russian fisheries during
the 1990s could be described in terms of three main features, the
one partly issuing from the other: the diffusion of management
responsibility, the degeneration of implementation performance and
the reduction in target compliance. However, the indication of
reduced performance implies, of course, that Russian authorities had
previously scored better on implementation performance and target
compliance. Indeed, the Soviet Union had a system for fisheries
research, regulation and enforcement – not to mention the production
plans of the command economy – which enabled the country to
7
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manage fisheries in its exclusive economic zone in accordance with the
principle of maximum sustainable yields, to establish total allowable
catches for each fish stock within the exclusive economic zone, to co-
operate with other coastal states in the management of shared stocks,
and to promote compliance with fishery regulations among all vessels
under Soviet flag.1 The extent to which the existence of this regulatory
system reflects the determined implementation of international oblig-
ations is disputable; probably, the national system for fisheries man-
agement developed in parallel with Soviet adjustment to the country’s
international fisheries obligations. Target compliance decreased during
the 1990s, mainly as a result of changes in the targets’ incentive struc-
ture brought about by the end of the command economy; suddenly, it
became profitable for Russian fishers to cheat. At the same time,
bureaucratic controversies (see next section) seriously reduced the
management system’s ability to monitor and enforce regulations.
In comparison with fisheries management, the nuclear safety sector
is more complex both with regard to issues to be covered and actors
involved. Most of the Russian nuclear safety obligations reviewed in
Chapter 5 date from the post-Soviet period and several of the same
problems have been encountered in their implementation as with
the fisheries obligations. In particular, bureaucratic controversies –
notably between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulatory agencies at the fed-
eral level – have clearly hampered implementation. Moreover, for-
eign assistance has come to dominate the implementation game of
Russia’s international nuclear safety commitments during the post-
Soviet period. Some of the most serious problems encountered in the
implementation can be ascribed to the interface between Russia and
the Western donor states, i.e. problems related to indemnity against
liability, access to nuclear sites, personnel immunity and tax exemp-
tions. We can conclude therefore that while there is at the moment
some progress in the implementation of Russia’s international
nuclear safety commitments, it is slow and fumbling.
As follows from Chapter 6, the productivity of Russian industry
decreased to such an extent during the 1990s that the country’s
LRTAP commitments were achieved without any evident effort. In
accordance with the 30 per cent reduction target of the first Sulphur
Protocol, SO2 emissions from European Russia had by 1993
decreased by more than 50 per cent from their 1980 level. Moreover,
Russia was already in compliance with the second Sulphur Protocol
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when it was signed in 1994 and SO2 emissions from the Kola Penin-
sula smelters have continued to fall since then.
Implementation activities
More interesting than the extent to which Russian environmental
obligations have been complied with or not concerns the steps Russ-
ian authorities have taken in order to induce such compliance by
target groups. A brief summary is given in the following of imple-
mentation activities taking place in fisheries management, nuclear
safety and air pollution control.
Fisheries management
The implementation of the international fisheries obligations of the
Soviet Union was the responsibility of the Soviet Ministry of Fish-
eries. In connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
establishment of the Russian Federation, the federal fisheries agency
had its status reduced to that of a state committee. During the
1990s, the State Committee for Fisheries repeatedly had to fight off
‘intrusions’ from other federal bodies of governance. These
attempts were only partly successful. On the one hand, the Com-
mittee succeeded in sustaining its status as an independent adminis-
trative body (except for the period 1997–98, when it was placed
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs). On the other
hand, it was compelled to relinquish responsibility for enforcement
at sea to the Federal Border Service and to accept the introduction
of a system of quota sales proposed by the Ministry of Economy.
The federal agencies are only partly involved in implementation
activities aimed directly at target groups; these are predominantly
carried out by federal agencies in the region in co-operation with
regional authorities. The most important federal agencies in the
region are the enforcement body Murmanrybvod, the remnants of
the former ‘industry complex’ of Sevryba and the newly established
(1998) Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Com-
mand of the Federal Border Service. While Sevryba has lost most of
the powers it enjoyed in Soviet times as the ‘extended arm’ of the
Ministry of Fisheries, it has not lost its role in the regulatory process
altogether. Until recently, its general director led the Technical-
Scientific Catch Council, which distributes quota shares among the
federal subjects of the northern fishery basin. Also, Sevryba has
retained some management tasks related to the practical regulation
of fishing activities.
More than anything, important decisions related to the manage-
ment of Northwest Russian fisheries seem to be made by a somewhat
diffuse corporate leadership of the area’s ‘fishery complex’, consist-
ing of representatives of regional authorities, the various federal
authorities located in the region, research institutes and target
groups.2 Such a constellation is visible in the bodies responsible for
quota allocation at the intra-regional and regional levels, for
instance the Technical-Scientific Catch Council and the regional fish-
ery councils. The main reason for the drop in target compliance in
Northwest Russian fisheries in recent years – apart from the change
in the fishers’ incentive structure – seems to be the negative conse-
quences of the transfer of responsibility for enforcement at sea from
Murmanrybvod to the Border Service. The latter so far has a poor
record of presence at sea; for several months on end, not a single
enforcement vessel was present in the Russian zone of the Barents
Sea. This, it is believed, allowed a massive subsequent catch of
undersized fish to take place. However, despite this flaw in enforce-
ment – admittedly a necessary link in the implementation chain –
there is nevertheless a system in place that takes care of the new and
specific obligations continuously emanating from various interna-
tional agreements and co-operative regimes, mainly the bilateral
Russian–Norwegian regime and NEAFC. In other words, there is a
‘capacity to govern’ in the Russian system for fisheries management
although reorganisations forced upon the existing system from the
outside have reduced this capacity.
Nuclear safety
In the nuclear safety sector, the Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom) is the organisational heavyweight, responsible for the
implementation of most of Russia’s international agreements in the
field. To some extent, Minatom delegates the implementation of
concrete projects to the so-called Interbranch Co-ordination Centre
Nuklid, which forms part of the ‘Minatom system’. In the military
environmental collaboration under AMEC, the Ministry of Defence
is the responsible partner on the Russian side. The Federal Inspec-
torate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) was estab-
lished in 1991 to control and license activities related to the
application of nuclear energy. This agency has also had an important
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role in the implementation of Russia’s international nuclear safety
obligations. There is a limited measure of horizontal integration
between the various federal agencies involved in the implementation
process. There is also a rather high degree of tension between the
‘hard’ agencies of Minatom and Nuklid on the one hand and
Gosatomnadzor on the other. The two former have gradually
expanded their sphere of influence at the expense of the latter.
Murmansk regional authorities have created a department for
nuclear safety within their structure, but have seen its role as mainly to
co-ordinate the various regional, national and, above all, international
attempts at ensuring nuclear safety in the oblast. It has also had a
certain ‘negative’ sway, halting projects planned by the federal author-
ities. The federal agencies located in the region are of less importance
in the nuclear safety area than in fisheries management. Implementa-
tion failure or delay has mainly been caused by bureaucratic contro-
versies at the federal level – primarily between Minatom/Nuklid and
Gosatomnadzor – or by inadequacies in inter-state agreements with
foreign donors. As was the case in the fisheries management, Russia
does have the ‘capacity to govern’ also in the sphere of nuclear safety,
but new patterns of joint implementation with other states have
created new challenges that have yet to be overcome.
Air pollution control
Soviet implementation of the country’s international obligations
related to air pollution control was ensured by an interdepartmental
commission charged with overseeing such implementation as well as
the incorporation of the requirements of the obligations in national
industrial production plans. The interdepartmental commission
was led by the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Envi-
ronmental Monitoring (Goskomgidromet) (presently the Federal
Service of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, or
Rosgidromet). A State Committee for Environmental Protection
was created in 1988 and elevated to ministerial status three years
later. The responsibility for co-ordinating Soviet implementation of
international air pollution control requirements was transferred
from Goskomgidromet to the new State Committee once it was
established. The old implementation system disintegrated through
this reform because the new governmental structure was not given
the political authority and financial muscle that the interdepart-
mental commission had previously enjoyed. The Ministry of
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Environmental Protection came under increasing pressure from
other federal authorities in the mid-1990s. In 1996, its status was
again reduced to that of a state committee and in 2000 it was dis-
banded altogether and its remnants incorporated into the Ministry
of Natural Resources.
Unlike the cases of fisheries management and nuclear safety, the
Murmansk regional administration has not established a department
for environmental protection within its structure. Rather, the
regional representation of the Department for Environmental Pro-
tection (under the Ministry of Natural Resources) functions as an
implementing agency not only for its federal head office in Moscow,
but also for the regional administration. The regional administration
determines environmental policies for the oblast by elaborating pro-
grammes, action plans and concrete regulations. Hence, although the
Murmansk regional administration has established departments for
fisheries management and nuclear safety, though not for environ-
mental affairs, it is more active in regulative measures in the latter
area than in the two former (where such measures are almost exclu-
sively set out by federal authorities). Relations with the federal agen-
cies in the region also differ in the three cases. In the fisheries
management, relations have at times been quite confrontational while
the most important decisions have continued to be made at the fed-
eral level. In the field of nuclear safety, the regional authorities have
aimed only at a co-ordinative role, preferring not to contest seriously
the authority of federal agencies. In the area of air pollution control
and environmental management more generally, there has indeed
been a certain devolution of powers to the regional level. However,
the regional administration has not found it necessary to establish
a department for environmental protection, but has continued its
traditionally close co-operation with the regional environmental
committee, which represents the federal authorities in the region.
As the Soviet system for implementation of the country’s interna-
tional environmental obligations (led by the interdepartmental com-
mission) disintegrated, as the federal environmental agency
gradually lost its authority, and as public authorities increasingly lost
control of industry enterprises, the enterprises themselves became
more important actors in the Russian implementation game. There is
little evidence that the managements of the Kola Peninsula smelters
have been overly concerned with implementation of air pollution
regimes. Hence, the case of Russia and the LRTAP regime is clearly
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one of ‘compliance without implementation’. The Russian commit-
ments ‘implemented themselves’, rendering ‘implementation activi-
ties’ on the part of public authorities, target groups and others
superfluous. The LRTAP regime contributed to certain behavioural
changes domestically in the Soviet Union, mainly in planning,
research and monitoring activities, but had little effect on actual
emissions. It is also an open question to what extent Russian author-
ities during the 1990s would have been either capable or willing to
actively contribute to the implementation of the country’s commit-
ments under the LRTAP regime had emissions not been reduced to
acceptable (according to the commitments) levels by exogenous fac-
tors. First, the federal environmental agency was seriously weakened
during the 1990s, culminating in its total dissolution and the incor-
poration of its remnants under the Ministry of Natural Resources –
a typical ‘user agency’ – in 2000. Second, the regional administration
of Murmansk Oblast – although having significantly increased its
political authority since Soviet times – would be expected to priori-
tise further industrial activity in the mono-industrial towns of the
oblast (contributing both employment and considerable revenues for
the regional budget) over environmental issues. Third, public
authorities’ chance to influence the workings of private enterprises
declined significantly during the 1990s. Finally – and partly related
to the latter circumstance – it is doubtful whether the authorities’
compliance mechanisms (here: fines) are compelling enough to
induce compliance among the nickel plants on the Kola Peninsula. In
sum, while Russia can show a high degree of formal compliance with
its LRTAP commitments in the 1990s, its record of implementation
efforts during the same period is correspondingly poor.
Table 7.1 gives an overview of the most important actors in the
Russian implementation of international commitments in fisheries
management, nuclear safety and air pollution control. The relative
strength of the agencies at the various levels is discussed in the
next section.
Lessons
In Chapter 1, we set out the book’s dual aim: to contribute to the
literature on Russian politics, in particular by providing specifics
on centre–region relations, and to make our findings relevant to the
literature on the implementation of international environmental
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Table 7.1 Most important actors in the Russian implementation of
international commitments in fisheries management, nuclear safety and air
pollution controla
Fisheries Nuclear Air pollution 
management safety control
a The table is not meant to be exhaustive. It includes those agencies and enterprises
that are given most attention in the book’s case studies.
Federal 
authorities
Regional
authorities
Federal agencies
in the region
Target groups
Minatom
Nuklid
Ministry of
Defence
Gosatomnadzor
Rosgidromet
Nuclear safety
department at
the Murmansk
regional
administration
Minatom
Gosatomnadzor
Rosgidromet
Northern Fleet
Murmansk
Shipping
Company
Kola Nuclear
Power Plant
State Committee
for Fisheries
Federal Border
Service
Fisheries
departments at
the regional
administrations
Murmanrybvod
Murmansk State
Inspection of
the Arctic
Regional
Command of
the Federal
Border Service
(Sevryba)
Individual fishing
companies
Department for
Environmental
Protection
(Ministry of
Natural
Resources)
Rosgidromet
Regional
administrations
(no specific
departments for
environmental
protection)
Department for
Environmental
Protection
(Ministry of
Natural
Resources)
(‘regional
environmental
committees’)
Rosgidromet
Pechenganickel
Severonickel
agreements in general, and of implementation in the Russian Feder-
ation in particular. What lessons of a more general nature can be
drawn from our case studies? In the following, we discuss this ques-
tion first with reference to the overarching political cleavages in
Russian politics outlined in Chapter 3, and then to other studies of
the implementation of international environmental agreements, as
summarised in Chapter 2.
Political cleavages in Russian politics
We concluded Chapter 3 with a set of questions related to the
general direction of Russian regional politics: has there been any
devolution of power from federal to regional authorities in fisheries
management, nuclear safety and air pollution control? Are regional
authorities and federal agencies in the region more concerned with
rivalries or with working with each other? What is the level of con-
flict between the regional administration and the regional duma?
Are the old ‘industry complexes’ still significant actors in Russian
politics? And the key question related to federal politics in Russia:
what is the level of conflict between the various federal agencies?
To address the latter question first, the level of conflict between
various federal agencies proved very high in all three case studies.
The ‘sector’ or protection-minded agencies of the State Committee
for Fisheries, Gosatomnadzor and the former State Committee for
Environmental Protection have all been involved in fierce battles
with other federal agencies – ‘power agencies’, such as the Federal
Border Service, and ‘user agencies’, such as Minatom and the Min-
istry of Natural Resources – and have seen their sphere of influence
reduced. Second, while federal authorities are formally in charge of
fisheries management, nuclear safety and air pollution control, there
are signs of varying degrees of power delegation in the three cases,
ranging from a very limited degree of delegation in nuclear safety
issues to quite a considerable delegation of authority in questions of
air pollution control. The case of fisheries management lies some-
where in between. Formal powers are limited, but the bulk of imple-
mentation activities are performed by regional authorities or federal
agencies in the region. Third, the two latter authority levels tend to
side with each other rather than engaging in rivalries. In the fisheries
management, there were evident signs of rivalry in the early and
mid-1990s, but the tendency in recent years has been towards co-
ordination of efforts. In nuclear safety issues, regional authorities
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have more or less explicitly taken upon themselves a co-ordinating
role, avoiding confrontations with federal authorities and federal
agencies in the region. In air pollution control, the ‘regional envi-
ronmental committee’ in practice functions as an implementing
agency both for its head office in Moscow and for the regional
administration. Fourth, there is little conflict between the regional
administration and the regional duma in questions of fisheries man-
agement, nuclear safety and air pollution control. The latter has
adopted regional laws on coastal fisheries, the radiation safety of the
population and a regional environmental fund, legal measures that
support rather than contest the positions taken by the regional
administration. Notably, they also avoid contesting the authority of
federal agencies, supporting the argument that Northwest Russian
federal subjects have generally sought an accommodating, rather
than a confrontational stance in relation to federal authorities.
Finally, the old notion of ‘industry complexes’ as important actors in
Russian politics is still relevant, but the form and role of these com-
plexes have changed since the Soviet era. The ‘fishery complex’ of
Northwestern Russia is still a highly relevant category, but it is no
longer represented by the Sevryba association. Rather, the individ-
ual shipowners have increased their political influence at the
expense of Sevryba. Likewise, the Kola Peninsula nickel smelters still
enjoy considerable political influence, not as parts of the old admin-
istrative chain, but of a large industrial conglomerate owned by one
of Russia’s most powerful oligarchs. Hence, in both fisheries and
pollution affairs the target groups still enjoy considerable political
influence, but public agencies have lost most of their previous
authority to govern them. In the nuclear field, the situation is more
reminiscent of Soviet days, with the Northern Fleet and the Kola
Nuclear Power Plant still state-owned. The political cleavages
related to fisheries management, nuclear safety, and air pollution
control are summed up in Table 7.2.
If we compare these findings with other studies of Russian politics,
our first conclusion supports the general impression of a lack of hor-
izontal integration and a high level of conflict within the Russian
bureaucracy. Also as expected, the delegation of power from the fed-
eral to the regional level is greater in air pollution control than in the
more sensitive area of nuclear safety. The extent of delegation is per-
haps a bit more unexpected in the case of fisheries management – at
least to the extent that we include federal agencies in the region in
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Table 7.2 Political cleavages related to fisheries management, nuclear
safety and air pollution controla
Fisheries Nuclear Air pollution 
management safety control
a The table is not intended to reflect measurement in any form. It is merely an
attempt at visualisation of some of the main conclusions of the study.
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authorities and
federal agencies
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siding or
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Siding
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Significant
political actors
the catchall phrase of a regional ‘fisheries complex’ (which there is
good reason to do regarding the fisheries). Bearing in mind that fed-
eral authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over natural resources in
the 200-mile economic zone (i.e. outside Russia’s territorial waters),
the influence of regional authorities in, for example, quota allocation
in the economic zone is indeed greater than one would anticipate.
Somewhat unexpected is also the apparent harmony between
regional authorities and federal agencies located in the region,
although this could be said to confirm the generally observed ten-
dency of the latter to ‘go native’, i.e. side with regional authorities
rather than their own leadership at the federal level. Furthermore,
the level of conflict between the regional administration and the
regional duma is also very low, which probably adds to the picture of
the latter as relatively impotent political bodies in post-Soviet Russia.
Implementing international environmental agreements
How have these political processes affected implementation? We
observed in Chapter 2 that an important lesson drawn from previ-
ous studies is that implementation failure is often unintentional, the
result of difficulties encountered during the implementation process
rather than a conscious choice by the state not to implement the
commitment in question. We also noted that this is expected to be
particularly true for post-Communist states, which, since the early
1990s, have seen a devolution of power, weakened fiscal strength
and control over target groups, a slow legislative process, a tendency
for sanctions to be ineffective and have only a short history of inde-
pendent enforcement agencies. In the following, we systematically
review our conclusions in relation to our initial hypotheses about
how the nature of the problem, the nature of the international com-
mitments, implementation in national legislation, implementation
activities performed by public authorities and others have affected
implementation in our cases.
Nature of the problem The problem areas within our three case
studies can, on the one hand, all be characterised as relatively
‘malign’ in an implementation perspective: the fishery, nuclear and
mining and metallurgical complexes are cornerstone activities in the
Northwest Russian economy. In the hard economic climate of post-
Soviet Russia, one would expect authorities to prioritise employ-
ment and tax revenues on the basis of continued resource extraction
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(as in the case of fisheries), risk behaviour (as in the nuclear com-
plex) and polluting activities (from the mining and metallurgical
combines) over environmental and natural resource protection. This
would clearly be assumed to reduce the potential for successful
implementation of international commitments that restrict indus-
trial activities or resource extraction. Further, public control over
target groups has declined since the major enterprises in at least the
fisheries and air polluting sectors have been privatised. On the other
hand, the chances for monitoring target activity range from ‘rela-
tively good’ in fisheries management to ‘very good’ in nuclear safety
and air pollution control. The targets of the two latter are mostly
stationary; and while fishing vessels, nuclear icebreakers and sub-
marines and surface vessels of the Northern Fleet admittedly move
over a considerable ocean area, they are at least easier to control
than a million cars. Moreover, the targets are themselves largely the
main ‘losers’ if implementation fails – at least in the long-term per-
spective. Adding to the relative ‘benignity’ of the problem is the
keen Western interest in solving the problems under scrutiny here.
Clearly, the role of fisheries, nuclear power and industry produc-
tion companies as cornerstone enterprises in the region has influ-
enced the propensity of public authorities to give priority to
environmental and natural resource protection concerns. In the fish-
eries sector, this has been most obvious in the Russian positions vis-
à-vis various international negotiations. For instance, the Joint
Russian–Norwegian Fisheries Commission from the late 1990s
established cod quotas far above the scientific recommendations of
ICES, mainly as a result of Russian pressure within the Commission.
However, there has been a determined effort to implement interna-
tional obligations once they are established.3 Likewise, while author-
ities would probably have been reluctant to accept or implement
international obligations that seriously impeded further industrial
activity in the mono-industrial towns of the Kola Peninsula, it is hard
to argue that this factor accounts for the problems found in the
implementation of Russia’s international nuclear safety and air pol-
lution control commitments in the northwestern region of the coun-
try. However, the loss of control over fishing and air polluting
companies as a result of the privatisation of these enterprises seems
to have hampered implementation, at least in the cases of fisheries
management and air pollution control. Finally, the relatively good
opportunities to monitor target group behaviour have improved the
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prospects of successful implementation, but cannot by themselves
serve as a main explanation for the achieved implementation. In
sum, factors related to the nature of the problems at hand can partly
account for implementation performance, but hardly constitute any
decisive element in this context.
Nature of the commitments The hypothesis on the varying influ-
ence of commitments on implementation performance is that agree-
ments that are binding upon the signatories, contain precise
obligations for the parties, and require a large degree of adjustment
in the behaviour of target groups are more difficult to implement
than accords that are non-binding, vague and demand only minor or
no efforts on the part of target groups. Of our case studies, air pol-
lution control is the one in which the nature of the commitments can
obviously explain much of the actual implementation efforts taking
place, or more correctly, not taking place. As a result of reduced
industrial activity, the commitments more or less fulfilled them-
selves. In nuclear safety, the situation is the opposite: the interna-
tional accords are so demanding upon the Russian party – requiring
restructuring of certain elements of the Northwest Russian nuclear
power complex to a so far unforeseen extent – that it can largely
explain much of the trouble encountered in the implementation
process. In both cases, the nature of the commitments proves an
important explanatory factor in accounting for implementation suc-
cess or failure. This is not the case in fisheries management. The
commitments following from the bilateral Russian–Norwegian
regime, reflecting the parties’ commitments in accordance with
regional and global agreements, are binding, precise and generally
require not insignificant changes on the part of target groups . But
even this does not account for implementation failure observable in
the Barents Sea fisheries.
Implementation in national legislation Is the implementation of
international commitments in national legislation (implementation
at the national normative level; see Chapter 2) a prerequisite for
their further successful de facto implementation (implementation at
the national level in actual practice)? The elaboration of a national,
and, to some extent, also regional legislation at the level of law has
been quite successful in the areas of nuclear safety and air pollution
control. Russia does not yet have a law on fisheries although the
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Federal Parliament has been working on such a law since the early
1990s. Hence, the incorporation of international commitments in
national legislation at the level of law does not seem to be a prereq-
uisite for successful implementation of Russia’s international fish-
eries agreements.4 There is little reason to assume that the situation
related to air pollution control would be much different had a law
on environmental protection not been adopted in the early 1990s,
i.e. that Russian authorities would have been able to pursue more or
less the same air pollution policy as today in the absence of this law.
It should also be observed that the existing law on air pollution is
from the Soviet era. In nuclear safety, the situation might be a bit dif-
ferent, although this is mere speculation. One might at least imagine
that public management of Russia’s vast nuclear complex – with the
conflicting public agencies involved – would have proven more dif-
ficult had not a legal framework at the level of law been in place.
Implementation by public authorities The lengthening of the pre-
vious chain of implementation has clearly been an obstacle to effec-
tive implementation in our case studies. Not only was Soviet
implementation of the country’s international commitments
ensured by the incorporation of these commitments into national
production plans; the Soviet Union also possessed administrative
systems in areas such as fisheries management, nuclear safety and air
pollution control that were indeed ‘capable of governing’. When we
claim the decreased implementation performance and target com-
pliance in Northwest Russian fisheries in recent years to be the result
of the disintegration of the previous enforcement system, this is
clearly an example of ‘unintentional’ implementation failure. Rather
than ‘Russia’ as a rational unitary actor deciding that ‘from this
moment on we will no longer adhere to our international fisheries
commitments and therefore dissolve the existing enforcement
system’, the reorganisation was partly the result of genuine suspicion
on the part of the presidential administration that the existing fish-
ery inspection was incapable of performing its tasks,5 and partly of
more common bureaucratic battles over budget shares (which
depend on areas of formal responsibility). The delays in the imple-
mentation of some of the international nuclear safety projects reflect
intra-agency conflict between Minatom and Gosatomnadzor rather
than an overarching Russian unwillingness to implement the pro-
jects. Likewise, some implementation processes in nuclear safety
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have reportedly been delayed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘dis-
playing political strength’ to compensate for its lack of financial gain
from international co-operation. We should also avoid the Western
tendency to perceive the Russian ‘hard’ agencies as necessarily ‘the
bad guys’ and the ‘soft’ ones as always ‘the good guys’. While there
is ample evidence of Minatom attempting to curb the independent
nuclear safety protection agency, it is possible at least to imagine that
Gosatomnadzor may ‘be more meticulous than necessary’ in its
licensing activities, thus hampering the implementation of Russia’s
international agreements, in order to legitimise its own existence as
an independent agency. Some would say that this is what happened
when the 40-tonne cask developed under AMEC was denied a
licence.6 The point is that the devolution of power to new agencies
– while being desirable either to ensure independent environmental
control or to increase the influence of regional authorities or stake-
holders – often involves the cost of lengthening the chain of imple-
mentation and hence reducing implementation effectiveness, at least
in the short run. It should be observed in this context that delega-
tion of power to the regional level has not hampered implementa-
tion. Quite the contrary, the co-ordinating role generally assumed by
regional authorities in our case studies has sooner furthered rather
than obstructed successful implementation.
In sum, implementation efforts by public authorities at both the
federal and regional level can generally explain the failure or success
of the individual cases of implementation. On the negative side,
most of the problems found in all our three case studies can be
accounted for by the high level of conflict between federal agencies.
On the positive side, much of the successful implementation activity
that is taking place can be ascribed to the existence of pretty well-
functioning systems for environmental and natural resource man-
agement (i.e. well-functioning as long as they are protected from
interference from other bodies of governance). Moreover, the inclu-
sion of regional authorities and federal agencies located in the
regions in some of the implementation processes seems to have had
a positive effect on implementation performance.
Implementation by others Participation by other actors than public
authorities in the implementation process is sometimes believed to
enhance chances of success. In particular, the participation of target
groups, research communities and NGOs is assumed to bestow
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legitimacy on the process and increase the knowledge base for imple-
mentation. We saw in the case studies that participation by such
other actors was generally limited to target groups here. In addition,
scientific institutes were also to some extent included in implemen-
tation activities, mainly in fisheries management. Where participa-
tion by target groups and researchers is observed, primarily in
fisheries management, but partly also in nuclear safety, it has con-
tributed positively to those aspects of the implementation process
that have proven effective. But, again, this has not been a decisive
element in explaining implementation performance.
An assessment of the explanatory power of the various factors we
have reviewed in relation to implementation performance is given in
Table 7.3. The nature of the problem seems to have had a moderate
effect in explaining implementation performance in all three case
studies. Most importantly, the fact that major target groups have
been privatised during the 1990s has quite seriously hampered imple-
mentation. The nature of the commitments proved an important
Table 7.3 Assessed explanatory power of various factors related to
implementationa
Fisheries Nuclear Air pollution 
management safety control
Nature of the problem (2) (2) (2)
Nature of the 
commitments (1) (3) (3)
Implementation in 
national legislation (1) (2)b (1)b
Implementation 
activities by public 
authorities (3) (3) (3)b
Implementation 
activities by others (2) (2) (1)
a 3: high importance; 2: some importance; 1: little importance.
b These assessments are made on the basis of contrafactual exercises: based on the
experiences of the fisheries management, it is assumed that the incorporation of
international commitments in air pollution control, and, to a degree, also nuclear
safety, is not a prerequisite for their successful de facto implementation.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the high level of conflict among federal agencies
would have hampered implementation of Russia’s international air pollution
requirements had they not implemented themselves through the reduction in
industry productivity.
explanatory element in the areas of nuclear safety and air pollution
control, but not in fisheries management. The air pollution control
commitments constituted no real challenge for the Soviet Union/
Russian Federation, while the nuclear safety accords require behav-
ioural changes so far-reaching that, it may be argued, complete com-
pliance should not be expected for some time yet. Based on the results
in the fisheries sector, implementation of international commitments
in national legislation at the level of law is no prerequisite for further
implementation activities. The performance of public authorities is
a major explanation to implementation success or failure, while
implementation activities of others, mainly target groups and partly
also scientific communities, play a certain role. In sum, the implemen-
tation performance in the case of fisheries management can be
explained mainly by both positive and negative elements in public
authorities’ implementation efforts, but partly also together with
research communities. In air pollution control, the nature of the com-
mitments, i.e. the lack or very limited need of behavioural changes is
the main explanation of implementation performance. Finally, the
picture is a bit more complex in the case of nuclear safety where all
the factors reviewed have had a moderate or considerable effect on
implementation performance.
Conclusions
The break-up of the Soviet Union and establishment of a new Russ-
ian state in the early 1990s was accompanied by a green wave of
environmental concern in the population and the reorganisation of
the state structure to incorporate independent agencies for environ-
mental protection and monitoring. The State Committee for Envi-
ronmental Protection, created in 1988, was elevated to the status of
a ministry in 1991. An independent control agency for nuclear
safety, Gosatomnadzor, was established the same year. A contrary
trend followed in the second half of the decade: the federal agency
for environmental protection lost its ministerial status in 1996 and
its status as an independent agency four years later. Gosatomnadzor
has so far maintained its independence, but has seen its powers and
areas of responsibility constrained by Minatom. Similarly, the State
Committee for Fisheries lost its independent status temporarily in
1997 and has since been under constant attack from other federal
agencies, notably the Federal Border Service and the Ministry of
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Economy. Ironically, some of the present tensions at the federal level
in Russia concerning the management of the environment and nat-
ural resources are the outcome of reorganisations encouraged by the
West, partly even spurred by binding agreements with Western coun-
tries. Had Russia not established an independent agency for nuclear
safety control, these tasks may very well have been performed suc-
cessfully by Minatom and the difficulties encountered in the imple-
mentation of CTR and AMEC would not have occurred. If
responsibility for fisheries enforcement at sea had not been trans-
ferred to the Federal Border Service – a reorganisation completely in
line with the ‘Western’ view that such control should be performed
by agencies with limited affiliation with their target groups (in many
countries performed by the Border Guard or the Navy), our Barents
Sea fisheries case study might very well have had excellent imple-
mentation performance and target compliance. While we do not
intend to imply that Gosatomnadzor should not have been estab-
lished – or that the transfer of enforcement powers to the Federal
Border Service was necessarily a mistake in a long-term perspective
– we would like to repeat that Russia in some areas of the manage-
ment of the environment and natural resources has a considerable
‘capacity to govern’ as part of its Soviet heritage. This is particularly
obvious in the management of fisheries.
Hence, while the general climate surrounding the protection of the
environment and natural resources is not very promising in Russia at
the turn of the millennium, our case studies have also revealed pat-
terns of governance at the regional, federal and international level
that do not bode too badly for the future. First, there is the estab-
lished ‘capacity to govern’, often overlooked by well-meaning West-
erners loaded with good intentions to ‘teach the Russians’. Lack of
knowledge of existing structures of governance in Russia might well
lead to the destruction of systems that already work quite well.
Second, the recent history of Northwestern Russia gives a certain
hope for the future as far as the role of regional authorities in the
implementation process is concerned. Apart from some initial con-
frontations in the fisheries management, regional authorities have in
all three cases taken upon themselves a co-ordinating role that has
clearly had a positive effect on implementation performance. Third,
most joint implementation initiatives have had a similarly positive
effect, not only on implementation problem-solving, but also in over-
coming structural difficulties created by the lack of integration and
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high level of conflict between various Russian agencies of gover-
nance. In both fisheries management and nuclear safety, bilateral co-
operation with Norway has ‘forced’ representatives of conflicting
Russian agencies – e.g., the Federal Border Service and the ‘tradi-
tional’ fisheries complex, and Minatom and Gosatomnadzor and the
State Committee/Department for Environmental Protection – to join
forces, which, in turn, has had positive effects on Russian implemen-
tation efforts. Based on these conclusions, our main recommendation
for the establishment of future environmental agreements with
Russia would be to take into consideration the specifics of Russian
political culture in drawing up implementation plans for the agree-
ments. Moreover, the potential that lies in joint implementation at
the micro level and in involving regional authorities in implementa-
tion processes should not be overlooked.
Notes
1 As we noted in Chapter 4, data on the functioning of the Soviet system
for fisheries managemet are poor, but it seems fair to assume that man-
agement agencies were relatively well endowed in terms of competence
and material resources to perform their tasks satisfactorily. Moreover,
target compliance was probably quite high since the command econ-
omy implied a high degree of control over the activities of the target
groups and the latter had low incentives to cheat.
2 Admittedly, important decisions have to be sanctioned by federal
authorities, but as mentioned in Chapter 4, the State Committee for
Fisheries does not interfere to any large extent in the day-to-day man-
agement of Northwest Russian fisheries.
3 Another question is whether the decisions of the Joint Russian–
Norwegian Fisheries Commission reflect the parties’ obligations as set
out in the global fisheries agreements.
4 This is not meant to imply that the implementation of Russia’s inter-
national fisheries agreements has been completely successful. How-
ever, to the extent that it has not been successful, it has not been a
result of lacking incorporation of international commitments in
national legislation. It could also be argued, as we do in Chapter 4,
that the absence of a law on fisheries does not mean that the manage-
ment of Russian fisheries takes place in a legal vacuum. Legal docu-
ments at lower judicial levels are constantly being issued. Further, the
definition of ‘incorporation in national legislation’ is not obvious (e.g.
how about a fax sent from Murmanrybvod to a fishing vessel?), so we
limit ourselves here to concluding that such incorporation at the level
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of law does not seem necessary to spur further implementation
efforts.
5 Added to this picture of a conscious effort to avoid implementation of
its international fisheries commitments in the Barents Sea comes the
fact that the original impetus behind the reorganisation process came
from events in the Far Eastern fishery basin, where rumours of corrupt
fishery inspectors were far more widespread than in the northern basin.
6 Another example, this time from the area of fisheries management, is
the following: towards the end of the 1990s, it became increasingly
difficult for Norwegian and Russian marine researchers to get permits
from Russian authorities to conduct joint scientific cruises in the Russ-
ian part of the Barents Sea. From the Norwegian side, it was generally
believed that some of the ‘bad guys’ (the ‘power agencies’) were behind
the refusals. While we will not contest that this had an effect, we were
once told by a Russian fisheries civil servant that the main obstacle was
in fact the State Committee for Environmental Protection – by Norwe-
gians generally perceived as a ‘good guy’ par excellence in Russian envi-
ronmental politics. According to our source, the Committee felt
obliged to increasingly spread its tentacles into new areas of gover-
nance in order to justify its existence.
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